Omaha Bombardment. Part III: The Execution

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“A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week.” LTG G. S Patton

‍The problem at Omaha was that a middling bombardment plan was executed in a halfhearted manner.  It was not a combination for success.  Before proving that assertion, I think it is important to provide context.  Remember that later on 6 June, most of the bombardment ships heroically came to the aid of the troops struggling to secure the beachhead.  The close-in fire of these ships broke the deadlock on the beach.  These were good ships manned by good men, trying their best under difficult circumstances.  And their efforts helped ensure victory at Omaha.  But . . .‍ ‍

. . . part of the reason those troops were in such dire straits was that those same ships failed to adequately perform their pre-H-Hour bombardment missions.  Somewhere along the line, they failed to grasp the essentials of the bombardment phase of their D-Day missions.  Whether this was a lack of training, lack of leadership, a poor plan or lack of focus on the key details of their mission remains to be seen.  Regardless, their failure, combined with an inadequate plan, contributed to the agony of Omaha Beach

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The Bombardment Group – Unwarranted Restraint

‍The heart of the bombardment plan was the Bombardment Group (CTG-124.9) consisting of vessels ranging from battleships down to escort destroyers.  They would not provide the bulk of the planned projectiles, but they had the guns with the best rates of fire and the best accuracy.  If anyone was going to get the job done it would be these ships.  For that reason, we’ll review their performance first. A detailed summary of each bombardment ship’s fire missions will be posted as an addendum to this installment, but for now it will suffice to recap the results.

‍All told, the bombardment planned for sixteen of these ships to fire 5,697 projectiles—ranging from 14-inch down to 4-inch in diameter—between 0550 and 0630 hours (H-Hour).  (Figure 1)  Unfortunately, the ammunition expenditure figures are not available for four of the ships (the two Free French light cruisers and two of the Royal Navy Hunt class escort destroyers).[1]  Together those four were supposed to have fired 1250 shells, but we have no data on what they did fire.  The ships for which we do have complete data, were supposed to have fired 4447 rounds but only actually fired 2812 (63% average expenditure).  ‍ ‍

But that data includes all missions, not just the beach neutralization mission.  If we analyze solely for beach neutralization, then we find there were 3910 rounds scheduled, but since we lack data for one of the ships, we can only account for 1969 rounds fired, with 250 from  Leygues unaccounted for.  The best case is that Leygues fired all 250 of its allotted rounds (250+1969= 2219) which would mean the beach neutralization ships fired only 57% of their allotted ammunition.  Since the average expenditure rate of the beach neutralization ships for which we do have data is about 50%, the most likely case is that Leygues fired a similar percentage, which would bring the average ammunition expenditure to 54%.  ‍ ‍

Figure 1. This table depicts the ammunition allocations and expenditures for the ships of the Bombardment Group for the H-40 to H-Hour bombardment. The right two columns include data for only those ships with beach neutralization fire missions.

That is significant.  Forty-three to 46% of the projectiles slated for beach neutralization remained in the magazines at H-Hour (with 46% being the most likely figure).  The beach neutralization mission was a failure on this basis alone.  And that number may be even higher. McCook was assigned a single target at the D-1 exit, but reported firing on three separate targets without giving locations on the two extras; they may or may not have involved beach neutralization targets, which would subtract the rounds fired on them from the above calculations. Worse, the lowest expenditure rate by caliber was for the most powerful guns:  18% for the 12-inch guns of the Arkansas.[2]‍ ‍

As bad as these general statistics are, their significance can only be appreciated by considering how this played out at key invasion objectives.   At first glance, the planned shelling of the defenses at the D-3 draw seemed to have every chance of success.  Those defenses were supposed to be pummeled by 385 12-inch shells from the Arkansas, and 400 6-inch shells from the Glasgow.  Firing from opposite fire support areas, the complementary gun-target lines could threaten the embrasures of gun emplacements on both sides of the draw.  And while the 12-inch guns were not valued as highly for beach neutralization due to their rate of fire, this would have been an excellent opportunity to see how effective large caliber projectiles could be.  But these ships made only a token effort.  Arkansas fired only 70 rounds and Glasgow fired only 219; a 37% expenditure rate and a shortfall of 496 shells.  Perhaps it is no coincidence that by nightfall, enemy resistance in the D-3 exit still prevented its opening.  ‍ ‍

It was a similar story farther east on the beach.  Five ships were supposed to fire on the three resistance nests defending the E-3/F1 exits (WNs -60, -61 and -62).  Arkansas was supposed to deliver 250 rounds from its secondary battery there, but had diverted that fire against a position in the vicinity of Port-en-Bessin.  Four destroyers (Emmons, Baldwin, Harding and Doyle) were supposed to add 1200 more rounds to the targets for a total of 1450 5-inch projectiles.  All told, they actually fired only 675 rounds—again, just 45% of the volume planned).  In addition to defending those two draws, the resistance nests contained one 88mm anti-tank gun, four 75mm field artillery guns and one 50mm gun sited to enfilade the eastern half of the landing beaches.  Three of those guns were in positions without overhead cover and should have been vulnerable to naval gunfire, had it been properly applied (suitable gun-target lines and fuze/projectile combinations).  But not one of these ships was in a position such that its trajectories could threaten the embrasures of those guns, and no time fuze was employed to neutralize the open-top positions.[3]  These errors, combined with the failure to fire the full schedule of projectiles, must have contributed to the subsequent bloodshed on Fox Green and the late opening of the E-3 exit.‍ ‍

By way of comparison, the only ship firing on the beach defenses that is known to have actually expended its full allotment of bombardment shells was the Carmick, which sent all 250 of its allotted rounds into WN70.  At the risk of making too fine a point of the matter, this position was adjacent to the site of the penetration of the bluffs by the 116th RCT and 5th Rangers, and it is tempting to conclude the full bombardment here made a significant contribution to the success in that area.  ‍ ‍

All in all, the beach neutralization task had little chance of success with such a half-hearted expenditure of ammunition.‍

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Positioning

‍The ships of the Bombardment Group filtered into the Omaha Transport Area as the convoys they escorted arrived.  Designated ships moved part way down the swept lanes to support the minesweepers with counterbattery fire, if required, while the remainder held back a while longer.  As the clock ticked toward 0550 hours (H-40) they moved forward towards their fire support positions. 

‍Despite instructions to anchor, the Texas decided to use her engines to maintain position, fearing that as the tide reversed, the ship would swing about its anchor and complicate firing solutions.  The Glasgow followed suit. ‍ ‍

In the eastern fire support area, the Arkansas anchored at 0430 hours, presumably followed by the Montcalm and Georges Leygues  (I haven’t been able to locate action reports for those ships).  As the destroyers for that group were moving to their assigned firing positions, the German coastal artillery finally opened up at 0530 hours  Fortunately these were the lighter caliber guns positioned in and around Port-en-Bessin (estimated to be 75mm).  Arkansas initially replied with its 5-inch and 3-inch batteries against what it identified as target T129,[4] one half mile east of Port-en-Bessin at 0538 hours, and then with turrets I and II of her main battery at 0543 hours.  Emmons, being just 2500-3000 yards from the enemy battery at the time, also returned fire.  As the port area was Montcalm’s designated set of bombardment targets, she quickly joined the action.  Not to be outdone Baldwin and Harding joined the party, and probably Melbreak as well (her report contains few details, but she was the farthest ship east of the group and closest to the port).  Doyle chipped in as well, although it targeted a battery one half mile west of Port-en-Bessin.  It isn’t clear whether Leygues joined this effort (due to the absence of its report).‍ ‍

While the response was gratifyingly aggressive, the question is, was it wise?  Did all those ships need to waste that much ammunition against one, possibly two light batteries?  There seems to have been no coordination to this response, merely reaction, raising the question of what command and control was being exercised over these ships during the early stages of the invasion.  The answer is that there apparently was none.‍ ‍

Within minutes the enemy batteries were silenced, at least temporarily, and everyone turned back to their primary pre-H-Hour targets, with only a few minutes delay in a couple of cases.‍ ‍

This incident did have one regrettable result, however.  As noted above, when the Arkansas ceased fire with her 12-inch and 3-inch batteries at 0550 hours, its 5-inch battery continued this mission against target T129 until 0623 hours.  This meant it did not fire the 250 rounds scheduled for target T43—which included the 88mm gun position in WN61.  Forcing the E-3 draw would be just that much more difficult.‍ ‍

Figure 2. Bombardment Group ship positions during the pre-H-Hour bombardment. [Yellow pins: position located by range and bearing from a specified point. Green Pins: positions generally located by range from a specified point, but no bearing. Red pins: no firm data on position.]

Figure 2 shows the initial positions of the bombardment ships as well as can be determined.  The ships of the eastern group provided little data on their positions, and as mentioned above, reports for two of those ships have not been located.  In addition, some of the reports included contradictory data, with the Baldwin’s and Emmons’ positions swapped in one report.[5]  This image does reinforce a point made in the previous installment:  the location of the bombardment ships resulted in gun-target lines such that at least half the enemy casemates could not be effectively shelled, if the emplacements could even be seen from those positions.  None of the eastern group of bombardment ships had a favorable line on any of the guns with enfilading fire west along the beach.  It was much the same with the western group and the east-facing emplacements at that end of the beach.‍ ‍

The bombardment plan had given conflicting instructions on whether to anchor or not.  In the main body of the CTF-124 order they had been given authority to “Anchor at discretion.”[6]   In Annex E (Gunfire Support), however, the destroyers were directed to maintain maneuvering.[7]  Both options had advantages and disadvantages, and the tradeoff basically came down to better firing data from a fixed position (especially as the targets became obscured) versus mobility to get into better firing positions (or evade enemy gunfire).  A couple of ships opted for a middle course.  Upon arriving at their assigned fire support positions, they dropped a dan buoy to mark the location.  This provided a fixed point of reference as they tried to keep position with their engines, while maintaining ability to maneuver as necessary.  Reports indicate only the Arkansas anchored during the bombardment phase, but as noted earlier it is likely Montcalm and G. Legyues did as well.  For those ships which did not drop a dan buoy, they soon found that their Dead Reckoning Tracker was useless in trying to deal with the effects of tide and wind, making firing calculations that much more difficult.‍ ‍

Figure 1 does disclose an apparent failure.  Annex E directed:‍ ‍

“Destroyers proceed down boat lanes and into inshore sectors of fire support areas maneuvering so as to maintain as heavy  a volume of fire on beach targets as possible and adjusting speed so as to approach close to assault beaches as first waves beach.”[8]

Yet we can see from Figure 1, only two of the eleven destroyers continued to close on the beach during the pre-H-Hour bombardment period, and even then, one of them, the Tanatside, continued inshore primarily because it was well short of its assigned firing position when the bombardment began.  Although we don’t have position fixes for the Harding, Doyle and Melbreak, their reports did not mention maneuvering during this phase.  Obviously, this failure to close into the shore would limit the destroyers’ ability to pick out emplacements, or observe the first wave so as to time their cease fires.  On the other hand, by that stage the targets had mostly been covered in dust and smoke, and it was almost impossible to blindly maintain accurate firing solutions while maneuvering.  That would indicate the better solution might have been to anchor—close in—to maintain better blind-firing solutions as dust rose.  This error may have been due to the ships’ inexperience with actual shore bombardment.[9]‍ ‍

But did the guidance from the CTF-124 order to close the beach with the leading wave even make sense?  Using the eastern fire support group as an example, this group of destroyers was spread out in a line to the east of the boat lanes—some very far to the east. So how could they adjust “speed so as to approach close to the assault beaches as the first waves beach?”  If the ships had followed this instruction, four destroyers would all have converged on the area of the E-3/F-1 draws, and their movement primarily would have been laterally from the east, not directly inshore.  While the general idea of closing the beach to maximize effects was fine, without proper positioning and a bit of deconfliction—which were lacking—it would have led to chaos.  It sounded nicely aggressive and warlike, but it was impractical, if not counter-productive. ‍

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A Proper Mental Attitude

‍It appears the conduct of fire for the bombardment was largely impaired by the decisions of the captains, and their decisions were, in turn, influenced by a couple of external consideration.

‍First was a distinct definitional misunderstanding regarding the term “neutralize.”  When providing counterbattery fire, the enemy position is neutralized when it stops returning fire.  But when firing against beach defenses, such as troop shelters and casemates that haven’t yet opened fire, you can’t use the same criterion (lack of response from the defenses) as an indication when to cease fire.  Since there would be no visible indication the beach defenders are neutralized, the bombarding ship must continue to lay down a heavy volume of fire up to the last moment.  That was an absolutely fundamental requirement, and was spelled out in the order (see the quote above).  And yet, that distinction seems to have been lost on the captains of some of the ships.

