In the early hours of 6 June 1944, the Eighth Air Force launched an air armada of 450 B-24 heavy bombers to pummel the enemy beach defenses at Omaha with 1270 tons of bombs. The defenses would be pulverized; the landings would be a walkover. Or at least that was what many people expected. ‍Yet a variety of hard realities would prevent even a fraction of that tonnage hitting the targets, even had the weather been clear.

In this installment, we examine several factors which limited the tactical effectiveness in employing strategic bombers in support of the amphibious landings at the Omaha Assault Area.

This analysis serves as a prelude to a following installment which attempts to clarify the mystifying circumstances of the last minute decision to delay the bomb releases, resulting in no bombs landing on target. ‍

After much concern and many complaints about his perceived lack of naval bombardment assets, Admiral Hall (commanding the Omaha Assault Force) developed a detailed bombardment plan to make the best of what he had to work with. Published and refined in the weeks before D-Day, the plan sought to employ his limited assets in the most effective ways possible, going so far as to incorporate strategic heavy bombers and a variety of smaller, less conventional fire support assets.

This instalment examines that plan with an eye to determining how well those assets were allocated and the adequacy of the coordination and guidance contained in that order. This analysis calls into question the effectiveness of much of the plan, which left a substantial percentage of guns idle or assigned to non-essential targets during the preparatory bombardment. The plan also included factors that limited the effectiveness of the fires on the primary bombardment tasks.

Follow me on a deep dive into some of the actual factors that resulted in the failure of the Omaha bombardment mission.

This installment follows the DD tanks of the 743^rd Tank Battalion, which were scheduled to land on the western half of Omaha Beach.  These tanks belonged to Company B (CPT Charles W. Ehmke) and Company C (CPT Ned S. Elder) and were embarked in eight LCTs under the command of Lt.(jg) Dean Rockwell, USNR. In contrast to the debacle on the eastern half of Omaha Beach, the popular story of the landing of the 743^rd’s tanks was one of complete success, due primarily to the excellent judgement and resolve of Lt.(jg) Rockwell - and maybe CPT Elder, too, depending on which story you read.

This installment digs into the facts behind that popular story, relying on Rockwell’s little known 1990 oral history which revealed a key element of the popular story was not entirely true. It also includes a never-before-published photo taken of a knocked out DD tank on Dog White beach sector.

In the early hours of the 5th of June 1944, the 64 Duplex Drive Sherman tanks of the 741st and 743rd Tank Battalions left Weymouth Bay aboard 16 Landing Craft, Tanks. It was a rough crossing, testing both men and the landing craft. But far worse trials awaited the tankers the next morning as they had to fight a deadly battle with the seas off Omaha Beach before they could even come to grips with the enemy. This installment focuses on the ordeal of the 741st Tank Battalion, which was slated for the eastern half of Omaha Beach. Specifically, it details how the errors in planning and coordination stacked the deck against these men, and examines the full story behind the decision that saw 27 of their 32 tanks sink in the waters off Omaha Beach.