The Duplex Drive Tanks of Omaha Beach (c) Embarkation Errors
British Duplex Drive Sherman Tanks with their screens inflated, embarked on a Landing Craft, Tank.
In the previous installment I detailed the vague and inadequate instructions contained in the various planning documents regarding the launching of the Duplex Drive (DD) tanks, as well as some of the after-the-fact claims participants made regarding verbal directives on the matter. Hidden in the planning process, however, was another layer of errors which would also influence events on D-Day. These errors resulted from the disconnects between certain preparations which had to be made early in the process, and the formal planning documents which were published later and contained details that partly nullified those preparations. Although seemingly minor in some respects, at least one of these disconnects would have unexpected impacts on D-Day.
Tardy Task Organization
Previously I touched on the manner in which the DD/LCTs were ‘task organized’ to meet the requirements of the plan. ‘Task organization’ is simply the manner in which units are grouped together to accomplish a mission, with elements added or removed as the nature of the mission dictates. In the American sectors there eventually would be three task organized DD/LCT divisions. Two of these divisions were slated for Omaha Beach, with Assault Groups O-1 (CTG 124.3) and O-2 (CTG 124.4) each having one division. The third division was slated for Utah Beach. Each division needed to carry two companies of DD tanks (32 tanks). With an LCT limited to carrying four DD tanks, this established a requirement for eight LCTs in each division. (The third and last tank company from each battalion was scheduled to land minutes later, but these tanks were equipped with deep wading kits and not DD kits. Therefore, they are omitted from this discussion, but will be the focus of a separate blog.)
The normal organizational structure of an LCT division, however, included only six craft. Hence the need to task-organize the LCT divisions by adding two LCTs to each division. The Navy based its task organization on an existing division of LCTs for each battalion. These divisions came from two groups within LCT Flotilla 12. That flotilla was commanded by LCDR Leide, who we met in the previous installment. Figure 1 illustrates the task organization for the entire DD/LCT effort. Divisions 69 and 70 constituted Group 35, which was commanded by Lt.(jg) Rockwell. Note that Rockwell’s two divisions were assigned to different beaches, and it isn’t clear why this was done. From a strictly span-of-control perspective, it would make more sense if they had both been allotted to Omaha Beach. There may have been good reasons for this allocation, but from a perspective more than eight decades later, it simply seems to be one of the odd little quirks in the planning process.
To the 18 LCTs from Divisions 69, 70 and 71, six more LCTs were allotted. One of these also came from Flotilla 12. The remaining five, however, came from three different flotillas, and no two of which were even from the same group. Mixing in individual craft in this manner did nothing to help unit cohesion, but circumstances often demand this kind of assignment. So, again, although there are a couple of points that appear odd from a perspective 80 years later, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the task organization as depicted. Under the pressures of NEPTUNE planning, this kind of task organization was not uncommon.
But there was a real problem hidden in Figure 1. In the division allotted to Assault Group O-1, either Rockwell or Leide had placed an ‘outsider’ in charge. Lt.(jg) J. E. Barry and his LCT-537 were normally assigned to Flotilla 19 but had been attached to the division allotted to Assault Group O-1 as one of the two additional craft. Again, this kind of cross-attachment is not unusual. What is unusual is the fact that Barry was placed in command of that division.
Figure 1. The final task organization for the DD/LCT units on D-Day. Barry was originally located in LCT-537 as indicated by the flag, but was switched to LCT-539 at the last minute. Note that various plans, orders and sources show different division, group and even flotilla numbers for these sets of craft. For simplicity of reference, I have selected the version as shown.
By placing Barry in command, they necessarily subordinated the normal commander of Division 71 to him, which could pose a host of problems. We have no idea why Rockwell or Leide made this decision. Was it because of a perceived technical or leadership shortcoming in the Division 71 leader? Or was it simply a rigorous adherence to the naval and military god of seniority?
Ideally, the training and standard operating procedures were virtually identical among the LCT flotillas in the European Theater, so a mixing of craft and commanders should not be too harmful. Ideally. The reality was somewhat different. By inserting an outsider into the chain of command between a division of LCTs from Flotilla 12 on one hand, and the leaders of Flotilla 12 on the other hand, they were simply asking for trouble. At best, the outsider Barry would serve as an imperfect filter between the vision and orders of Leide and the LCTs Leide had trained. It was nothing less than a self-inflicted weaking of the chain of command. Leide had organized Flotilla 12 over that past half year, placing his stamp on it, and Rockwell had done the same with his Group 35. It is only to be expected that both men would cast a critical eye on an outsider who was suddenly taking control of one of their babies: Flotilla 12’s Division 71.