‍Alongside that matter were two closely related problems.  People firing heavy weapons tend to vastly overestimate their destructive power when they see the large, impressive detonations they cause.  This is especially the case among the inexperienced—and virtually all the gunfire support ships involved were extremely inexperienced in shore bombardment.  Troops in concrete bunkers, and even those in foxholes and trenches, are never as easily destroyed as offshore observers imagine.  This applies not just to naval gunners, but army gunners and bomber pilots as well. Even more importantly, this applied to the fighter pilots circling above who were new to the job of spotting for the naval gunfire.  Inexperienced observers simply assume (wrongly) that great big scary explosions near a target ‘must have’ destroyed it.  One of the greatest lies of industrial-age warfare is, “believe me, the barrage will be so incredible you’ll be able to just walk on in.”  That has rarely turned out to be true, and Omaha would be no exception.‍ ‍

That attitude was then inadvertently stoked by RADM Hall’s (Commander of Force “O”/CTF-124) continued adherence to the concept of destruction over neutralization (and to a degree RADM Kirk’s as well, Commander of the Western Naval Task Force).  In both his base order and Annex E, Hall directed his large bombardment ships to lay down “counterbattery, destructive or neutralizing fire.”  Destructive fire was never the objective, as Ramsay had repeatedly emphasized.  Yet when Hall used that mesmerizing word ‘destruction’, it further primed his captains to think along the wrong lines, and apply the wrong fire techniques.‍ ‍

We have to look no further than the Harding for a perfect example of this.  Harding was ordered to neutralize one single target: T41, which (along with T43 noted above) covered the WN61 position defending the east side of the E-3 exit, and was home of a 50mm gun (in an open-pit emplacement) and the 88mm antitank gun enfilading that half of the beach.  And Harding had 300 rounds to do it.  Initially Harding was distracted by the fire coming from the Port-en-Bessin area and lobbed 40 rounds in that direction starting at 0537 hours.  Shifting fire to its assigned target T41 at 0547 hours, the ship ceased fire at 0605, under the belief the position had been “apparently destroyed.”  It had fired only 100 rounds.  The ship started looking for other targets, first seizing on target T33 (Melbrake’s assigned target).  Harding tossed 20 rounds at it and again claimed the target complex was also destroyed.  At 0610, Harding decided to shell a “fortified house in a draw west of Port-en-Bessin; target destroyed, 40 rounds expended.”  At 0615 hours it shifted fire to what it described as an enemy field piece (no location reported) and sent 24 rounds in its direction.  It claimed the crew was scattered and the gun was withdrawn, but “probably not destroyed.”  At 0625 hours, as its high volume of fire on T41 should have been reaching its climax, Harding instead was focused back on Port-en-Bassin to engage a gun on the breakwater—a target Montcalm was tasked to suppress (the port’s defenses were Montcalm’s only task). 

To summarize the Harding’s bombardment contributions, it fired just one third of its allotted ammunition at its assigned target, at which time it improbably decided the gun positions, shelters and entrenchments had been ‘destroyed.’  They were not destroyed.  Whatever neutralizing effects those 100 rounds might have had, were wasted because the Harding had ceased fire on its assigned target fully 25 minutes before H-Hour, giving the defenders plenty of time to shake it off. Whatever the strengths of the Harding’s captain, he brought the wrong mental attitude to the task and lost focus on what his primary bombardment mission involved.‍ ‍

Nor was the Harding the only example of this.  On the western flank, the Thompson was ordered to place 450 rounds on two targets in WN74.  That was the highest allotment for any of the bombardment ships, as Thompson’s fire mission was supposed to last longer, from 0550 to 0715 hours.  Recall from the previous installment, one of these two targets contained a pair of 80mm guns sited to enfilade the western half of the beach.  The other target consisted of the general defensive works within the rest of the strongpoint, which did not immediately threaten the landing.  At 0550 hours, Thompson opened fire for 30 minutes on the target that included the two gun emplacements. It then judged the target “apparently destroyed” and ceased fire, having expended 107 rounds.  With 10 minutes left before H-Hour, Thompson shifted fire to the other target.  This was a major error. Thompson was not forced to cease fire because the leading waves fouled its gun line; the target was west of the boat lanes and there was no interference. Nor was it forced to cease fire because of time limits; it was cleared to shoot until 0715 hours. Thompson was simply overly impressed by its own fireworks and decided it must have destroyed the target. With 10 minutes left before H-Hour, the gun crews had time to shake off the effects of the bombardment and re-man the guns. It isn’t certain when the guns went into action, but it wouldn’t be last heard from them.

After ceasing fire on the gun positions, Thompson shifted fire to the second target. It was a desultory effort, consisting of just 56 rounds fired over the next 40 minutes (with 30 minutes of it after H-Hour), but Thompson declared that target destroyed, too.  In total, the ship had fired just 163 rounds of its allotted 450 during its bombardment window.  That proved to be a false economy as the ship then noticed a gun firing on the beach. The coordinates Thompson reported for this ‘new’ gun were the same coordinates as the two 80mm guns it claimed had been destroyed at 0620 hours (though it didn’t make that point in its report). There’s no way of telling how long it (or both) had been firing before it caught Thompson’s attention.  Thompson spent the next 40 minutes again trying to silence the gun(s), during which time the gun(s) continued to shell the troops on the beach.  It took another 106 rounds before the ship again announced the position destroyed, rounds that would have been far more productive had they been expended before H-Hour to silence those guns before the landings began. 

It the 10 minutes between Thompson’s cease fire and H-Hour—when Thompson was supposed to be firing its most intense period of bombardment on the gun positions—the ship instead shifted fire to the target that did not threaten the waves as they beached. We don’t know when those guns were put into action, but the volume of flanking fire on the Dog Green beach sector would indicate the guns had not been neutralized by the Thompson’s aborted bombardment and were probably up and firing at or shortly after H-Hour. This would not have happened if Thompson had been focused on continuing its neutralization mission; instead it opted for a destruction mission, with no visible criterion to make such a judgement. And, once again, it’s worth noting that these guns were in earth field works (not concrete emplacements) and should have been vulnerable to Thompson’s 5-inch guns. But the ship had a poor angle of fire on them and had skimped on ammunition.   ‍‍ ‍

The failure of the Bombardment Group was the culmination of several factors, and was not simply due to too little time or too few guns as Hall claimed.  Most of these have been discussed before, but to recap, these are the most important factors:‍ ‍

-          Diversion of ships from either defensive (counterbattery) or offensive (beach defense neutralization) tasks, assigning them instead to targets that did not immediately threaten the landing.‍ ‍

-          Too heavily weighting the defensive tasks.  This primarily applies to wasting Texas’ main battery on Pointe-du-Hoc when a destroyer could have handled the mission. As a result, the heaviest guns in the force made no contribution to neutralizing the beach defenses.  This could also apply to Montcalm; dedicating 6-inch (152mm) guns to neutralize 75mm guns was perhaps excessive and wasteful.‍ ‍

-          Inadequate positioning of ships relative to the orientation of the defensive fortifications within the assigned targets.‍ ‍

-          Failure to use the most effective shell types.  For every one AA shell used, more than 6 common shells were fired, despite the former having better terminal effects.  This proportion was in keeping with Hall’s order, and may have reflected limited stockage levels on hand in the UK.  It also may have reflected the desire to retain AA shells for expected Luftwaffe attacks.  Whatever the cause, it still hampered the bombardment.‍ ‍

-          Passive command.  Once the pre-H-hour bombardment began, it proceeded automatically, without active command involvement.  While this would have been fine had the bombardment proceeded as planned, that is not what happened.  Even though the Destroyer Squadron 18 commander (and his flagship Frankfort) had been diverted to organizing the offshore screen and was not present inshore to control the destroyer force (a questionable decision), his deputy commander (captain of Satterlee) was present on the firing line.  While Satterlee made several excellent decisions on D-Day, it made no attempt to stop the bombardment from veering off the tracks.‍ ‍

-          There was a marked difference in attitude in prosecuting defensive as opposed to offensive tasks.  As soon as a coastal artillery battery opened fire from the vicinity of Port-en-Bessin, every ship in the eastern fire support group aggressively responded.  On the other hand, while prosecuting the beach neutralization task, only one ship fired its entire scheduled ammunition, with the rest firing only about a half.  ‍ ‍

-          Synchronization with the leading wave.  The intent was to increase the volume of fire to a maximum just before the leading wave beached.  While bombardment times were specified in the order, the actual cease fire was supposed to be guided by the progress of the first wave.  Only one ship, Baldwin, mentioned doing this.  The others either ceased firing at the prescribed time, or prematurely switched to other targets.  (The Satterlee deserves mention for taking the initiative to shell Pointe-du-Hoc in conjunction with the Rangers’ delayed landing.  But as that was not its assigned target and occurred after the bombardment period, it doesn’t strictly fit in this discussion, however commendable). ‍ ‍

As you can see, there were many factors in play.  Some were the result of tradeoffs (such as the matter of anchoring versus maneuvering).  Some were flaws in the planning and some were the result of decisions in the midst of gunfire.  And there were factors that no one could affect (such as the six idle 5-inch guns—the equivalent of another one and a half destroyers—on the unengaged side of the battleships).  They all combined to steadily erode the scale and effects of the bombardment.‍ ‍

Yet emerging from this are two overriding facts:  1) too few of the guns available were appropriately targeted on the beach defenses; and 2) only a bit more than half the projectiles that should have been fired, were.  ‍ ‍

So far we have discussed only the standard naval gunfire ships.  It’s now time to turn our attention to the various craft used to complement the fire of their larger brothers.‍

‍ ‍

The Self-Propelled Artillery

‍Given the lack of information about these howitzers on D-Day, there is little to be said.  As you’ll recall from the previous installment, each of the 36 M7 self-propelled howitzers was allotted 100 rounds to fire as its LCT followed the leading waves toward the beach.  That should have totaled a healthy 3,600 rounds hitting the defenses in the 25 minutes prior to H-Hour.  It would have been a considerable addition to the bombardment, amounting to two thirds of what the naval gunfire ships were supposed to shoot (keeping in mind the differences in caliber).  Of course, this potential was offset by the their limited accuracy aboard the bobbing LCTs.

‍There is scant information on the 58th Armored Field Artillery (AFA) Battalion’s action on D-Day.  The unit history mentions the battalion training to fire from LCTs, but completely omits mention of doing so on D-Day.[10]  Similarly, Hot Steel, The Story of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, also omits this.[11]  However, Fran Baker, the editor of Hot Steel, does have records indicating the battalion fired 774 rounds from their LCTs on 6 June.[12]

‍The 62ND AFA Bn opened fire as planned beginning at 0600 hours at 8,000 yards range.  A total of 349 rounds were fired from the LCTs. 

“On the initial run-in for firing several LCT’s proceeded well within 3,000 yards of the beach while still firing.  All the LCT’s were subject to small arms and cannon fire at this time but no damage to craft or wounds to personnel were suffered.” [13]‍ ‍

The battalion commander (LTC Donal Bennett) had almost nothing to say about firing from the LCTs in his report, merely noting “Battalion fired on beach defenses prior to H-hour.”[14]‍ ‍

Based on 18 howitzers in each battalion, the 58th would have fired roughly 43 rounds per howitzer while afloat, and the 62nd fewer than 20.  These numbers are well below the 100 rounds allocated per howitzer by the CTF-124 order.[15]‍ ‍

There is no clear indication whether these battalions conducted their shoots by direct lay, or if they used the clock method (as discussed in the previous installment).  But we can possibly make an educated guess.  If firing in direct lay, the rear howitzers would have their sight-lines blocked by the howitzers ahead of them in the LCTs, which would prevent them from aiming and therefore firing.  If that were the case, then only the ten howitzers at the front of the LCTs could have fired for each battalion, bringing the rounds-per-gun up to a somewhat more reasonable 77 rounds for the 58th and 35 for the 62nd.‍ ‍

The hard reality, however was that these battalions delivered significantly less ordnance than planned.  Instead of 3600 high explosive projectiles, they delivered only 1123, or  just 31% of the expected firepower.  So, the Army was no better at delivering ‘drenching fire’ than was the Navy.

‍ ‍

The Rockets‍ ‍

Hopes were not necessarily high for the LCT(R) group since CAPT Sabin, heading the Gunfire Support Group, had rated their preparedness as poor due to the late arrival of their craft and their lack of training. Determining their actual performance on D-Day is difficult, as the reports are vague and contradictory.‍ ‍

One the Navy side, optimism was the tone.  LCDR Carr was the commander of the LCT(R) flotilla, and his report was positive.  ‍ ‍

-          His craft used radar with a position prediction indicator (PPI) screen to judge range to the shore.  All but one craft used ranging shots to confirm the radar.  These ranging shots were not as useful as hoped, as the shallow waters nearing the beach caused the rockets to detonate as if they were striking dry land (misleading the observer­—looking from thousands of yards off shore—to believe he was in range).  ‍ ‍

-          Complicating this, the Officers in Charge (OiCs) of the craft stated they could not actually see their targets due to the dust and smoke.‍ ‍

-          Despite the above, the OiCs believed they “fired on target in all instances.”‍ ‍

-          As reported by the OiCs, the time of firing for the craft ranged from H-7 to H+2, which conflicted with the much earlier time recorded in some Army reports.‍ ‍

-          The OiCs also reported the first wave’s estimated range to the shore varied from 200 to 2000 yards, (which indicates synchronization failed badly in the longer cases).‍ ‍

The claim that they believed they “fired on target in all instances” is plainly incompatible with the details concerning misleading ranging shots, inability to see their targets and their first experience with using radar for fire control.    ‍ ‍

Despite his skepticism, Sabin struck a mixed, but mostly positive tone in his report:‍ ‍

“Rocket craft took up their positions, some late. The fire, however, was generally accurate and, it is believed effective.”[16]

‍Later in the same report he warmed up to them even more:‍ ‍

“Rocket fire was excellent in general.  Rockets from two of the craft appeared to be short.  Many rockets exploded shortly after launching.  Conversation with a few Army personnel who landed early indicated they considered the rocket fire their best cover.”

