The Duplex Drive Tanks of Omaha Beach, Part (f) Conclusions and Final Thoughts
The saga of the Omaha Duplex Drive tanks is in many ways symbolic of Operation Neptune itself. The need for these tanks was a direct result of the alliance’s strategic dilemma: despite nominally giving the invasion high priority, it was unable or unwilling to commit sufficient naval assets to the task. One of the results of this mismatch between strategic lines of effort and force priorities was the critical shortage of bombardment ships for Neptune. The eventual solution was to seize on an experimental concept, throw it in on the first wave of the assault, and hope for the best.
On the one hand we see in this the genius of innovation, flexibility and industrial brute force, all key components of the eventual Allied victory. The fact that the industrial base could convert 200 Sherman tanks into duplex drive variants and ship them to the United Kingdom in a matter of just a couple months was an astounding feat (not to overlook the conversions being produced in the UK). But that kind of improvisation often contains the seeds of failure, usually in the form of inadequate engineering or inadequate production quality. And so it was here. The design of the duplex drive kit was so immature that the first thing they had to do when they reached the United Kingdom was apply fixes to the struts to keep them from collapsing. Given the brutal nature of the English Channel, that ‘fix’ would fall short.
An Extract from Commander, 3rd Armored Group memo to MG Huebner, Commander, 1st Infantry Division, addressing DD tank training. This paragraph highlights the deficiencies of the newly arrived duplex drive Sherman conversions.
And that illustrates the leitmotif which wove through the Neptune planning. It was in many ways characterized by a large scale effort to improvise solutions to problems which sprung, as often as not, from poor strategic planning and the enemy’s refusal to passively await a beating. In virtually every category, the planners were scrambling to find the means to achieve the ends. Bombardment ships, landing ships, landing craft, escorts, minesweepers, transport aircraft for airdrops - all were critical shortages. Sometimes units or materiel were found to fill the gap, but these were usually ad hoc, untested or ill-trained. And too often the invasion had to make do despite the shortages.
It is important, however, to keep this in context. War-by-alliance is a difficult endeavor, especially one being fought across the entire globe in numerous theaters, each with its own unique demands, and all clamoring for a share of vast, yet limited resources. The point of the preceding paragraphs is to highlight the limitations which hampered the planning and execution of D-Day. It is not intended to lodge a blanket indictment of LTG Morgan’s COSSAC or GEN Eisenhower’s SHAEF. Nor is it intended to criticize the wisdom of the Combined Chiefs of Staff or the political leadership of the allied nations. Certainly, individual decisions by each and every one of those bodies can be questioned, and sometimes, as they say, ‘mistakes were made.’
But that isn’t the point. All war is characterized by friction, inadequate resources, tradeoffs and sub-optimal solutions (the least bad options). Operation Neptune was no different. And despite the challenges and near chaos, it did succeed. Not as cleanly or easily as planned (or hoped), but assaults on defended shores seldom are.
The question here, however, is how effective were the commanders, their staffs and the executing units in coping with the limitations to make it all work. In some cases it was a matter of doing a familiar mission, but with green, perhaps ill-trained, units. In other cases, it was making the best of the least bad alternative. Which brings us back to the DD tanks. A new ‘gimmick’, inadequately designed and tested, hurriedly produced, not well suited for the waters in which it was to operate - yet necessary, if not vital, for want of a better solution. They were indeed the least bad solution. But that didn’t make them the wrong solution.
So, it is now time to recap the preceding five installments with an eye on how well each echelon addressed, helped or hindered the effort to land 64 swimming Sherman tanks on Omaha Beach at 10 minutes before H-Hour.
What I hope I have provided in this series is the most comprehensive body of research on the DD tank effort to date, as well as a detailed analysis of that information. To repeat a caution from an earlier installment, the saga of the DD tanks is so thoroughly replete with conflicting reports and questionable firsthand accounts that any conclusion depends entirely on which imperfect source you reject, and which you decide to accept. Others will no doubt weigh the sources differently and come to different conclusions. What follows represents my evaluation after more than a year’s study of the topic.
Two of three DD tanks landed directly on Easy Red Beach Sector by Ensign Henry Sullivan’s LCT-600. Photo by Robert Capa.
The 6,000 Yard Line.
One of the more curious aspects of the DD tanks saga was the disregard paid to the advice of the two men who had become experts in their use. After conducting an intense six-week training course for DD tanks and LCTs, Lt.(jg) Dean Rockwell and MAJ William Duncan were as much of experts on the matter as anyone else in Western Naval Task Force. Duncan ran the school to train the DD tankers and Rockwell’s LCTs supported the training. At the end of that training program, both men submitted reports. Rockwell noted that DD tanks “can be launched 3-4,000 yards from shore and reach a specified beach.” [1] Duncan noted that the tanks had been launched from as far out as 6,000 yards, but also noted that in launches of more than 4,000 yards out, six cases of non-fatal carbon monoxide poisoning occurred.[2] He therefore recommended they “not be launched more than 4,000 yards from the beach.”
Having received recommendations from their own designated experts, the powers that be ignored that advice and decided the appropriate launching distance would be 50% to 100% farther than recommended. They would launch at 6,000 yards.