This awkwardness could have at least been mitigated by Leide of Rockwell. They could have placed the leader of Divisions 71 (a Lt.(jg) Scrivner) in charge of the second section, leaving him the face-saving responsibility of leading four of his six LCTs. They did not do this. An ensign (ENS Donal K. MacKenzie) was placed in charge of the second section, and Scrivner was left to command only his own craft within Barry’s section of the division. This was one of the oddest decisions within the DD/LCT project and it raises many questions. But lacking information on why this decision was made, we are not in a position to judge whether it was wise or not. And whatever personal friction may have resulted within Division 71, it does not appear to have played a negative role in the events of D-Day, as LCT-603 (Scrivner’s) would end up as the tail-end-Charlie of Barry’s eight LCTs and therefore was not in a position to affect anything. On the other hand, using Scrivner in a more responsible role may have helped prevent the later errors. There is no way of knowing.
In theory, much of this should have been smoothed over in the weeks of training leading up to D-Day. Major Duncan (executive officer of the 743rd Tank Battalion, and commandant of the DD tank training school) noted that training began on 15 March 1944. But initially only four DD tanks were available, with the remaining tanks (more than a hundred) trickling in as they arrived by ship. How much training the LCTs had gotten in is an open question, especially given the distractions of late arrivals, overhauls and shipyard modifications experienced by the LCTs. By 1 April, two weeks after the planned start of the DD training school, only ten of the twenty-four LCTs were expected to have the ramp extension kits mounted (necessary for safely launching DD tanks), and by that same date, only a total of five DD tanks had been delivered to the three battalions undergoing training.[1] So, there is some question how complete and comprehensive the training was by the time it ended on 30 April. Nevertheless, figures Rockwell provided for training indicate that the average LCT had launched its load of four DD tanks 12 times,[2] although that number undoubtedly varied widely between individual craft. In fact, one craft (LCT-600) wouldn’t even be available to start training until by May 6.
More importantly, those figures speak only to the crew proficiency at launching the tanks. It serves as no indication of the tactical cohesion and proficiency of the individual divisions when operating as a team. One would hope that training had welded the disparate crews together, but that was likely only partly the case. It is important to note that the task organization depicted in Figure 1 was only locked-in during the last half of May, whereas the training at Torcross was largely completed by the end of April. In fact, with the assault group orders not being issued until the last week of May, it is questionable whether any of the DD tank training at Torcross was performed with the LCTs organized into their D-Day task organizations. Which raises the question whether Barry was able to exercise his role as division commander in any meaningful way at any time during training. Perhaps he did, but there are no records that indicate this.
Recall RADM Hall’s comment in his Operation NEPTUNE report regarding the state of training leading up to D-Day. Referring to Exercise FABIUS, the 3-6 May final D-Day rehearsal. He stated:
“Unfortunately, due to the late arrival of the landing craft in the Theater, plus the necessity of alterations and repairs to put those already present in the best possible condition for the assault, only between sixty and seventy percent of the landing craft which eventually took part in the assault under Force “O” took part in this exercise.”[3]
In summary, the DD/LCT force may have been eager and willing, but it was far from a well-honed naval force. The LCTs were fresh off the construction ways and were manned by crews equally raw and partly trained. By the time they arrived in theater, took possession of and reassembled their craft, and guided them through the local shipyard modifications and shakedown cruises, there was little time for division- or group-level maneuver training. And inserting an outsider into the middle of the chain of command at that late date could only pose a problem for one unlucky division.
Of course, there was little chance this one point alone could result in a debacle. But debacles invariably are the result of a cascading series of minor errors and flukes of fate.
An indication of the confusion over DD/LCT planning was contained in in the Western Naval Task Force (RADM Kirk) Operation Plan No. 2-44 (dated 21 April 1944). This document was published five weeks after the start of the DD tank school, and just 9 days before the school’s formal course ended. Most of the LCTs which would be used on D-Day had been at least partially trained by then.
The problem was, Kirk’s order allocated only one DD/LCT division to Omaha Beach, and that was Division 69. This was one of Rockwell’s two divisions, and it would be the one he personally led on D-Day. Slated for Utah Beach were Rockwell’s second division (Division 70) and Division 71 (which was supposed to be the core of Barry’s division at Omaha). The allocation therefore was just the opposite of the tactical requirement: Omaha had one division when it required two, and Utah had two when it required one. This undoubtedly was the reason behind Rockwell’s rather pointed comment in his 30 April report on training.