‍ It isn’t apparent how he could judge the fire to be “excellent in general” as the targets were obscured.  Still, his final comment was equally upbeat:‍ ‍

“Rocket craft are the most useful and important of the close gunfire support craft.  Properly trained and used, they can be of great assistance. It is recommended that additional high speed, shallow draft, short range rocket craft be developed.”‍ ‍

As complimentary as that last quote sounded, his caveat of ‘properly trained and used’ reveals he was talking about the hypothetical value of the craft, not the effectiveness as witnessed on D-Day.  In fact, the last sentence recommended a type of rocket craft completely different from the ones he employed.  Skepticism here is also warranted by the fact that the LCT(R)s were sent back to the UK the very next day (D+1).  The CTF-122 plan directed they be returned when they exhausted their ammunition, but each craft had an entire second set of rockets, and were supposed to have reloaded and been ready to fire again by H+210, at targets designated by CAPT Sabin (per the CTF-124 plan). But Sabin did not employ them later on D-Day, or in the following days to assist the push along the coast west from Vierville towards Grandcamp-Maisy.  Instead, they were sent away.‍ ‍That is probably the clearest judgement on their effectiveness.

After the war, Sabin took a different tone.  While claiming the rocket barrages provided a morale boost to the invading troops, he also noted that:  ‍ ‍

‘‘ . . . due to excessive dispersion, however, the rockets inflicted very little damage on the enemy.’’ [17]‍ ‍

He also mentioned in passing that “approximately six thousand rockets left their pads” during the assault; he didn’t point out that was three thousand fewer than were supposed to have launched.   Two pages later he revealed that after H-Hour he still had two fully loaded LCT(R)s at hand, indicating two of the rocket craft had not arrived in time to launch; he did not explain why the remaining 1000 rockets did not fire.‍ ‍

The Army perspective of the rockets’ effectiveness was more in line with Sabin’s later, non-official writings. The 16th RCT reported the rocket craft fired too early, corroborating evidence of the synchronization failure, especially since most of this wave landed late.[18]  It didn’t mention where the rockets struck, but noted their targets were fully in action when the troops landed.  The Army’s Omaha Beachhead stated:‍ ‍

“The rockets, according to most reports from the assault troops, made a heartening display but failed to hit defensive positions-an opinion which cannot be accepted as final and which runs counter to naval reports.”[19]‍ ‍

But even some Navy reports called the rocket accuracy into question.  The LCTs from the group landing DD tanks in the 116th RCT sector mentioned the rockets, but two of those reports thought they were witnessing a series mines detonating in the water and on the beach, or mortar or artillery fire, indicating the barrages landed too short.  A third LCT recognized the explosions for rockets, and reported they landed all around the craft as it beached 75 yards from the waterline – another poorly synchronized and short barrage.[20]‍ ‍

Fragmentary reports from German defenders were just as uncertain, although their comments were recorded decades later and may not be entirely accurate.  Each of their positions should have been hit by a rocket barrage.  Henrik Naub was a machine gunner in WN71 and made no mention of rockets being employed.[21]  Hein Severloh (in WN62) graphically described the horror of the barrage of gunfire and rockets, but noted:‍ ‍

“Nevertheless, the shells of this barrage mostly hit the base too high and caused little damage.”[22]‍ ‍

Similarly, Gustav Winter, who manned the ‘concrete panzer’ in WN68, described a terrible bombardment by large caliber shells, no doubt the abbreviated shelling by the Arkansas and Glasgow.   He did not, however, mention a rocket barrage.[23]‍ ‍

Essentially, we have no idea how accurate the rocket barrages were or how effective the impacts.  Despite the optimism of Navy observers who were looking at a smoke-clouded shore, the sparse reports from American and German troops alike seem to indicate that their effectiveness was minimal.‍ ‍

But in some respects, this distracts from another key point, and that is the difficulty of synchronizing these barrages with the landing of the leading wave.  For one thing, the term ‘leading wave’, which the LCT(R)s were supposed to key on, referred to the tanks that landed from LCT(A)s and (HE)s, and they should have touched down at H-Hour.  In theory the first infantry (Wave 2) should have landed one minute later.  But the Navy’s boat waves were not up to the task of keeping such a tight schedule.  Sabin, who was close inshore observing his various gunfire support craft, candidly stated “there was a general mix-up of all craft.”[24]  Boat divisions lost formation, craft were swept to wrong beach sectors or steered toward misidentified landmarks, and many in the leading waves landed late.  To be truly effective, the LCT(R)s needed to synchronize their firing closely with the first wave of tanks and the first wave of infantry.  And this was simply impossible as the small assault craft were incapable of performing their role to the required degree of precision.‍ ‍

There were many reasons for this, including the sea conditions, the excessively long distance between the Transport Area and the beach, and the generally inexperienced crews of the small craft (more on that in a later series).  The simple fact is that the effectiveness of the rocket craft depended on precise clockwork functioning of several parts, none of which—to include the LCT(R)s—were up to the job on 6 June.  Rocket craft had proven effective in the Pacific, but Hall’s command hadn’t yet gotten the bugs worked out.‍ ‍

I tend to consider these LCT(R)s to have had little physical effect on the defenses.  Their noise and concussions may have contributed something to the general neutralizing effect, though even that is questionable due to the synchronization problem.  Nevertheless, Hall spoke well of the concept in his report, without, however, actually commenting on their effectiveness on D-Day.‍

‍ ‍

The LCG(L)s‍ ‍

Not a lot was expected of the LCG(L)s.   Converted from LCT hulls, they were not particularly good gunnery platforms and had no fire control systems other than direct sights.  By naval gunnery standards, their two 4.7-inch guns were just a bit smaller than the 5-inch guns of the destroyers.  But these flat-bottomed craft could get close inshore where it should be easier to locate and target specific features.  In short, they might come in very handy—with a bit of luck.  The LCG(L)s were tied to the LCT(A)/(HE)s of the first wave, being tasked to escort these craft from the Line of Deployment to the beach, providing neutralizing fire on specific targets on the way in.‍ ‍

According to the plan, three LCG(L)s would fire on four targets in WN72 and WN73 (the D-1 exit).  One LCG(L) would fire on WN65 (E-1 exit) and the final LCG(L) would strike WN61 (at the E-3/F-1 exits).  As a result, both of the casemates that had 88mm guns would be targeted by an LCG(L).  Each craft had an allotment of 120 rounds (except one with 150) and was to fire from H-20 until times ranging from H-4 to H-Hour.  Like the destroyers, however, they were ordered to continue firing until the lead wave of LCT(A)/(HE)s landed or fouled their gun line, in case the LCTs were either early or late.‍ ‍

Unfortunately, they too performed poorly.  It started with two of the LCG(L)s slated for the D-1 draw (#426 and #449)  mistakenly ending up at Utah beach.  Sabin’s report claimed #426 arrived back at Omaha in time to fire on schedule, but #426’s action report contradicts that, stating it arrived at Omaha at 0745, after proceeding at emergency speed, but having to stop and rescue survivors in the water.  The #449 craft remained off Utah. ‍ ‍

As a result, the bombardment of the defenses at the D-1 draw would be reduced by 240 rounds (66%).  The #424 craft did arrive on station, on time and opened fire at 6000 yards, and closed the beach to an unspecified distance.  It ceased fire at 0640 hours, having fired only 66 rounds.  Thus, instead of being hit by 360 rounds of 4.7-inch fire, the D-1 defenses received barely more than one sixth of that number.  (This area had already been shorted 140 5-inch rounds from McCook’s and Texas’ abbreviated bombardments.)‍ ‍

The #811 craft opened fire on its target ( a group of pillboxes in WN65) at 0610 hours at a range of 4000 yards and closed the beach on the flank of the LCT(A/(HE)s until reaching 1000-500 yards.  The OiC was apparently confused as to his mission, believing it was a point target instead of the complex of guns and machine guns.  As a result, after observing two hits and one probable hit on his target, he ceased fire.  He only fired 47 of his allotted 120 rounds.‍ ‍

The final LCG(L) was the #687 craft, which had target T43 (WN61) in its sights, and had 150 rounds to fire (30 more than the rest of the LCG(L)s).  It opened fire at 0609 hours at a range of 4,000 yards and closed to 1,000 yards.  In his report, the OiC stated his mission was neutralization, and apparently, he had the correct interpretation of that word as he fired for the full duration of his timeframe, and expended 110 rounds, despite the obscuring dust.  His report, however, illustrated the weakness in the design of the LCG(L)s in this phase.  The #2 gun was directly behind the #1 gun and, being at the same level could not fire over it.  So, when the craft was headed directly toward the target as it escorted the LCT(A)/(HE)s to the beach, it could only fire one gun.  He attempted to solve this problem by sailing on a zig-zag course which would permit the #2 gun to bear for part of the time.  This was complicated by the need to avoid fouling the gun lines of the Harding and the Baldwin which were firing at the same target.  Again, planning needs to consider these details.‍ ‍

But generally speaking, the LCG(L)s were a disappointment, expending only 223 of an allotted 630 rounds.  Under-firing seemed to have been the common affliction among the bombarding vessels, be they ships or craft or howitzers.‍ ‍

Both CAPT Imlay (Deputy Commander of Assault Group O-1) and CAPT Sabin (Commander of the Gunfire Support Group) doubted the value of the LCG(L)s in the landings, focusing on their lack of fire control systems and a decision not to link those craft with spotters ashore, which precluded them from being directed on known targets.[25]

‍ ‍

The Control Vessels

‍There were six patrol craft that acted as control craft offshore at Omaha.  The vessels were PC-461 Class, 173 foot submarine chasers.  Although doctrinally sub chasers, they were classified as patrol craft and numbered as such (e.g., PC-552).  (Not be confused with a smaller class (110 ft) of submarine chasers used as secondary control craft on D-Day.)  ‍ ‍

As primary control craft, four of the six PCs had the job of locating their beach sectors and positioning themselves at the Line of Departure to guide the boat waves to the correct beaches.  The remaining two craft were reserve control vessels, and they would start at the Line of Departure, and accompany the lead waves to 2000 yards offshore and take position there.  ‍ ‍

As these six ships mounted 3-inch guns, they were incorporated into the bombardment plan and each craft was given a target to fire on and allotted 50 rounds (AP) for the job.   ‍ ‍

On D-Day, one PC (PC-552) did not fire as it was too busy trying to rescue soldiers whose DD tanks had sunk.  It isn’t known whether PC-567 fired, as the only report from that ship was from the embarked Dispatching Officer, and he made no mention of firing, probably because he was busy with other duties.  I assume the ship did fire; there was nothing to distract it from that task as was the case with PC-552.  We know from a crewman’s personal account that PC-553 did fire, and while he mentioned hitting their pillbox seven times, he did not mention how many rounds were expended.  PCs -568, -618 and -1225 did fire, with the first two closing to 2000 yards and the latter remaining 4000 yards offshore.  They fired 51, 19 and 50 rounds respectively. ‍ Two craft ceased fire 12 minutes early due to smoke-obscured targets, and the third kept up the fire until H+10.

