In the spring of 1943, the US and UK established a planning group under the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) with the charter to begin planning for the long awaited invasion of the Continent. Yet from the very beginning, this planning effort was seriously hampered by unrealistic allocations of assault divisions, shipping and craft. These mistakes were finally addressed, but the delay left the Allies scrambling to remedy the flaws in their planning, and the steps taken to correct those flaws were too often inadequate and directly impacted the Normandy landings. This post reviews the initial constraints and decisions that placed OVERLORD planning in a catch-up mode until the very eve of the landings.

Much of the current military histories has been written by authors with no military experience. While many excellent works have been produced by such authors, the lack of military experience imposes strict limits on the depth, and in some cases the understanding of the details that lie beneath the events. This series examines several key points of the Omaha Beach landings, focusing on the root causes that normally are skipped over in popular histories. Written from the perspective of a career Army officer, it delves into details seldom before discussed or analyzed.