“3. I should like to make the following recommendations:
“(a) It is imperative that no one of the above listed LCTs be left out of the plans for DD tanks on D-Day. The assault should have the use of the maximum amount of personnel with the maximum training.”[4]
From this it appears Rockwell feared that as WNTF sorted out the LCT assignment matter, they would simply tell him to use another division already slated for Omaha—even if it had missed out in training—rather than switch divisions between the beaches. It was a well-founded fear, but fortunately it proved groundless. The LCTs that had been selected for the DD tank mission had been fitted with special ramp extensions, so the LCTs used in training had to be used on D-Day. And this in turn would require reallocation of LCTs. There were three changes issued to Kirk’s WNTF order that would affect the task organization. As of Change 1 (dated 4 May) the six craft of Division 17 that would constitute the core of Barry’s division were still listed under the Utah forces, with the remaining 18 LCTs listed correctly. That date coincided with Exercise FABIUS, the final rehearsal for Omaha Beach, and with Division 71 still allotted to Utah Beach, they must have missed that exercise. Nor did they participate in the Exercise TIGER, the final rehearsal for Utah Beach; Rockwell’s report indicates only 32 DD tanks were used in that exercise, which would have been Division 70, the one division the DD/LCTs actually intended for that beach. Again, was Barry ever afforded the opportunity to lead his composite division in any realistic training?
Speaking the Language
Change 2 to Kirk’s WNTF order was issued on 10 May, and while a page survives that states the task organization was revised, the pages with those changes did not. Fortunately Change 3 (published on 22 May) did survive and shows Division 71[5] was moved to Omaha Beach at least by that date. As the only surviving copies of the Utah Beach landing tables show they were revised on 10 May, those tables could not reflect these changes to Kirk’s latest task organization. This obscure fact has caused confusion for historians ever since.
This switch of LCT divisions was the best opportunity to solve Rockwell’s span-of-control challenge. The planners could have moved Rockwell’s Division 70 from Utah to Omaha, so that both of his divisions were on the same beach. Unfortunately, Division 70 had already been incorporated into the Utah Landings Tables and Diagrams as bringing in the DD tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion, and had already rehearsed that role in Exercise TIGER. Division 71, on the other hand, had been slotted to land artillery at Utah almost four hours after H-Hour, a task that took no special training or equipment. The planners probably thought it was best to take the division that wasn’t already planned to carry DD tanks at Utah and move them to the beach where their special skills were needed.
The irony is that if Barry could not be trusted to act on his own, as implied by Rockwell’s and Leide’s later reports, then Utah would have been the best place for his division, because both the Assault Force commander and the Landing Force commander at Utah would be personally involved in the launch or land decision, and the deputy Assault Group commander would maintain direct control over that division until it beached. In that environment, Barry would not have been given enough slack in his leash to get in trouble, as Rockwell and Leide suggested was the problem on D-Day. Again, a minor glitch in planning—corrected by means of a curious half-measure—would contribute to the D-Day fiasco.
Interestingly, the 22 May changes to Kirk’s task organization were correctly included in Hall’s order for Omaha (CTF 124 Operation Order No. BB-44) which was actually dated two days previously, on 20 May. Clearly there had been some good staff coordination between the two headquarters. Hall’s order also included some necessary and key details which would, unfortunately, be the source of further confusion in the DD/LCT saga. Annex D of his order was the Attack Landing Plan, and it included a series of LCT Assignment Tables. These tables specified the loads for each LCT, the craft’s designated landing beach sector and the craft’s relative landing position within the division. It even designated the order of movement within the division and where the leader’s LCT would be. These table are an excellent example of the detailed planning necessary for an assault landing to succeed.
The problem came because they were in part ignored.
An Error in Divisions
As D-Day approached, Rockwell and the DD tank company commanders were able to get a jump on the embarkation effort. Most of the assault shipping would sail to the embarkation ports where they would load the troops and equipment they would carry to the far shore. But on 25 March, just as the DD training was getting underway, MG Heubner (CG, 1st Infantry Division) provided an endorsement to a memo from COL MacLaughlin regarding that DD training.[6] Part of that endorsement was a recommendation that the DD tanks be loaded on the LCTs and moved to the concentration areas by water rather than road convoys. The LCTs were based at Dartmouth, which was close to the DD tank base at Torcross, so this recommendation made sense. Heubner only controlled the tanks of the 741st and 743rd Tank Battalions, but he recommended the same procedure be used for the tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion, which were also training at Torcross and which were slated for Utah Beach. And this recommendation was approved. After Exercise FABIUS, the last D-Day rehearsal, the DD tanks were provided time on a firing range to boresight and check fire their main guns. When that was completed, they were ready to embark on the LCTs when the alert order was issued.