It’s impossible to establish how much effect the PCs had on German defenses.  After the pre-H-Hour bombardment, these ships reported some excellent pinpoint shooting and destruction of quite a number of enemy positions (without slighting the honor of the sailors involved, it isn’t clear how much of those claims were the result of accurate observation or ‘enthusiastic estimation’)  Nevertheless, as far as the pre-H-Hour bombardment is concerned, there is no way to judge their effect.‍

‍ ‍

The Elephant in the Screen‍ ‍

Hidden in plain sight in Kirk’s operation plan was Task Group 122.5, the Reserve Fire Support Group, consisting of one light cruiser, 17 destroyers and the heavy cruiser Augusta.  That’s a very large reserve and a whole lot of firepower standing idle, especially when you’ve been complaining you don’t have enough bombarding ships.‍ ‍

The truth is they weren’t exactly idle and these ships were filling necessary roles.  First, they were mostly deployed in the WNTF flank screen facing Cherbourg.  The E-Boat raid on RADM Moon’s Exercise Tiger convoy had made Kirk understandably nervous about what surprises might come from Cherbourg and the Brittany ports.  And if Kirk was nervous, Moon was doubly so. ‍ ‍

And second, they were standing by to replace bombarding ships that had used up their ammunition allowance.  Naval gunfire was going to be very important in the coming days, and they could not simply exhaust all the ships’ magazines in the first few hours.  As no one wanted a ship to completely ‘run dry’ on ammunition, the plan stated if a ship fired 70% of its magazines, it would be pulled out of line and placed in the screen until it could be sent with a return convoy to the UK for replenishment.  Once it was pulled out of the bombardment force, a ship from the Reserve Gunfire Group would stand in and replace it.  Only one ship at Omaha fired off 70% on D-Day, the Satterlee.‍ ‍

Still, seventeen destroyers and two cruisers seem a bit excessive as a reserve.  It’s difficult to believe one, or two, or even three couldn’t have been added to Hall’s bombardment force.  From this perspective, 80+ years later, it is impossible to judge all of the considerations Kirk had to weigh, and it wouldn’t be wise to flatly say he erred in this allocation of ships.  But it is reasonable to wonder if some adjustment shouldn’t have been made.‍ ‍

On the other hand, two factors do argue against the allocation of an additional ship or two from the Reserve Fire Support Group.  First, Hall clearly did not get nearly the volume of fire expected from the ships he did have, and there would be no guarantee any reinforcement would have been handled any more effectively.  And second, Hall’s failure to deconflict positioning and gun-target lines in the fire support areas was such that adding one or two more ships may have actually been counterproductive.‍ ‍

There was one small, surprise gift from the Reserve Fire Support Group.  In the early hours of 6 June, the heavy cruiser USS Augusta with its nine 8-inch guns and eight 5-inch guns sailed into the Transport Area off Omaha.  Although Augusta was Kirk’s WNTF command ship (with his Army counterpart, LTG Bradley aboard), it was also dual-hatted as part of the Reserve Fire Support Group.  In my previous installment I questioned why it hadn’t been given a bombardment task in any of the plans.  It turns out that at some point late in planning, the subject must have come up and it was included.  ‍ ‍

Augusta arrived at the western swept lane hours earlier, but didn’t proceed into Fire Support Area 3 until 0550 hours.  At 0617, it dropped anchor and a minute later opened fire.  Its action report did not identify the target, and the ship only expended twenty-one 8-inch rounds over a five-minute period, ceasing fire at 0613 hours.  It opened fire again at 0635 hours (again at an unidentified target), expending 30 rounds before ceasing fire eight minutes later.  Having taken a symbolic lick at the enemy, the ship then repositioned back into the Transport Area, anchoring next to Hall’s command ship (the USS Ancon).  It hadn’t been much, and it probably didn’t help much, but it couldn’t have hurt.  It was a bit disappointing, though.

‍ ‍

Questions and Answers‍ ‍

There are four major questions this series has attempted to answer.‍ ‍

The first is why Admiral Ramsay and General Montgomery did not adopt an invasion model more akin to that used in the Central Pacific.  I believe the first installment answered that question thoroughly.  I’ll merely leave the final word to Unteroffizer (Corporal) Henrik Naube, of the German 352nd Infantry Division, manning a machine gun in WN71:‍ ‍

“I am also puzzled as to why the Americans did not damage our positions more fully before the landing. I imagine that there is a balance for an attacker to keep, between a lengthy bombardment which does a lot of damage but also signals that an attack is coming soon, and on the other hand a last-minute preparatory bombardment which forces the defenders to take cover but without letting them prepare for the attack. Nevertheless, considering their capability, I am surprised that their aircraft did not attack us more fully overnight on the evening of the 5th June or at first light on the 6th, when the bombs from their heavy bombers fell wide. I think that would have disrupted our defences and still prevented us from reacting in time by bringing up reserves and so on.”[26]‍ ‍

Henrik’s second sentence shows a better understanding of the difficult tradeoffs involved in selecting the bombardment length than did a number of senior officers in the Allied command.  As for his second sentence, well, that provides an excellent segue to the next installment, which will examine the planned air bombardment.‍ ‍

The second question was whether the bombardment plan was reasonably sound, which was addressed in the second installment of this series.  That analysis identified several flaws in the multiple layers of bombardment planning, most of which concerned conflicting instructions and unclear guidance.  The major flaw appeared to be the failure to make the most of the assets on hand, such as the Frankfort not being used, the targeting of Texas at Pointe du Hoc and the diversion of ships to non-critical targets during the brief bombardment window. The result was a significant diversion of firepower from the critical beach neutralization task.  The best illustration of this lopsided allocation of firepower unwittingly comes from Hall’s own report on the operation.  He proudly bragged that the defensive counterbattery mission was so effective that only a single shot was fired at the fleet and it missed.[27]  That was a factually incorrect statement, but the general sentiment is on point: the German coastal artillery had virtually no impact on the invasion.  That fact stands as a clear indictment of how Hall apportioned guns-to-tasks.  The fact that he succeeded so completely at the counterbattery task—while failing so badly at the beach neutralization task—is clear evidence he put far too many of his critical and limited assets into the former task and badly shorted the latter.‍ ‍

It’s almost as if he never believed the beach neutralization task was achievable, and as a result did not tackle the job as seriously as he did the counterbattery task.  If so, his doubts created a self-fulfilling prophecy, with too few guns committed, too few rounds fired and too few captains vigorously prosecuting their beach neutralization task.‍ ‍

And that neatly leads to our third question: was the bombardment plan executed effectively?  No. It was not.  With almost half of the Bombardment Group’s planned projectiles left unfired at H-Hour, there is no question execution was a failure.  The self-propelled howitzers firing from LCTs fired an even lower percentage of their shells, and with much less accuracy.  And no one can make even an educated guess what effect the rockets had.  Finally, the LCG(L)s and control craft suffered from many of the same problems, with the added point that there were so few of them.  ‍ ‍

The failure of the bombardment at Omaha was not so much due to the lack of bombarding ships or time (though a bit more of each would have been very nice to have) as it was due to poor allocation of ships to tasks, and extremely poor execution.‍ ‍

Had intelligence spotted movement of the artillery of the German 352nd Infantry Division into position behind the beach, that would have presented Hall and his gunfire planners an entirely different set of challenges.  His bombardment group would have been clearly inadequate to shell the numerous battery positions scattered inland in addition to their other tasks.  Presumably this would have resulted in some of the Reserve Fire Support Group’s ships shifted to Omaha.  And while this was the reality they ended up facing on D-Day it is outside the scope of this analysis:  how well was the bombardment, as planned, executed?‍ ‍

And that leaves us the fourth and final question.  Could the bombardment have succeeded had it been better planned and executed?  That’s difficult to say, if for no other reason than how to measure success?  Where on the sliding scale of ‘attritted defenses’ is the success line?‍ ‍

We do know that even in its anemic form on D-Day, the bombardment did have some significant effects.  All three of the German defenders I cited earlier testified that a soldier in their separate groups broke down in fear.  Eyes bled from the concussions.  Hearing was lost.  Concrete walls ‘rippled and cracked.’  Two of them described nearby concrete positions destroyed.  The end of one position was blown open, exposing defenders to the beach. Gustav Winter, manning the concrete panzer, said his turret was penetrated by a Sherman tank shell that killed his loader.  Yet when examined after D-Day, it was found intact, indicating he abandoned the fight.  Similarly, Henrik Naub in WN71 reported that the Volksdeutsch[28] troops in the neighboring bunker killed their German NCO rather than continue the fight.  So even this truncated bombardment had effects, both physical and moral.  It wasn’t enough in that truncated form, but it hinted at what more could have been accomplished had it been fully prosecuted.  ‍ ‍

Had the bombardment been almost doubled—that is, had all the allotted ammunition been fired—and had the ships better synchronized their cease firing with the landing of the first waves, there is little doubt it would have been far more effective.  Had the LCT(R)s been better trained, more accurate and better synchronized, the effectiveness would have been even greater.  And had the self-propelled artillery fired its full allotment, how much more effective might it have been, despite their accuracy problems?  ‍ ‍

But how much more effective and would it have been ‘enough?’  That’s impossible to quantify, and everyone will draw their own conclusion.  As for me, I won’t commit the typical error of predicting it would have been a ‘walkover.’  In an era of dumb bombs and unguided projectiles, there were strict limits to what a bombardment could achieve.  But I do think it is obvious that the losses among the American invaders would have been considerably less had the bombardment been better planned and more violently executed.  Maybe, just maybe, it would have been successful enough that we would not feel obliged to think the adjective ‘bloody’ must precede Omaha.‍

‍ ‍

Spin and Scapegoat‍ ‍

Hall never did admit that his view of the tactical environment was faulty, and he never let slip the slightest hint how poorly his pre-H-Hour bombardment misfired.  In his after action report he repeatedly hammered home his belief that he hadn’t enough time or ships for the bombardment, and he similarly criticized Ramsay’s decision that neutralization was all that could be achieved.  Hall repeatedly stated that slow, aimed fire for destruction of beach defenses over a prolonged time should have been used.  This despite the fact that such a delay likely would have resulted in a defeat of the invasion.  Hall suffered from the blindered perspective of a man focused on the first 100 yards, and was incapable of seeing any larger ramifications.  He was so fixed in his opinion that he didn’t see the flaw in his own assertion.  He blamed the ineffectiveness of his pre-landing bombardment on inability to spot the enemy positions. ‍So how would a longer and more deliberate (aimed fire) bombardment succeed when he nothing to aim at?

In fact, Hall was left in an untenable position.  On the one hand, he blamed the ineffectiveness of his bombardment on the lack of ships, time and the inability to spot the emplacements.  On the other hand he had to portray his command’s efforts as effective and successful.  He attempted to rationalize this internal contradiction with this carefully crafted disclaimer:‍ ‍

“Naval gunfire support was effective against the targets on which it was directed.  Unfortunately the pre-landing bombardment was not accompanied by air bombardment as was planned, consequently many enemy position were left untouched.”[29]‍ ‍

This was wildly at variance with the facts.  As worded, it clearly implied that the naval and air bombardments were focused on different targets. Hence the failure of the air bombardment left many targets untouched.  Absolutely false.  As figure 3 graphically demonstrates, every air target duplicated naval bombardment targets.  Not a single target was assigned to the bombers alone.  If any target had been left untouched, then Hall’s force had to have failed to engage it as well.  But they didn’t fail to engage those targets.  What they failed to do was to engage them fully, skillfully and in proper synchronization with the first wave.  ‍ ‍

Figure 3. This combined targeting chart shows that all 13 air bombardment aimpoints coincided with naval bombardment targets. Therefore none of the defenses should have been left untouched, as RADM Hall stated, due to the delay in releasing bombs. Every position still should have been neutralized by what Hall characterized as effective naval bombardment.

Hall was also absolutely incorrect when he stated his “gunfire support was effective against the targets on which it was directed.”   That was an inexcusable exaggeration.  It possibly could have been at least more effective, had his captains vigorously prosecuted their bombardment missions.  But they didn’t.‍ ‍

This failure has generally been papered over by the subsequent critical role played by the destroyers later in the morning when they stepped up and provided excellent support to the troops pinned on the beach.  That (deservedly) heroic story, when coupled with the constant references to the ‘bomber failure’ scapegoat, has kept historians from digging more deeply for over eight decades.

‍But now we know better.

‍ ‍

Coming Next

‍- Shortly following publication of this post, I’ll publish an addendum summarizing the experiences of each of the ship’s in the pre-H-Hour bombardment, for those who would like to look into the details more closely.

-‍ In the next two to three weeks I’ll post an installment analyzing the planned air bombardment for Omaha, focusing on the practical limits of using strategic bombers on tactical targets, and what the likely outcome might have been had the weather not interfered.

F‍OOTNOTES ‍

[1] Action reports for the Hunt class escort destroyers are available, but have scant detail and do not mention ammunition expenditure.  I still have feelers out to find D-Day reports for the Free French cruisers.

[2] The 14-inch guns of the Texas were larger, but were not involved in the beach neutralization mission.

[3] CTF-122 operation order prohibited use of the still-secret radar proximity fuze, but mechanical time fuzes were allowed.  The hope may have been that the high trajectory rockets would eliminate these open positions, but given the poor training of those ships, it was an unrealistic dream.

[4] This would appear to actually have been T128 based on the description ‘one half mile east of Port-en-Bessin.’  T129 was about 3 miles east of Port-en-Bessin.

[5] For instance, the Doyle’s position is shown based on its reported bearing and distance from its target.  However, it also reported its estimated distance to the beach, which would place it significantly closer to the nearest shoreline.

[6] Commander Assault Force Omaha (CTF124), Operation Order No. BB-44, pg. 11.   NARA, RG 313, Entry Number P111, Box 81.CTF 124 OpOrd, pg. 11

[7] Ibid. Annex E (Gunfire Support Plan), pg 4.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Commander Assault Force “O”, Action Report – Assault on Vierville-Colleville Sector, Coast of Normandy, dtd 27 July 1944, pg 101.  When commenting on joint exercises in the Slapton Sands area, Hall stated, “In the case of the U.S. destroyers, this was definitely limited by the low ammunition allowance possible.”

[10] History of the 58th Armored Field Battalion, on file at the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library’s Digital Library (call no. UA30.2 (58th) .H5 RARE).

[11] Baker, Fran, ed. Hot Steel, The Story of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, Delphi Books, 2014.

[12] Correspondence with the author, 26 February, 2026

[13]After action report, 62nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 19 Nov thru 31 Aug 43, June, Sept, Dec, 1944, Jan 1945. See the Unit Journal entry for 6 June 1944, pg. 60 of the .pdf.  On file at the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library’s Digital Library.

[14] Ibid.  See Narrative of the Battalion Commander, dtd 4 July 1944, pg. 51 of the .pdf

[15] Opcit. CTF124 Operation Order No. BB-44, Annex E (Gunfire Support Plan), Appendix 2, pg. 17.

[16] Commander, Gunfire Support Group (CTG124.8), Action Report – Operation Neptune, 3 July 1944, pg. 18.  NARA, RG 38, Nara Catalog Id: 4697018

[17] Stillwell, P., ed, Assault on Normandy,First Person Accounts From the Sea Services. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1994, pg. 59.

[18] See, for example, the After Action Report of the 3rd Battalion, 16th Regimental Combat team for the 30-minute late landing of their craft, and the 16th Regimental Combat Team’s S-3 Combat for the early (“off schedule”) firing of the rockets.

[19] Armed Forces in Action Series, Omaha Beachhead (6 June – 13 June 1944), Battery Press, Nashville, 1984. pg. 41.

[20] LCT587, LCT589 & LCT590

[21] Henrik Naube, Eckhertz, Holger. D DAY Through German Eyes - The Hidden Story of June 6th 1944: Book One (p. 45). DTZ History Publications. Kindle Edition.  (Omaha Beach, The Resistance Nest Machine gunner

[22] Severloh, Hein. WN 62 - Memories of Omaha Beach: Normandy, June 6, 1944 (German Edition) (p. 74). Kindle Edition.

[23] Gustav Winter, Eckhertz, Holger. D DAY Through German Eyes - More hidden stories from June 6th 1944: Book Two (D DAY - Through German Eyes 2) (p. 5). DTZ History Publications. Kindle Edition.

[24] Sabin’s (CTG124.8) action report, pg. 16.

[25] For Imlay’s comments, see Deputy Commander Task Group 124.3, Report on Operation Neptune, 1 July 1944, pg 10, and for Sabin’s, see pg. 37 of his report (footnoted earlier in this article)

[26] Eckhertz, Holger. D DAY Through German Eyes - The Hidden Story of June 6th 1944: Book One. DTZ History Publications. Kindle Edition. p. 67.

[27] Commander Assault Force “O’ (Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force), Action Report - Assault on Vierville-Collevile Sector, Coast of Normandy, dtd 27 July 1944, pg 7.   In fact, several ships reported near misses at ranges that precluded the beach defenses as their sources.  One of his destroyers, Baldwin, was actually hit by two shells from a shore battery of 75mm or 88mm.

[28] These were foreign nationals categorized as ethic Germans, but not citizens of Germany.  The were a lower racial category and often included Poles who had no allegiance to Germany, but had been conscripted.

[29] See Hall’s 1st endorsement (dtd 25 Sept 1944, pp 18-19) to Deputy Commander Assault Force O-2’s Action Reo0rt – Operation Neptune, dtd 4 July 1944.  NARA, RG 38, NARA Catalog Id: 4697018

‍ ‍

Omaha Bombardment. Part II: The Plan

Overview

With the basic form of Operation Neptune establish in the Initial Joint Plan and the Joint Fire Plan, and further amplified in Admiral Bertram Ramsay’s series of ‘ON’ orders, it was the turn of the subordinate commanders to begin formulating their own orders.  The second tier of orders consisted of those published by the commanders of the Western and Eastern Naval Task Forces, led by Read Admiral Kirk, US Navy, and Rear Admiral Vian, Royal Navy.  Kirk’s Western Naval Task Force (CTF-122), controlling Assault Force Utah and Assault Force Omaha, issued its operation order on 21 April 1944.[1]  It was now time for RADM Hall, commanding the Assault Force Omaha (CTF-124) to get down to the stubby pencil work.

Hall’s planning had gotten off to a poor start, at least according to Ramsay, who had visited Hall in March to observe his Exercise Fox.  Ramsay found the TF-122 staff badly organized and the task force itself not yet formed into task groups, even though they were at the stage of holding exercise rehearsals.  Hall blamed the problem on a lack of staff officers.  Whether Hall’s organization was as bad as Ramsay believed, the matter was not helped by the creation of Moon’s parallel staff for the Utah landings.  Now both naval assets and experienced staff planners were split between the two commands.  And until Hall formed his force into subordinate task groups—who would assume the burden of more detailed planning—his staff would be overworked if not overwhelmed.  This contributed to many of the planning errors which I have highlighted in this series of articles.

Hall published his own order on 20 May,[2] a month after Kirk’s and two weeks after the final rehearsal exercise (Fabius), leaving his subordinate task groups and task elements just a few days to sequentially develop and publish their own orders.[3]

Organizing the Battlespace

Figure 1. Taken from the Fire Support Annex of the CTF-124 Operation Orde, this figure depicts the organization of the offshore waters at the Omaha Assault Area.

Hall’s order included charts which established routes, areas for specific activities and graphical control measures.  In addition to establishing the Transport Area, it also established areas for his fire support ships. (Figure 1) The battleships and cruisers would arrive early off Omaha as they initially had the mission to support the minesweepers with counterbattery fire should German coastal defense sites try to interfere with the vital sweeping task.  These big bombardment ships would anchor in the first areas cleared of mines (the so-called Swept Lanes).  The two designated fire support areas for destroyers included Fire Support Area 3 (encompassing the Kansas and Oregon sectors) and Fire Support Area 4 (encompassing the far eastern area of the Ohio sector).  The bulk of the Ohio sector consisted of the boat lanes for the beaching craft.  The boat lanes were separate from the fire support areas, but some of the bombardment ships could operate in those lanes as required.

Destroyers were not to anchor but were to maneuver to maintain position against the current or to gain to better firing positions.  Once the zones outside the fire support areas were swept of mines, the destroyers could use them for maneuvering.  The area inshore of the 10 fathom line was believed clear of mines and was available for maneuvering.  This requirement to “remain underway maneuvering so as to avoid mutual interference with lines of fire” was necessary but would have an adverse effect on gunnery.  Destroyers were also instructed to “close the range as much as possible when delivering neutralizing and destructive fire.”[4]

Although not shown in Figure 1, the land area was divided into two sectors for the purpose of assigning counter-battery responsibilities.  The boundary coincided with the boundary between the two assault regiments.  The battleships, cruisers and destroyers operating in Fire Support Area 3 were responsible for Sector I (in the west), and those of Fire Support Area 4 were responsible for Sector II.

Organizing the Force

The various ships and craft of the bombarding force were assigned to different task groups at different stages of the operation.  For example, the destroyers successively were part of the escort group during the Channel crossing, then part of the bombardment task group and then to the area screen.  Within the context of the bombardment mission, the fire support groups were organized as follows:

-          FS Group 1:  USS Texas and HMS Glasgow

-          FS Group 2:  USS Arkansas, FS Montcalm and FS Georges Leygeus

-          FS Group 3:  Twelve destroyers/escort destroyers

-          FS Group 4:  Consisting of four sub-groups:  a) Five Landing Craft, Gun (Large) (LCG(L)); b) Nine Landing Craft, Tank (Rocket) (LCT(R)); c) Sixteen Landing Craft, Tank (A) or (HE); and d) Seven Landing Craft (Flak) (LCT(F)).  (The LCF did not figure into the bombardment plan and will not be discussed further).

-          FS Group 5: Ten LCTs with 36 M7 Self-propelled artillery guns embarked.

-          FS Group 6: Twenty-four Landing Craft, Support (Small) (LCS(S)).

Although not included in the CTF 122 task organization, there was another valuable gunfire asset present at Omaha.  Kirk’s command ship, the heavy cruiser USS Augusta (CA-31), would be anchored in the swept lane of Fire Support Area 3.  The nine 8-inch guns of her primary battery and eight 5-inch guns of her secondary battery made her the third most powerful warship at Omaha on D-Day, and were potentially a powerful addition to a bombardment force that was so short on ships that it was forced to rely on self-propelled artillery firing from bobbing LCTs.  But would it be incorporated into the bombardment plan?

Targets and Targeting

Considerable effort had been expended to obtain as much information on enemy dispositions as possible.  Most of the intelligence came from aerial photography and reports from the French resistance.  Although intelligence had missed the movement of the German 352nd Division into the area, it had nevertheless complied a fairly comprehensive index of German positions on and behind the beaches.  The Vth Corps and TF-124 staffs developed a target list of almost 140 locations.  Many of these were important terrain features (e.g., beach exits, road junctions, etc.) but the majority were occupied enemy positions.

One hundred and forty targets were obviously beyond the capability of Hall’s bombardment force, but that wasn’t a problem.  Many of those did not need to be struck during the 40 minutes of preparatory fires, and many others were so close together that they could be suppressed by a single fire mission.  And many more were simply included in the list as they seemed likely to be engaged as combat ashore progressed.

For the purposes of the pre-H-Hour bombardment, the important targets fell into two categories.  The first were enemy coastal artillery positions that could threaten Hall’s ships and craft.  Hall was particularly sensitive—excessively so in some opinions—about the danger from two such batteries: Pointe du Hoc to the west and Longues-sur-Mer to the east.[5]  Although Pointe du Hoc was supposed to be assaulted by the Rangers at H-Hour, and Longues was about 5,700 yards outside of Hall’s sector to the east, both positions housed 155mm guns with estimated ranges of 26,000 yards.  The range fans of these two batteries worried Hall to the extent that he chose an extremely long distance offshore for the Transport Area: 23,000 yards.  (Figure 2) Ramsay had tried to convince Hall to bring it in closer; the British Transport Areas were much closer, despite facing similar or more numerous enemy batteries.  Hall refused.  It was a mistake.  The excessively long ride to the beach contributed to the loss of LCVPs and LC(A)s, and seriously reduced the physical state of the assaulting troops.

Figure 2. This map shows the major coastal artillery batteries and their range fans. The Omaha Transport Area lay just inside where the range fans for the Pointe du Hoc (the red circle) and Longues-sur-Mer (the blue circle) batteries intersected.

Countering coastal artillery batteries (a defensive task) was doctrinally the job of battleships and heavy cruisers, with light cruisers (6-inch/152mm guns) acceptable in a pinch.  Hall had two battleships that could handily suppress a 155mm battery, and potentially the heavy cruiser Augusta (8-inch/203mm guns) as well.  As the Longues battery was in the Gold Assault Area (to be targeted by HMS Ajax, a 6-inch cruiser from that force), Hall was left with just one serious threat, and two heavy ships (and possibly a third: the Augusta) to deal with it.  So, Hall was in excellent shape.  But the battery at Pointe du Hoc was not the only coastal artillery battery.  Port-en-Bessin, at the boundary between Omaha and Gold Assault areas, contained a cluster of smaller caliber guns as well as a few smaller German gun boats, similar to the LCG(L), all mounting 4.7-inch guns or smaller.  These would need to be dealt with. 

The principle offensive task during the pre-Hour bombardment was preparatory fires, defined as:

“. . . intensive fire delivered on the landing beaches and adjacent areas during the approach to the beach of the landing craft of the leading wave.”[6]

The preferred ships for this task were the destroyers due to their high rate of fire with decent-sized projectiles.  Light cruisers were also good in this role.  The heavy cruisers and battleships were less desirable; despite their far heavier shells, their slower rates of fire made them less effective in the drenching fire role, and made them more suitable for deep support missions.

And of course, the heavy bombers would play a role in both the defensive and offensive tasks - more on that in a later installment.

One of the perennial issues in amphibious operations was the competing priorities of the naval and land commanders.  Target selection naturally was an interest to both the Navy (who was concerned primarily with the defensive task of neutralizing enemy coastal artillery) and the Army (who was primarily interested in the offensive task of neutralizing enemy beach defenses).  This was a matter that vexed Ramsay several times during the planning phase. 

“The Army appear to think it is their right to dictate the targets for air & naval guns whereas up to the time the Army are established ashore by the Navy, I maintain that the employment of air and naval guns is mainly a matter for the Naval C in C.”[7]

There appears to be no indication Hall and Major General Gerow (the Vth Corps commander) had any serious disagreement in this regard, but it remains to be seen how Hall’s allocation of fires between the defensive and offensive tasks might have affected the success of the landings. 

Intelligence Failure

It’s important to note what was not included in the target list: the German field artillery batteries.  Indirect fire (gun/howitzer artillery, rockets and mortars) are the principal casualty inflicting weapons in modern warfare.  Small arms fire, wire obstacles and minefields primarily serve the defender by slowing or halting the attackers in a kill zone where they make lucrative targets for indirect fire.  As a result, neutralizing the enemy field artillery units generally has a very high priority.  And yet there was only one ‘possible’ field artillery position included in the target list­—and it was not scheduled for bombardment. 