The Landing Tables of the 4th Division (revised 10 May) did correctly reflect the DD tanks of Companies A and B, 70th Tank Battalion, embarking at Torcross, and the wading tanks of Company C with the tank dozers, embarking at Dartmouth.[7] For some reason, the Landing tables for the 1st Division did not reflect this change, and directed all the tanks of the 741st and 743rd Tank Battalions be embarked at Portland. That was all too typical of the many relatively small errors in such a large and complex operation. Nevertheless, all three battalions loaded their tracks as Heubner suggested: the DD tanks loaded at Torcross and the wading tanks and tank dozers loaded at Dartmouth.
On 25 June, the LCTs and DD tanks destined for Omaha Beach sailed for Portland.[8] The problem was, the embarkation at Torcross had gone wrong.
For some unknown reason, Rockwell’s LCT division for Omaha Assault Group O-2 saw the two companies of the 743rd Tank battalion loaded on the incorrect LCT sections. As loaded, Co. B would land on Dog White instead of Dog Green, with Co. C landing on Dog Green instead of Dog White. The 1st Infantry Division’s Landing Tables had been published on 15 May and the Final Ship Assignment Lists were published on 16 May. Both of these reflected the correct load assignments for each LCT. So why didn’t Rockwell and Leide follow those orders? It was most likely due to the fact that only 10 copies of those documents were included in the distribution to Hall’s headquarters, and the information in those would not be widely disseminated until Hall issued his own order. That order included LCT Assignment Tables[9] which also correctly specified the loading and LCTs for Companies A and B. It was published on 20 May, just five days before the LCTs and DD tanks sailed from Torcross to their departure ports. The distribution list for Hall’s order included one copy for every LCT, so in theory, Rockwell and Leide should have seen the LCT Assignment Tables before embarking the tanks. But that theory had a flaw. Hall’s order was over 250 pages long and included vast segments that were completely irrelevant to the skipper of an LCT. The communications annex alone was 100 pages long, and only a few paragraphs of it pertained to a craft commander. The poor ensigns and lieutenants (junior grade)—who had absolutely no training or experience to prepare them for this aspect of a major operation—were swamped with irrelevant masses of information and had to sift through the chaff to find a grain or two of wheat. Hall himself later acknowledged this was an error.
“The Assault Force Commander’s order was distributed to all unit, craft and ship commanders, down to and including L.C.T.s. In light of the experience gained, it is doubted whether such a wide distribution was either necessary or advisable. In large part, the commanding officers of the smaller craft such as L.C.T.s and the units such as L.C.M and L.C.P.(L) Flotillas had neither the time nor the opportunity to digest the entire order.”[10]
Hall was undoubtedly correct in this. He went on to recommend that in the future it be left to the assault group commanders (O-1, O-2, etc.) to disseminate only the necessary information in their orders, and not to burden junior officers with the entire amphibious force order. This was a lesson Hall must have learned in his North African and Mediterranean operations, and it is curious he committed such an error for NEPTUNE.
Had Rockwell and/or Leide received copies of those Assignment Tables—buried in the mass of Hall’s order—and missed them, or perhaps misread them? Or had Assault Group O-2 temporarily withheld distribution of Hall’s order until CAPT Bailey could issue it in conjunction with his own order (published 27 May, two days after the DD/LCTs sailed for Portland), which would have meant Rockwell and Leide had to act on faulty, unofficial information for embarkation? Either explanation seems plausible, and there is no indication which might be the case.
The faulty embarkation was just one more glitch in a hurried, last-minute project, which was itself just a small part of an equally hurried major planning effort. But at least the error could be fixed. The four LCTs in each section were interchanged in the landing assignments tables and in the order of movement, thus getting the embarked tanks to the correct beaches. This was effected by Change 1 to Hall’s operations order (dated 30 May).
The incident was significant enough that RADM Hall mentioned it in his NEPTUNE report, while at the same time minimizing its impact.