This omission was a gross error.  It was not, however, an error in judgement among the planners.  It was a failure of intelligence.  Allied intelligence had completely missed the forward repositioning of the German 352nd Infantry Division into the coastal defenses.  And as troops of the 352nd thickened the bunkers and trenches at Omaha, their artillery moved forward as well; in fact, it had moved forward before the infantry units had.  Where there had been just one four-gun 105mm battery supporting the beach defenses, seven batteries could range the beach on D-Day.  Four of these were 105mm batteries and the remainder were 150mm batteries (the latter were just as dangerous as the guns of Pointe du Hoc).[8]

The presence of troops and field artillery batteries of the 352nd Infantry Division were not the only intelligence failures.  Rommel had spurred a frantic rush to increase defensive works, and Allied intelligence was simply unable to keep up with the rapid developments.  Take for example the two most deadly direct-fire weapons the Germans had on Omaha Beach:  the two 88mm anti-tank guns.  The 88mm gun emplaced in WN61 (E-3 Exit) had only been completed in late April, while the one in WN62 had been completed only in late May.[9]  Had their presence been known, or even suspected, Hall’s targeting priorities may have been much different.

As the plans were finalized, the two most deadly categories of German weapons were not even addressed by the bombardment planners: the field artillery batteries and the 88mm anti-tank guns.

Target Assignments

Part of the art of targeting lies in the selection of the targets that needed to be struck, and the assignment of the right bombardment guns and projectiles for the job. 

Navy armor-piercing shells had a delay fuze and were effective in penetrating concrete structures; but they had relatively less high explosives filler than Army projectiles of similar caliber.  The Navy ‘common’ shell had lower penetration, a somewhat higher proportion of high explosives and an instantaneous fuze.  The Army landing manual rated them as “not well suited for general use in support of a landing,” though the AP rounds would be useful against concrete bunkers and casemates, if a direct hit could be scored.  The Army rated the Navy’s HC shells (High Capacity, i.e., thinner-walled projectiles with more high explosives) and AA shells (anti-aircraft shells, sometimes referred to as ‘AA common’) more highly and said they should make up the bulk of the supporting fires.[10]  (The AA shells had roughly 3 times the explosive filler as the common shells.)  The bombardment plan explicitly specified shell types only for the battleships.  However, the plan did include the following guidance:

“Destroyers will use a high ratio of common type projectiles in pre-landing bombardments.”[11]

It isn’t clear why Hall’s plan favored a less capable projectile for the destroyers during the critical bombardment phase, but it may be one reason the bombardment was not as effective as hoped.  The fuze/shell combinations that were actually fired on D-Day will be covered in a later installment.

Now, let’s see how the bombardment plan combined these assets and against which targets. 

14-inch and 6-inch Guns

With an abundance of battleships and cruisers—at least in regard to the number of coastal artillery batteries—Hall had some flexibility in assigning these ships to targets beyond their doctrinal defensive role.  Figure 3 illustrates target allocation for the primary batteries of each of the two battleships and three cruisers.  He assigned two ships to defensive missions: the Texas’ 14-inch guns targeted the battery at Pointe du Hoc with up to 250 rounds (65% AP/ 35% HC) and very briefly the adjacent St. Peirre du Mont infantry position (12 rounds, HC), while the Montcalm’s 6-inch guns targeted the smaller enemy guns at Port-en-Bessin with 300 rounds.  These two ships easily overmatched their targeted batteries in caliber, number of guns and rate of fire.  There was one disconnect with the Texas, however.  Because the CTF plan specified the ratio of HC to AP rounds, the subordinate fire support unit commanders were not authorized to change that ratio. RADM Bryant was the commander of the Bombardment Group (CTG 124,9), and he flew his flag from the Texas.  Bryant’s order specified that HC shells should be used in counter battery fire, not AP.[12] This was likely in recognition of the fact that the guns of Pointe du Hoc were believed to be in open gun pits. Not all the smaller guns at Port-en-Bessin, however, were in open emplacements.

Figure 3. Targets assigned to the main batteries of the battleships and light cruisers.

That left Hall with the Arkansas and two cruisers he could devote to neutralizing beach defenses.  The defenses at Exit D-3 received the bulk of their attention, with WN68 being the focus of two of the Arkansas’ fire missions, and WN66 receiving a third (385 rounds for all three of its missions; 70% HC/30% AP).  Although Ramsay specified the objective was merely neutralization, Hall’s order specified destructive effects for these Arkansas fire missions. They were the only targets at Omaha for which destructive results specified. When destructive effects are desired, F.T.P-167 advised HC shells should be used with delayed fuzes, a point whose significance will become apparent later.

WN66 also received the full attention of the Glasgow’s main battery (400 rounds).  

The Georges Leygues’s main battery was assigned WN64 (250 rounds)

4-inch and 5-inch Guns

One destroyer, the Frankfort, would play no role in the pre-H-hour bombardment.  Although it was the flagship for Destroyer Squadron 18 (DESRON18) and had the squadron commander aboard (who therefore commanded the 12 ships of the Destroyer Fire Support Group), it was initially tasked with organizing the offshore screen,[13] so was not physically in the fire support areas until after H-hour.  The absence of the squadron commander could pose problems for the bombardment, and it is a point to keep in mind when we examine the execution of the plan. The two destroyer division commanders, however, remained in the fire support areas and should have provided continuity of command.

The secondary 5-inch batteries of the two battleships were employed against WN71 (Texas, 250 rounds) and WN61 (Arkansas, 250 rounds).  (Figure 4)  Although each battleship had six of these guns, they were in casemate mounts, so only the three guns from the engaged side of each ship could fire these missions.  With a rate of fire of 8-9 rounds a minute, a battery of three such guns should have been capable of firing the allotted 250 rounds during the bombardment.

Figure 4. Targets assigned to the destroyers and the secondary batteries of the battleships.

Six of the US destroyers were assigned targets defending the Dog through Fox beach sectors.  Each of these targets was one of the German resistance nests along the beach (except for WN69, 66 and 64).  These destroyers were each tasked with from one to three targets and allocated 250-350 rounds.

Interestingly, no 5-inch fire was allocated against the defenses at the D-3 Draw.  Only the 12-inch guns of the Arkansas and the 6-inch guns of the Glasgow were turned on these positions. This might provide an interesting test case as to whether the larger 12- and 6-inch guns were more effective in the neutralization/destruction role than the lighter 5-inch guns.

One thing summary discloses is that Hall’s bombardment plan had inserted targets that did not directly address counterbattery or beach neutralization tasks. (Figure 5) One destroyer, the Satterlee, was assigned two adjacent targets (in WN76) a kilometer west of Pointe du Hoc.  This was a curious choice for a command that was short on bombardment ships, especially as 300 rounds were allocated to its neutralization.  The targets were not in a position to threaten the landing at Pointe du Hoc.  The target list did not identify any enemy force at that position, and the intelligence overlay indicated it was only occupied by a squad.[14]  From a point, more than 80 years removed, it would seem this target would have been better addressed after H-Hour, and Satterlee would have been better employed elsewhere during the bombardment period.

Figure 5. This chart shows how the guns of the Bombardment Group were allocated missions for the pre-H-Hour preparatory fires phase. Forty-one of the 132 guns were not allocated to either of the two primary tasks during that phase.

Similarly, the destroyer Thompson was assigned two targets, which were separated by more than 400 yards (meaning one fire mission could not cover both targets), in the vicinity of Pointe et Raz de la Percée (WN74, 450 rounds).  This area was the assault objective for the two companies of the 2nd Ranger Battalion that were to land on the Charlie beach sector, but they would not be in position to assault the strongpoint from the landward side for at least an hour, as they would have to scale the cliffs of Charlie beach sector and then maneuver to WN74.  Thus, Thompson’s fire would cease on one of the targets (the defensive works) far too early to be of any use in supporting the Ranger assault.  The second target within that strongpoint, however, included two 80mm guns (75mm in some sources) facing east toward the Dog beach sectors and was a legitimate target for the bombardment period.

Although Hall complained about the lack of bombardment ships, his plan took three destroyers largely out of the fight.  One (Frankfort) was diverted to the screen, one (Satterlee) and a half (Thompson) were diverted to targets not critical to either defensive or offensive tasks; only half the firepower of a single ship of the three (Thompson) was committed to a defensive task. 

Among the British Hunt class ships, we again see the diversion of guns from both the defensive and offensive tasks, with Talybont firing four missions (about 400 rounds) against two German positions between Pointe et Raz de la Percée and Pointe du Hoc.  Neither of these positions threatened the amphibious shipping nor contributed to neutralizing the beach defenses.  While they did contain German troops, these could have been targeted after H-hour, thus freeing up the Talybont for beach defense neutralization.

Similarly, Melbreak, off the east end of the beaches, was assigned a single fire mission against WN59, three kilometers east of the E-3 exit.  It had no weapons to threaten the amphibious shipping, nor did it cover any of the landing beach sectors.  The firing period for this mission was from H-40 to H+60, with 300 rounds allotted.

Only Tanatside seems to have contributed to either the defensive or offensive tasks, being assigned two fire mission against WN65, on the west side of the E-1 exit (400 rounds).

Although the figures varied between ships, generally they were allotted roughly 25%of their magazine capacity for the bombardment phase. This was in line with guidance from F.T.P-167, which also reserved another 25% for targets of opportunity after H-Hour. The CTF-124 plan directed the 5-inch ammunition allowance for destroyers to be:

• 1250 rounds AA common (7.11 - 8.4 lbs. explosive filler)

• 250 rounds common (2.58 lbs. explosive filler)

• 45 rounds White Phosphorus (smoke)

• 100 rounds illuminating

• 200 round AA special (Variable time fuze)

LCTs / M7 Self-Propelled Artillery

The 36 self-propelled howitzers of the 58th and 62nd Armored Field Artillery Battalions were embarked in 10 LCTs.  They were assigned targets at opposite flanks of the beach, with 100 rounds allocated per gun, for a total of 3,600 rounds to be fired in a 25-minute period between H-30 and H-5.  In theory, this represented a significant addition to the bombardment. (Figure 6)

Figure 6. Targets assigned to the LCT(R)s, LCG(L)s, self-propelled artillery and PatrolCraft.

The guns were due to start firing at about 8,000 yards (at H-30) and continue firing as the LCTs slowly cruised toward the shore, ceasing fire at about 3,700 yards (expected to be at H-5).  The guns faced two major challenges to accuracy.  First, the motion of the LCTs in even moderate seas would play havoc with the trajectories.  Second, as the range decreased, that variable had to be continually factored into the gun data.  There were two methods of doing this.  The first was simply sighting the target in the direct fire mode and adjusting the gun’s elevation for each round.  It’s doubtful the sights on the self-propelled howitzers were adequate to identify the assigned targets at those ranges except in the most general geographic sense, and this method depended on the skill of 36 individual gunners.  These factors did not promise good results.

The second method was the clock method, which was based on the assumption that the LCTs would close the beach at a predictable pace, and the gunnery data could then be pre-calculated and changed on a time schedule while firing.  This was the method taught at the Assault Training Course and seemed the more precise, or rather less inaccurate, method. 

There is little in the records that documents the training, planning or firing while afloat by these two battalions.  As to how they performed the gunnery tasks on D-Day, there is only a single off-hand comment that they shot in the direct fire mode.

The technique of using self-propelled artillery firing from LCTs did not appear promising.  During Exercise Trousers (12 April), Ramsay observed 90% of the shells fell into the sea.[15]  A week later, however, at the next exercise (Exercise Smash III, 18 April) he noted they fired “good, the best I have seen . . .”[16]  As promising as that improvement might be—and he did not indicate how effective that relative improvement was—those were British exercises and did not reflect whatever proficiency the American units at Omaha had achieved.

LCT(R)s

The nine LCT(R)s were part of CAPT L. S. Sabin, Jr.’s Gunfire Support.  These LCTs originally had been given to the British through Lend Lease.  For Neptune, they were to be modified to carry about 1000 rockets each and ‘reverse Lend Leased’ back to the US.  The craft were delivered late and were in very poor material condition.  Although they had begun forming crews for these craft by the end of 1943, the late delivery of the craft posed major training hurdles.  As of 5 May, only two of the LCT(R)s destined for Omaha were on hand, with the remaining seven arriving on the 6th, 17th and the final craft during the last week of the month.  The late delivery of the LCT(R)s meant all nine crews had to rotate on the two available craft during training, resulting in minimal depth of experience for the raw crews.  By the time the last seven craft began to arrive, the British Assault Gunnery School had closed and the LCT(R) flotilla had to conduct makeshift training on their own.  Only one craft had participated in Exercise Tiger (it did not fire) and another in Exercise Fabius.  None of the crews were experienced in basic seamanship, ship handling or use of the rockets.  Two crews:

“ . . . joined the assault forces without ever having handled their craft except in the passage from Base Two and without ever firing rockets except at the Assault Gunnery School.”[17]

Sabin rated his LCT(R)s’ readiness as: 

“Generally poor except for two or three early deliveries which reached a satisfactory state of training.”[18]

The rocket craft were assigned beach neutralization targets along the landing sectors, mostly targeting strongpoints flanking the four draws.  (One craft was assigned the 75mm guns of WN74 at Pointe et Raz de la Percée).  Nine thousand rockets should smother the beach defenses in the five minutes before the first wave landed.  The intent was for these craft to take position about 2,700 yards behind the first wave, and fire their rockets when the first wave LCT(A)/(HE)s were 300 yards offshore, but the erratic nature of these rockets caused this to be increased to 500 yards.  The rocket craft had radar to determine the range and were to fire ranging shots to confirm the distance before firing their full salvos. 