“A few mistakes were made, but these were detected in ample time to correct them; in one instance two companies of DD tanks were loaded on the wrong L.C.T.s, necessitating a change in the L.C.T. Assignment Table of the Operation Order.”[11]
Although indicative of the confusion that continued as D-Day loomed, this change likely had minimal impact. True, eight LCT OiCs needed to study different beach panoramas so they could identify by sight their intended landing sites, and it would change their convoy and approach formations, but as we’ll see, it seems not to have affected the events of D-Day.
Nevertheless, the last reason a lieutenant (junior grade) or lieutenant commander would want to come to their rear admiral’s attention was because they made an error which only he could fix. Hall was not fond of the DD tank concept to begin with, and the two naval leaders of that effort had just made a rather significant error that needed Hall’s intervention to fix, and this just five days before the planned sortie date. This episode must have made an unfavorable impression on Hall, and it is fair to wonder how this may have influenced the defensive tone in their post-D-Day reports as Rockwell and Leide tried to explain the D-Day debacle.
Beyond this, the embarkation confusion was perhaps a clue that not all was well within the DD/LCT project. Given the key role of this first wave and Hall’s general misgivings about the DD program, an astute commander might have tasked his chief of staff or a plans officer to take a closer look at its status. But given the sheer scope of Hall’s command and the last-minute character of much of the preparations, that sort of keen observation might be too much to expect.
Or would it? An insight into the adequacy of Hall’s planning can be gained from Admiral Ramsay, the Allied Naval Commander in Chief. He visited Hall on 10 March, shortly before Exercise FOX—even before the creation of Moon’s Force Utah—and was not impressed.
“He has not formed his Force O in groups as are Forces J & S & and he himself has been doing all the planning which should have been done by his group comdrs. I asked him why this was & he hedged a bit but gave the excuse that he had not the commanders & staff necessary. The answer of course is that he should have insisted on getting them.”[12]
Ramsay’s observation was made a bit more than two months before Hall published his operations order, so we would like to hope that in that period much had been done to rectify the faults in Hall’s staff organization and planning. Yet there are indications Hall never completely overcame this slow start. Turning again to Hall’s report on Operation NEPTUNE, it is clear his priority was to keep his staff as small as possible due to limited space on the flagship and that inevitably must have impacted the quality of his planning as well as supervision of preparations.[13] In that light, Hall’s lack of awareness concerning the confused planning for the DD/LCT project might not be excusable after all.
Formation Error
The next planning error would have more serious implications. It’s also the more complex issue to describe, involving sailing formations and the approach to the beach. As a result. I’ll go into some detail on the mechanics of the problem.
The standard method for landing craft when approaching a beach employed a column formation, with the section’s leader in the first ship. Normally the senior Army officer would be in the same craft as the Navy section leader to ensure unity of effort. As the column neared the beach, the formation would change to bring all craft into a shallow Vee formation with the lead craft at the point of the wedge. This was done by each succeeding craft veering to left or right, based on their order in the column; even numbers would veer to the left, odd to the right. This method ensured that the leader remained in the center of the formation, making it easier for the other craft to guide on the leader for the final run into the beach. It also had the advantage of landing the senior Army leader more or less in the center of his unit, easing his command and control tasks when he landed. The shallow Vee formation ensured the craft would touch down at different moments, hopefully avoiding all the craft being hit by a single artillery salvo. If the unit was a division of craft consisting of two sections, the process would be much the same, with the second section deploying to the left of the first section.
Figure 2. An extract from Assault Group O-1's Approach Schedule showing the landing formation of the first LCVPs on Easy Red Beach Sector.
Figure 2 illustrates this. It is a diagram from the Approach Schedule of the Assault Group O-1 (CTG 124.3) operations order showing the final formation of a wave consisting of a division of LCVPs.[14] The A and B sections have each moved from a column formation into shallow Vee formations in the vicinity of the line of departure. Each LCVP is labelled with two designations. The bottom number shows the landing table serial number and the relative position of each craft as it hits the beach, starting with the lowest number on the right with higher numbers to the left. The top designation determines the crafts’ position in column movement before assuming the shallow Vee. The A or B designated which section, and the last two letters designate the beach sector, in this case Easy Red. The center numbers, 31-36, indicate the order within the section’s column. Note in each Vee the leader’s craft designation ends in 1 (i.e., 31 in this case), The designations ending in odd numbers (33 and 35) are echeloned to the right, and the designations ending in even numbers (32, 34 and 36) are echeloned to the left. By convention, the division leader is at the head of the righthand Vee, as indicated by the small flag symbol. So the disposition of craft in this extract shows that initial plans called for the conventional approach formation of a column deploying into its final landing formation.