LCG(L)s

The LCG(L)s were converted LCT(3) hulls, and they also suffered from late delivery and a rushed training program.  Nevertheless, Sabin rated their readiness on the eve of the invasion as fair.

Mounting two 4.7-inch guns, they were to take position to the flanks of the first wave (the LCT(A)/(HE)s) and fire on specified targets from H-20 until just before H-Hour (the specific time varied by craft).  All of their targets were offensive, consisting of immediate beach defenses, and there were about 150 rounds of ammunition allotted for each LCG(L).  Note that the 4.7-inch guns were a larger caliber than those mounted in the Hunt class destroyers, though the latter were better gunfire craft with better gun control systems.

LCS(S)s

One other category of fire support craft was at hand.  These were the Landing Craft, Support (Small) (i.e., LCS(S)) of Fire Support Group 6.  Their firepower was so small that Hall’s plan did not bother to assign them targets.  Nevertheless, there were 24 of them, each mounting machine guns and launchers for 24 rockets (with 24 reloads).  Their mission was to guide in initial waves and provide last minute suppressive fire starting 1,000 yards from the beach.

Although not included in any of the fire support groups, there were six patrol craft that would serve as the primary control craft for the various beach sectors. As each of these patrol craft mounted a 3-inch gun, they were assigned specific targets and were each allotted 50 rounds to fire between H-25 to H-5. 

Key Guidance

In addition to these provisions, Hall’s plan included many details to regulate the bombardment.

One of these details conflicted with Ramsay’s ON 8, and would prove to impact execution on D-Day.  Under ‘Close Support Fire—Drenching of Beach Defenses’,[19] Ramsay directed:

“A high rate of fire is to be maintained during this period, even though continuous spotting is likely to be impractical.”[20]

Hall’s order, however, stated:

“Ships are not to employ rapid fire for more than one minute without correcting for range and deflection.”[21]

Hall’s guidance appears to mirror that which Ramsay had issued for counterbattery fire (the section preceding the Close Fire Support section), but the CTF-124 order stated it in a context that applied to fire support missions in general.  Under Ramsay’s instructions, a destroyer whose preplanned bombardment target was shrouded in dust should continue firing.  Under Hall’s instructions, the destroyer would have to cease firing as they could not spot and correct their fire.  This situation was hopefully clarified by the CTG-124.9 (RADM Bryant’s Bombardment Force) order that stated:

“(12) Due to dust, haze and general confusion, air spot for scheduled firing may not be available.  In such case carry out fire on scheduled targets using best data available.”[22]

In reality, it was an open question as to which instructions a ship’s captain would follow.  It was an opportunity for confusion, and Chaos seldom lets such opportunities pass.

Another note in Hall’s order raised another question:

“Fire missions assigned Destroyers and LCG(L)s and scheduled above to close between H-5 and H-2 shall be continued until LCT(A) – LCT(HE) wave fouls the range.”[23]

As a result, positioning of the destroyers would be key to whether they might be forced to cease fire before H-5 or were able to continue as long as the leading wave might be delayed. Unfortunately, Hall’s order did not specify the destroyers’ positions other than assigning them patrol areas—in which they were to remain maneuvering underway—so at this point it isn’t clear if there was adequate effort to deconflict gun-target lines and wave approach bearings.  That level of detail was also not addressed in RADM Bryant’s order for the Bombardment Group or in CAPT Harry Sander’s order for the Destroyer Fire Support Group.[24]

More than Just Lobbing Shells‍

Unnoticed in the plan was small bit of confusion that would have significant impact on D-Day. The US destroyers had no experience with shore bombardment in an actual invasion, and their training in the UK had been limited by insufficient ammunition allocations. The Arkansas had yet to fire any of its guns in anger in WWII, so was completely new to the intricacies of beach neutralization. Even the Texas had had only a brief experience with bombardment, and that was in 1942 during Operation Torch. The confusion centered around their understanding of the concept of neutralization, which in a number of cases would lead to premature suspension of bombardment. As a result, the conduct of fire by several of these ships turned out to be not at all what was expected, either in terms of the number of rounds fired or in synchronization with the landing of troops. Somewhere along the line, the bombardment force hadn’t fully understood the nature of their task. A more complete explanation of this disconnect will have to wait for the next installment.

The Problem with the Pointe

The six 155mm coastal artillery guns at Pointe du Hoc seemed to have had a hypnotizing effect on the planners at all levels, but especially within Hall’s staff.  This battery was easily overmatched in caliber, number of guns and rate of fire by the Texas (ten 14-inch/356mm guns) and the Arkansas (twelve 12-inch/305mm guns) and was even overmatched in terms of number of guns and rate of fire by each of the three cruisers (nine or twelve 152mm guns per cruiser).  More importantly, the Pointe du Hoc battery was a German Army unit, which meant its director and fire control systems were not at all sufficiently refined for engaging moving naval targets.  Most telling of all, the battery position consisted of open gun pits (excepting for the two initial casemate positions that had been damaged).  They could be easily neutralized, even by a destroyer, using time-fuze (air burst) projectiles.

Doctrinally, battleships and cruisers were the best platforms to neutralize coastal artillery batteries, but this would seem to have been one of the obvious cases to ignore the manual.  The nature of the Pointe du Hoc battery simply was not as serious a threat as was feared.

The battery position did still need to be neutralized, if for no other reason than to assist the Ranger assault, but this would have been better served by a destroyer such as the Satterlee, which according to the plan would be wasting its pre-H-Hour shelling on a non-critical target to the west.  This would have freed up the main battery of the Texas for employment against defenses at one of the two primary exits.

The Naval Bombardment Plan – A Lack of Focus?

Our initial focus was on Hall’s allocation of bombardment ships between offensive and defensive targets.  But this examination reveals he had introduced a third mission set.  During an assault, a basic tenet of fire support is that as troops close on the objective, the fires are then shifted to the flanks and rear of the objective to seal it off from reinforcements, pin enemy formations in place, etc.  This shifting of fires would fall into the Navy’s Close and Deep Support categories.  Several of the target assignments discussed above clearly fall into those support categories, but were incorporated into the short pre-landing preparatory fires.  There’s nothing particularly wrong in doing that, assuming you have ample support assets to adequately do the beach neutralization tasks, and have enough excess guns for any support tasks.  Hall, however, made it abundantly clear he felt he did not have adequate bombardment ships.  Thus, every gun Hall diverted to these support tasks further hamstrung the beach neutralization effort, which he felt was already critically under-supported. 

The Satterlee, Talybont and Melbreak (and half of the Thomspon’s firepower) were all assigned to targets which neither threatened the amphibious shipping nor played a role in the immediate suppression of the landing sectors.  There were probably reasons to shell those targets, but nothing so time-sensitive or imperative that they needed to divert scarce guns from beach neutralization in the equally scarce time allotted for that task.  Indeed, the targets for those three ships could, and probably should have been shelled after H-Hour.  In much the same vein, only one of Thompson’s two targets (the set of 75mm guns at Pointe et Raz de la Percée) demanded attention prior to H-Hour.  The second target could wait until later.

Having brought up the topic of “lifting and shifting” fires after H-Hour, it must be noted that Hall’s plan virtually ignored this mission set after H-Hour—at least as far as the ground combat was concerned.  Virtually all of the pre-planned fires starting after H-Hour were directed against defensive targets (enemy positions that threatened amphibious shipping).  Montcalm and Tanatside would continue shelling Port-en-Bessin.  Melbreak would continue shelling its ‘isolation target’ past H-Hour and through to H+80, at which time it would further pile on Port-en-Bessin.  Satterlee, Talybont and Thompson would continue firing on their pre-H-Hour targets for times ranging from 15 to 45 minutes after H-hour.

Only four ships had new preplanned targets assigned after H-Hour.  The Arkansas would shoot 50 rounds of harassing fire at the city of Treviers, 8 kilometers south of Vierville (identified merely as ‘troops in town).  Destroyers Carmick, Emmons and Doyle were allotted a combined total of 150 rounds to shell six grid coordinates (not further identified) located at the heads of the D-3, E-1 and E-3 draws.  These were scheduled to last just 20 minutes, with an average of only 25 rounds per target.   

In summary, Hall’s plan wasted the firepower of three and a half of his destroyers on targets which neither threatened the amphibious shipping, nor contributed to neutralizing the beach defenses, to which must be added the diversion of the Frankfort to the screen.  These four and a half ships would have been an important addition to the firepower of the seven and a half destroyers that were committed to neutralizing the beach defenses.  It must be noted that the 1st Division order for the invasion seems to have been fully in agreement with this diversion of firepower.

And finally, the cruiser Augusta.  As Kirk’s flagship (with Bradley aboard), the Augusta did not fall within Hall’s task organization.  In fact, in addition to its role as the CTF-122 command ship, it was also part of the Reserve Gunfire Support Group (CTG-122.5 - more on this unit at a later date!). As it was the sole heavy cruiser present and already had a gunfire role, the omission of its 8-inch guns from the bombardment plan raises serious questions.   If Hall—and Kirk—really felt so strongly about the shortage of bombardment ships, it is odd they could not find a way to to incorporate the Augusta into the bombardment plan.

So, it would seem that the plan’s allocation of ship to mission roles was faulty, and failed to weight the allocation sufficiently to beach neutralization.  But what about allocation of fires to key targets within those mission roles?  This is a difficult question as neither the naval plan nor 1st Division plan gave any relative priority to eliminating any resistances nests or opening any exits.  All were treated as the same priority and the assumption seemed to be that the beach defenses would be knocked out in stride; most of the order focused on achieving objectives well beyond the beach. 

There were two paved roads off the beach, through the D-1 and D-3 exits, and you might assume they would be given higher priority, but they were not.  In fact, the 1st Division’s Traffic Circulation Map indicated traffic leaving the beach would go through the D-3, E-1 and E-3 exits, with return traffic to the beach down the F-1 exit.  The paved road at the E-1 exit was not part of the traffic circulation off the beach to the vehicle transit areas.[25]  Although there is no evidence of a direct linkage between this traffic circulation scheme and Hall’s fire support plan, the relatively light fires devoted to WN71, 72 and 74 may have been influenced by it not being a one of the beach exit routes. The plan assigned only two 5-inch fire missions against these three targets (McCook and Texas’ 5-inch battery for a total of 550 rounds).  Three LCG(L)s, one rocket barrage one third of a battalion of self-propelled guns and two patrol craft were also to be concentrated on these positions, but all those assets had severe accuracy problems.  The only fires whose accuracy could be relied on were the 5-inch guns.  It was not an impressive concentration of firepower considering how dangerous those defenses turned out to be.

As for the D-3 exit, recall that the Arkansas was assigned a destruction mission against WN66 and WN68. The plan called for 70% of the 385 rounds to be HC, and the destruction role called for delayed fuze. This would virtually guarantee heavy cratering of the paved road through the D-3 draw, negating much of its early value.

The defenses at the E-3 exit, guarding the unpaved secondary road, also included three positions: WN60, 61 and 63.  The firepower concentrated here was substantially greater, although the three positions were dispersed over roughly twice as wide an area as at the D-1 exit.  Nevertheless, four destroyers and the secondary battery of the Arkansas targeted those defenses with 1,450 5-inch projectiles.  Three LCT(R) rocket barrages were also dedicated to this area as were all the self-propelled howitzers of the 62nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion.  Even in terms of planned air strikes, the E-3 draw was more heavily target with five strikes as compared to three at the D-1 Exit.  Only the LCG(L) support was lower at the E-3 exit.

It isn’t clear whether the CTF-124 planners were aware of the presence of the 88mm guns at the D-1 and E-3 exits.  As noted earlier, the gun position in WN61 was completed in late April, and the one in WN72 was completed in late May.  The fact that the bombardment plan did not target those positions with anything greater than 5-inch guns tends to indicate they were not aware of those threats.  The 1st Division’s plan indicates they were aware of the new casemate in WN61 (with no indication of the size of the gun) but appeared totally unaware of the new casemate in WN72.[26]  Being apparently unaware of the latter 88mm gun position, the planners seemed to have had no particular reason to target the E-1 draw’s defenses more heavily.  