Figure 3. This detail from the Assault Group O-1 Landing Diagram depicts the intended positions of Barry's LCTs when they were to launch their tanks. (Note: The boxes labelled with 'S's above the diamonds are small craft which were to lead each group of four DD tanks to the beach and provide last moment suppressive fires.)
Early planning for the DD/LCTs within Assault Group O-1 anticipated this same conventional scheme of maneuver for the DD/LCTs, as demonstrated by Figure 3, which is a detail from the Landing Diagram (Annex E) of that assault group’s operation order.[15] It depicts the DD tanks (the diamond shapes) as they were intended to land on the indicated beaches. Below each group of four diamonds are two LCT numbers. The first number indicates the craft serial number, as used in the landing tables. They were numbered sequentially, lowest to the right (55) and highest to the left (62). The second LCT number (highlighted in red) is the actual hull number of the LCT carrying those four tanks. Note that Barry’s division of eight LCTs has been broken into two four-craft sections. The only difference between this and Figure 2 is that Barry’s two sections would launch with a gap of several hundred yards between them. Barry’s own craft (LCT-537, second from the right in the line abreast formation) is exactly where the division leader should be positioned and this distribution of landing craft indicates that at the time this annex was developed, a normal approach formation was anticipated. And it further proves that some coordination had been made between the CTG 124.3 staff and Rockwell, as the staff knew which craft (LCT-537) would be the division leader’s, and correctly placed it in the formation.
Figure 4. The standard LCT approach formation deploying into line abreast, as Lt.(jg) Barry's division would have used on D-Day.
Figure 4 is a depiction of the standard sailing dispositions through the boat lanes for Barry’s division to launch their DD tanks as required. This placed both the Army and Navy leaders in the same two craft. It also placed the Navy leaders at the head of their division (Barry) and section (MacKenzie), as well as placing them as close to the center of their formation when launching. It was an excellent scheme of maneuver for the purposes of command and control. [Note: As the LCTs were not supposed to actually land, there was no need to remain in the shallow Vee, and they would simply assume a line abreast formation for launching.]
As excellent as that may have been, it was about to be thrown overboard. When the two assault groups finally published their operations orders, they did so after Rockwell had sailed with his already-embarked DD tanks on 25 May. Assault Group O-1’s order wasn’t published until 29 May and O-2’s order on 25 May, and they contained a change to the approach plan. Rather than leaving the Transport Area and sailing down the boat lanes to deploy as shown in Figure 4, the orders instead directed Barry’s and Rockwell’s division to proceed down a swept channel at the west boundary of each of their respective boat lanes. In Barry’s case he was to follow the channel from Point BA to Point BB. (See Figure 5) The LCT division would remain in column until they reached the 6000 yard line, then turn left in column and proceed until the LCTs were opposite the intended beach sectors, turn to the starboard (right into line abreast) and prepare to launch their tanks. That was a significant change.
Figure 5. The Omaha Assault Area Diagram showing the anticipated approach to the beach (blue) and the final approach route (red) for Barry’s division as directed by the Assault Groups’ orders.
What was the reason for adopting this changed routing? It isn’t clear. In the Assault Group O-1 order, all landing craft were instructed to ‘be prepared’ to follow channel BA-BG, but otherwise plan on moving directly down the boat lanes. Only the DD tanks and DUKWs were specifically ordered to use channel BA-BG. The boat lanes were supposed to have been swept clear by H-3 hours, so it appears offshore mines were not the concern. The only other consideration that seems to make sense would be the inexperience of the DD/LCT crews and leadership. Elsewhere I have addressed how new and untrained these LCTs and crews were.
Nor was their leadership much better. Rockwell, whose only previous experience was in an LCT training command, had been appointed commander of Group 35, Flotilla 12, in late November 1943, which was just 15 months after receiving a commission. That flotilla was just forming, with its LCTs still coming off the builders’ ways. At this point his task was to get the new craft shipped overseas. He reached the UK in mid-February himself, not yet having any experience as an LCT group commander. Three weeks later he was sent to Dartmouth to lead the LCT component of the DD tank effort. Rockwell did have the advantage of being in the Navy for almost two years at that point (he was commissioned from the ranks), but his time with LCTs was almost exclusively in Chesapeake Bay, and he had no training to prepare himself for the command of the 12 LCTs in his group. And once he did link up with his LCTs, he was quickly sent off on the detached training mission with the DD tanks, heading a composite LCT unit, fully half of which were not from his organic group. He didn’t even have a chance to learn group leadership and command skills at the feet of a flotilla commander.
To put it mildly, Hall would be entrusting the critical first wave of 64 tanks to very inexperienced craft, crews and leaders. And this is a likely explanation for the revised movement formation. Given the very green crews, the follow-the-leader formation for the approach to the launching positions would place the least demands on the raw crews.
But there was a complication. If the LCTs retained their planned column formation, then they would arrive offshore in a completely mixed up order, as depicted in Figure 6. Not only would the two tank companies be landing on the wrong beach sectors, but the positions within the companies would be completely changed. That was clearly unacceptable.
Figure 6. Diagram showing the effect of the new approach formation as compared to the specified launching positions.
Something had to change, and the easiest solution seemed to be to change the order of LCTs within the sailing formation. Neither of the assault groups’ operation orders specified the LCT formations during the Channel crossing or how they arrived in the Transport Area, so altering these formations would not require another embarrassing change to an already published order. In the revised formation, the LCT scheduled for the easternmost launching position would lead, followed by the remaining LCTs in the order of their launching positions. (Figure 7) This solved the problem; now the LCTs would arrive in the correct positions, with their embarked tanks also correctly positioned.
Figure 7. Diagram showing the revised sailing formation bringing the LCTs into the correct positions.
But one problem remained with this formation. Instead of leading his division, Barry would be relegated to seventh position in a column of eight. This was clearly not the position for the division leader. Rockwell’s solution to this new problem was to order an exchange of OiCs. He directed Barry to take over LCT 549, which was the new lead craft, and directed its OiC, Ens McKee, to take over Barry’s LCT 537. Apparently, Rockwell was slow in realizing this problem, or at least slow in devising a solution, as Barry didn’t not board LCT-549 until the day of the final sortie, 5 June. Had the aborted 4 June sortie not been turned back by weather, the planned 5 June landings would have been conducted with Barry at the rear of his own formation. This last-second act of expediency would have serious consequences. In a stroke, Rockwell had broken apart the links between the Army and Navy leaders in that division. (Figure 8) Neither of the Army company commanders was collocated with his Navy counterpart. Given that the various orders had imposed strict radio silence, and given that the order for Assault Group O-1 (under whom Barry operated) specified that the launch or land decision was supposed to be made jointly by the senior Army and Navy officers, then Barry would be facing serious obstacles.
Figure 8. Diagram depicting the positions of key Navy and Army leaders resulting from the formation and LCT OiC changes.
Although the above discussion focuses on the effects within Barry’s division, similar formation changes were required within Rockwell’s division. Rockwell, however, had one advantage for his division. As the commander of Group 35, he was not the OiC of any individual craft. He could position himself on any of his LCTs without displacing its OiC. So, when he shifted his flag to LCT-535 (easternmost LCT and therefore the new division lead craft), it caused minimal impact within his division’s chain of command. Nevertheless, it did physically separate him from CPT Elder, the man with whom he was supposed to consult. So, the “unanimity of effort” Leide and Rockwell would later emphasize, was in fact disrupted by their own hands (though in response to external changes) before the operation began.
The embarkation for the Omaha DD/LCTs ended up being something of a mini-debacle which foreshadowed the D-Day events. Both divisions encountered problems resulting from poor coordination. One problem was fixed by the Task Force commander’s intervention. The second was addressed through a series of expedient decisions with a far less satisfactory result. Where does the fault for all of this lie? There is no definite smoking gun, and it may be that Rockwell’s DD/LCT project was simply the unlucky victim of too hurried planning, conducted by too many layered commands, with too little adequate coordination. We have seen indications of some direct coordination between either Rockwell or Leide and the two assault groups (notably the placement of command LCTs in the landing diagrams). But something went wrong in that process. The change in approach formations was common to both assault groups (but not as a result of Hall’s order), and it is difficult to believe Leide would not have gotten wind of it before embarkation at Torcross. Rockwell probably can be excused for this failure simply because he was physically separated more so than Leide. Were Rockwell and Leide to blame for the confusion and chaos? Were they instead victims of Hall’s chaotic planning effort, one which apparently had not adequately improved since Ramsay’s observations in March? Or was it a mixture of both?