We can form some conclusions from CTF-124 targeting.  It appears it failed to effectively use its bombardment ships, with a significant portion of the firepower diverted to secondary targets or diverted to non-gunfire missions.  The bulk of Hall’s firepower (in terms of sheer volume of projectiles) rested on the self-propelled artillery and the LTC(R)s; the former being highly unreliable and the latter seriously under-trained.  Aware of the deficiencies of both of those assets, one would think the CTF-124 plan would have more fully exploited the battleships, cruisers and destroyers in the beach neutralization role.  In addition, several planning factors would contribute to lessening the effectiveness of the bombardment, such as the instruction to use a high ratio of common rounds, and instructions requiring a halt to rapid fire after one minute to verify spotting.  And there was more . . .

Target Geometry and Gun-Target Lines

Figure 7. An example of a German gun casemate with the embrasure protected by a ‘wing’ of blast wall.

In his report on the invasion, Hall remarked on the difficulty of spotting the enemy’s gun positions because they were sited to enfilade the beach and were protected on the seaward side by concrete and earth walls which not only protected the bunkers but shielded the gun muzzles and embrasures from view.[27]  This should not have been a surprise as the weekly ‘Martian’ intelligence reports (dating prior to 20 May when Hall’s order was issued) included detailed drawings of the typical gun bunkers used by the Germans.  These plainly showed the protective blast wall that shielded the gun and embrasure against observation and fire from directly offshore.

If the planners did examine those drawings, the targeting implications seemed to have been lost on them.  While these gun bunkers were proof against fire from directly offshore as well as naval fire coming obliquely from offshore to the rear, there was still one direction in which they were vulnerable.  A ship close inshore in the direction of the embrasure could land shells near or behind the protective blast wall, and perhaps even in or near the embrasure.  Although the chances of destroying the gun were still slim, gunfire delivered on such a gun-target line had a much greater chance of neutralizing (stunning/demoralizing) the crew.

The bombardment plan overlooked this point.  Taking the destroyers as an example, those bombarding the beach defenses were split into two groups (located to the eastern and western flanks of the beach) and were assigned targets on their corresponding halves of the beach.  As a result, their gun-target lines would usually send shells at the enfilading positions from the worst possible angle.  The Emmons and Baldwin, both directed to fire on WN62, would fire on their target from positions to the east of it, meaning their gun-target lines could not possibly place rounds that might threaten the embrasures or crews of the two concrete emplacements for the 75mm guns. 

Figure 8. An overhead view of WN62. The blue lines show the orientation of the protective blast walls that shielded the embrasures. The blast walls were about 15-20 yards long. The orange arrows show the principal directions of fire for the 75mm guns. The red and yellow lines represent the gun-target lines for destroyers Baldwin and Emmons, respectively. Based on their positions offshore, these destroyers had little chance to neutralize these bunkers or other west-facing emplacements.

Similarly, the Baldwin was directed to fire at WN61, as was the 5-inch battery of the Arkansas.  Again, both ships were located somewhat to the east of the target, meaning it was impossible to see even partly around the blast walls or threaten the embrasures.  This was particularly unfortunate as the west-facing 88mm anti-tank gun was in that position.   

It must be pointed out, however, that the Emmons and Baldwin weren’t in totally useless positions, as their gun-target lines had somewhat more favorable angles on the eastward facing positions in WN62.  But this merely emphasizes the point that such positions should be bombarded by ships with complementary gun-target lines so that embrasures could be threatened by at least one of the ships no matter which direction the bunker faced.  Neither Hall’s nor Bryant’s order addressed this.

In a few cases, a ship had a decent gun-target line.  HMS Tanatside was one of those.  Directed to fire on WN65, its gun-target line had a favorable (but not ideal) angle on the eastward facing bunker in that position.  Its gun-target line would have been much more favorable had it come a couple thousand yards closer inshore.

Figure 9. Actual and alternate positions and gun-target lines for HMS Tanaside. The yellow line for the Tanatside shows the distance the ship closed while firing and the red line points to its target at WN65. The blue line from WN65 indicates the direction of the blast wall protecting the east-facing bunker. Had the Tanatside been able to start firing from closer inshore, it could have obtained a much better firing line on the bunker. The proposed alternate position shown for the Tanatside was still 4,000 yards offshore (3,500 yards closer inshore than its actual position).

And this would turn out to be an issue during the bombardment.  While the destroyers heroically came in so close to shore later in the day that they risked grounding, during the pre-H-Hour bombardment the plan had positioned them so far offshore that it limited gun-target lines to unfavorable angles on the targets. The plan did direct them to close inshore as much as possible; in the next installment we’ll see how well that played out.

It would seem very little thought had gone into the positioning of the various bombardment ships relative to the location and configuration of their targets, or relative to the position of other bombardment ships.  The reports of ships having to check fire as a sister ship drifted into the gun-target line would also indicate this.[28] The plan’s organization of the water off the beach (Figure 1) was taken almost directly from the generic example diagram in F.T.P-167. But German defenses at Omaha were not generic, and a more sophisticated set of fire support lanes should have been developed to effectively carry out the bombardment mission. Any attempt to address this problem would have had to create something along the lines of a third fire support area in the middle of the boat lanes.  From there two or three destroyers could get better angles on the on the embrasures which ships in the flanking fire support areas could not possibly threaten.  While such a solution would introduce additional problems—which should not be underestimated—it was the only way to spot and strike at these hidden gun positions.

A Question of Scale vs Psychology

So far we have considered the bombardment plan only from a quantitative perspective, as if it were some sort of mathematical equation: X number of projectiles delivered to an area Y yards square will neutralize the position.  But combat is a human endeavor, and such a mathematical approach ignores the human factor.  A bombardment that will break and route one defender may have little effect on another defended with higher morale or better discipline.  And in that truism may lie much of the blame for the failure of the Omaha bombardment.

Figure 10. This figure depicts the combined targeting from all naval bombardment ships and craft (except the LCS(S)s). While it appears comprehensive, many details would combine to substantially reduce the potential effects of the bombardment plan.

The bombardment was designed with the expectation that the defenses were manned by a limited number of low quality troops from the 716th Infantry Division, a ‘static’ formation incapable of offensive operations.  Despite the impressive strengthening of the physical defenses under Rommel’s prodding, the men manning the defenses were the same old men, young boys and convalescents.  Worse (though better for the invaders), a substantial number of the division’s troops were conscripted Poles whose loyalty to the Reich was almost nonexistent.

Most of the defenders’ hardened positions (gun casemates, troops shelters, ammunition shelters, etc.) were built to standards that made them basically proof against 5-inch shells, which was part of the reason the objective was neutralization, not destruction.  Neutralizing effects—stunning and demoralizing the defenders—are largely dependent on morale.  And the morale of the static 716th Infantry Division’s troops wasn’t expected to be very high.  With the strongpoints thinly manned, with almost no artillery support and almost no reserves at hand, the defenders’ sense of isolation would have been much greater.  The defenders’ morale, already weak, would have been especially vulnerable to the psychological effects of the bombardment. 

But all that changed when Rommel ordered the 352nd Infantry Division to move forward to bolster the defenses.  Steven Zaloga’s detailed analysis indicates the Omaha defenses had been tripled by the addition of two rifle companies of the 916th Infantry Regiment (part of 352nd Division) as well as detachments from that regiment’s heavy weapons company, infantry gun company and anti-tank company.  In addition, two engineer companies had moved in just behind the line of beach defenses.[29]  The reinforcements from the higher-quality 352nd Infantry Division served to stiffen the original defenders, and the presence of reinforcements from the 352nd located to the rear would have further raised the defenders’ morale.

Perhaps the greatest boost to the resolve of the defenders was the four 105mm and three 150mm batteries of artillery, where before the defenders had just one.    

All in all, the defenders on 6 June were far less likely to suffer the demoralization effects than the original garrison the plan was based on.  The neutralizing/demoralizing effects of bombardment are to a major degree dependent on the morale and quality of the troops being attacked.  And the bombardment at Omaha found itself attacking far stronger defenses than had been anticipated, in both physical and morale respects.  This key factor of psychological vulnerability/resilience is typically omitted from analyses of the Omaha bombardment.  And that is a critical failure, for the psychological state of the defenders was perhaps even more important than the depth of concrete or weight of projectiles. 

The intelligence failure was a matter beyond Hall’s and his planners’ hands.  What they absolutely could affect, however, were the details of the bombardment plan.  Did they employ their bombardments assets in the best way possible, or even reasonably well?  This analysis calls that into doubt.  Given that Hall had complained long and loudly that he had been given woefully inadequate bombardment assets, some of his decisions are open to question.  Was the Frankfort’s diversion to the offshore screen during the bombardment period wise?  Was the failure to incorporate the Augusta into the bombardment plan wise?  Why was the Texas assigned the Pointe du Hoc mission?  Why were so many destroyers/escort destroyers assigned targets that addressed neither the defensive nor offensive tasks of the bombardment?  Why did the fire support areas provide such unfavorable gun-target lines?  Why were less suitable projectiles selected?  Given these questions, it may be that the failure of the bombardment was not so much a matter of too few bombardment ships or too little time for the bombardment, as it was poor use of the assets at hand.

In the Next Installment . . .

I had planned to include a discussion of the air bombardment plan in this installment, but it quickly became clear the discussion of both the naval and air plans would take up far too much space for one installment.  So, the matter of employing strategic heavy bombers in tactical support of an amphibious landing will have to wait a week or two.  At that time, we’ll examine whether the B-24s were capable of delivering even a fraction of the ordnance that Hall and Gerow were counting on (assuming weather permitted visual bombing) or whether the entire plan was a fantasy.

Footnotes

[1] Western Naval Task Force, Allied Naval Expeditionary Force (CTF-122), Operation Plan No. 2-44.  Short Title: “ONWEST TWO.”

[2] Eleventh Amphibious Force (Task Force 122), Operation Order No. BB-44.

[3] Most of his subordinate task groups issued their orders between 27 and 31 May.

[4] TF-124, Operation Order No. BB-44, Annex E, pg. 2 and pg. 8.

[5] The coastal artillery batteries at Maisy and Grandchamps were at the far western end of the Omaha Assault Area, but these guns were oriented towards the Utah area and could not bear on the Hall’s Transport Area.

[6] US Navy F.T.P. 167, Landing Operations Doctrine, 1938, pg. 114.  The corresponding Army manual, Field Manual 31-5, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores, 1941, pg. 103, contains similar language.

[7] Ramsay’s Diary, 15 March, pg. 44

[8] In the event, one of the 105mm batteries was reserved for defending Port-en-Bessen and did not fire on Omaha’s landing beaches.

[9] Zaloga, Steven. The Devil's Garden: Rommel's Desperate Defense of Omaha Beach on D-Day Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (Kindle Edition). pg. 234.

[10] War Department Basic Field Manual, Landing Operation on Hostile Shores (FM 31-5), Washington, D.C., 1941, Chptr 6, pg. 106.  Much the same guidance was contained in the U.S. Navy’s F.T.P.-167, Landing Operations Doctrine, Washington, D.C., 1938, pg. 133.

[11] TF-124, Operation Order No. BB-44, Annex E, pg. 8.

[12] CTG 124.9 Operation Order No. B1/44, dtd 31 May 1944, pg. 4.

[13] In the wake of the disastrous E Boat attack during Exercise Tiger, the American naval leaders were highly concerned about a similar attack coming from Cherbourg during the landings.

[14] The position included at least one 37mm antiaircraft gun and would become a thorn in the side of the Ranger’s position later, but that does not change the fact that those 300 rounds of 5-inch fire would have been better employed elsewhere. 

[15] Ramsay Diary, 12 Apr, pg. 55

[16] Ramsay Diary, 18 Apr, pg. 57

[17] Commander, Gunfire Support Craft (CTF-124.8), Action Report – Operation Neptune, dtd. 3 July 1944, pg. 6.

[18] Ibid, pg. 7.

[19] There is a bit of doctrinal language problem here, as the US Navy did not consider ‘close support’ to be preparatory fire, rather a phase following the landing of the troops.  Regardless, Ramsay’s meaning is clear.

[20] ON 8 paragraph 37,

[21] Hall’s order, Annex E, pg. 7, para 3.x.(5)

[22] CTG 124.9 (Bombardment Group) Operation Order No. B1/44, dtd 31 May 1944, pg. 5, para (12)

[23] Hall’s order, Appendix 3 to Annex E, pg 17, note at end of para 1.

[24] DESRON18 (Destroyer Fire Support Group/TG 124.9.3) Operation Order No. 7-44, dtd 2 June 1944.

[25] Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Field Order No. 35, dtd 16 April 1944, Annex 4 (Administrative Orders, Appendix 1 (traffic Circulation Map.

[26] Ibid.  Annex 10 (Tank Employment Plan) identified only two “Special Targets” and directed one platoon of tanks to knock out each of the positions.   One of the special targets was the casemate in WN60 (but did not identify the caliber of gun within).  The other Special Target was WN74 (Pointe et Raz de la Percée). The new casemate in WN72, which would house the 88mm gun, was completely omitted.  Subsequent changes to that order did not update the intelligence or targeting.  

[27] Commander Task Force 124, Action Report – Assault on Vierville-Colleville Sector, Coast of Normandy, dtd 27 July 1944, pp. 96-7 and 103.

[28] To be more closely discussed in a following installment.

[29] Zaloga, pg. 131.