Where Rockwell and Leide undisputably do come in for criticism, however, is how they covered up these failings after the D-Day debacle. Neither officer mentioned either of the embarkation problems despite the fact that one of these problems would directly lead to the lack of coordinated command in Barry’s division on 6 June. It was the exact kind of mitigating factor that their duty required them to report. Their failure to make any mention of those details would appear to indicate they were covering up relevant facts that could call their own leadership into question.
Rockwell was later to comment that in Barry, he had chosen the wrong man. In reality, it seems Barry was in large part set up for failure by Rockwell’s orders and inadequate planning. Rockwell in essence pled guilty to the lesser offense of selecting a poor subordinate—thereby making Barry the scapegoat—in order to deflect charges involving his own role in the events.
In the next installment, we’ll take a deep dive into the actual events of D-Day.
Acknowledgements.
While researching this Omaha Beach Series, I have come in contact with several excellent researchers, and as good researchers do, we shared our finds. In the case of this DD Tank series, I owe a tremendous debt to Patrick Ungashick whom I stumbled upon while we were both delving into the subject. Patrick had managed to dig up a trove of Lt. Dean Rockwell’s personal papers which Rockwell had provided to Steven Ambrose. Any serious study of the DD tanks question must include these Rockwell papers, and I would have been lost without them. My sincere gratitude to him. Patrick has a book coming out this June which uses WWII case studies as a teaching vehicle for management decision making. One of those case studies focuses on, of course, the DD tanks at Omaha Beach. Patrick and I take somewhat different approaches to our analyses, and our conclusions are somewhat different, but I wholeheartedly recommend his upcoming book: A Day for Leadership; Business Insights for Today’s Executives and Teams from the D-Day Battle, or one of his other fine books. Thanks, Patrick!
[1] Memorandum from Commander, 3rd Armored Group, to Commander, 1st Infantry Division, subj: DD Tank Training, dtd 25 March 1944. [RG407 Entry 427D - Neptune - DD Tank Training - Barges - File 659] Armored groups, such as the 3rd, provided administrative and some logistical support for the independent tank battalions, but did control their tactical operations. These battalions were normally attached to an infantry division for combat operations.
[2] Memorandum from DD LCT Unit Commander [LT.(jg) Rockwell] to Commander, ELEVENTH Amphibious Force [RADM Hall], subj: DD LCT Operations, Evaluation of Results of, dtd 30 April. [RG407 Entry 427D - Neptune - DD Tank Training - Barges - File 659] MAJ Duncan’s report of the same date included similar data.
[3] Report by Commander Assault Force “O”, included in The Report by The Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force on Operation “NEPTUNE”. (Part V.—Comments and Recommendations; 4. Preparation and Training; (A) Comments, pg 622).
[4] Opcit, Rockwell.
[5] LCTs 598-603; the additional two LCTs were already slotted for Omaha Beach.
[6] See footnote 1.
[7] The wading tanks of Company C, 70th Tank Battalion and the dozer tanks would land in a separate wave, directly on the beach, in support of the engineer beach gap clearance mission. The organization at Omaha was different in that the DD tanks were in Companies B and C, and the wading tanks were in Company A of each battalion.
[8] Force O Commander in his NEPTUNE Report, pg. 5.
[9] Annex D, pg. 17 of CTF 124 Operation Order No. BB-44.
[10] Report by Commander Assault Force “O”, included in The Report by The Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force on Operation “NEPTUNE”. (Part V.—Comments and Recommendations; 2. Plans, Planning and orders; (A) Comments, pg 618).
[11] Report by Commander Assault Force “O”, included in The Report by The Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force on Operation “NEPTUNE”. (Part V.—Comments and Recommendations; 13. Combat Loading; (A) Comments, pg 633). The handwritten changes to the LCT Assignment Tables are visible in the NARA copies of this order.
[12] Ramsay, Bertram, (1994), The Year of D-Day, The 1944 Diary of Sir Bertram Ramsay, The University of Hull Press, pg. 41.
[13] Opcit. Part V.—Comments and Recommendations; 3. Staff Organization; (A) Comments, pp 618-619.
[14] Commander, Transport Division 1, Operation Order 3-44, dtd 29 May 1944, pg. C-8 of Appendix Three to Annex C (Approach Schedule). Note that COMTRANS DIV 1 was designated the commander of Assault Group O-1 under Hall’s order, and as such carried the designation CTG 124.3 under the Force O task force organization.
[15] Ibid, Annex E.