In deciding this, they not only disregarded the advice of their own ‘experts’, they acted counter to their own best judgements. After the failures of D-Day, key naval figures were quick to claim they had always thought the DD tanks were a hairbrained idea. RADM Hall is perhaps the most notable among this crowd. Yet despite those supposed misgivings, they directed the launching of the ‘unseaworthy’ DD tanks at distances far greater than recommended. Their supposedly strong misgivings were so far at variance with what they directed in their orders that one must doubt whether those misgivings were authentic, or were merely post-debacle attempts to distance themselves from the consequences of their own orders.
The unfortunate fact is that there is no indication as to who was the original father of this decision. The highest level order citing that distance was RADM Kirk’s order for the Western Naval Task Force, however similar guidance was in effect at every beach, whether American, British or Canadian (at the British and Canadian beaches, the launch line was even farther out – 7,000 yards).[3] This would seem to indicate the policy came from Admiral Ramsey or even General Montgomery. Yet there is no record of any such order coming from either man.
There may have been grounds for this 6,000 yard decision. The fear of enemy coastal artillery may have imposed this caution; after all, launching required the LCTs to remain almost stationary, making for an easier target at closer ranges.[4] This possibility is underscored by the fact that at the British and Canadian beaches, instructions were not only to launch the DD tanks at 7,000 yards, but be prepared to launch them from even farther out if under fire from shore batteries.
Nevertheless, the 6,000 yard line stands at the apex of the DD tank fault pyramid, not necessarily because of the degree of the ensuing damage it may have caused, but because it so perfectly illustrates the lack of common sense brought to bear on this matter.
A Cascading Series of Errors
At Omaha, the confusion started with RADM Hall and subsequently infected all lower echelons. It began with Hall’s initial decision for apportioning responsibility. COL Severne MacLaughlin (Commander, 3rd Armored Group, the parent headquarters for both the 741st and 743rd Tank Battalions) reported Hall’s initial plan was for MG Gerow to make the decision if the weather was bad.[5] (Gerow, the V Corps Commander, would be with Hall aboard his command ship the USS Ancon, 23,000 yards offshore in the Transport Area.) In other words, Hall tried to remove himself completely from the matter.
Recognizing this was entirely unsatisfactory, MG Bradley (commanding the First U.S. Army) sent his letter to RADM Kirk, insisting on two points: 1) that the decision be made by the Assault Force Commander, with advice from the Landing Force Commander; and 2) that the decision should not be delegated to individual craft level. Although RADM Kirk changed his order (CTF 122) to allow breaking radio silence prior to H-Hour to facilitate such a decision, Hall rejected the idea in his own order. As far as can be determined, no answer on the record was provided in response to Bradley’s letter, and there is scanty and conflicting documentation on Hall’s decision on the matter before 6 June 1944.
In the wake of the confusion of responsibility on D-Day, Hall belatedly penned an apologia in his 22 September endorsement of Rockwell’s report. In it he attempted to show that he had provided clear guidance on the launch-or-land decision.
“2. The question as to who should decide whether to launch DD tanks was discussed at length by the Assault Force Commander with the Commanding General, Fifth Corps, U.S. Army and the Commanding General, First Infantry Division, U.S. Army. For the following reasons it was agreed that the decision should be left to the Senior Army Officer and the Senior Naval Officer of each of the two LCT units carrying DD Tanks:
“(a) They had more experience than any other officers in the Assault Force in swimming off DD Tanks from LCTs.
“(b) The decision should be made by someone actually on the spot where the launching was to take place and embarked on an LCT rather than on a large vessel. A decision under such conditions should be sounder than one made on a large vessel miles away where the sea conditions might have been much different.
“(c) If a decision were to be made elsewhere and action had to await an order, confusion and delay might result in the absence of such an order, and it was anticipated that communications might be disrupted by the enemy action so that it would be impossible to transmits orders by radio.
“NOTE: The two unit commanders were to inform each other by radio of the decision reached.”[6]
It is impossible to miss the unintended irony in the concluding note, given the fear of enemy jamming in the preceding paragraph.
In military vernacular, ‘discussed at length’ is usually a euphemism for ‘there were strong and irreconcilable disagreements.’ Similarly, in that context, the phrase ‘it was agreed’ generally means the commander made a decision over objections of key subordinates, who ultimately had to go along with the boss’ decision. Despite the false patina of unanimity, that paragraph indicates opinions were sharply divided.
The reasons Hall laid out for his decision did have the virtue of having some merit and might have been convincing were it not for his original stance. In that original stance, he would have had Gerow making the decision under the identical ‘limiting’ circumstances (23,000 yards offshore aboard a large and stable ship), and Hall was just fine with that. But after Bradley’s letter of protest, the decision was kicked back to Hall, and suddenly the conditions that Hall thought were fine for Gerow’s decision-making, were now completely unacceptable if Hall himself had to make the decision. This cast the rationale listed in Hall’s apologia in their true light: they were not put forward as sound tactical considerations, they were merely convenient pretexts that would enable Hall to again avoid responsibility in the matter. In Hall’s revised analysis, such a decision could only be made by a man ‘on the spot’ in the boat lanes with expertise in the matter of DD tank launchings, which, not so coincidentally, ruled himself out.
From this, I believe Hall’s primary motivation clearly was to avoid any personal responsibility for the decision to launch the ‘gimmicks’ in which he had no faith. And this ‘hands off and eyes shut’ attitude was the fountainhead for the confusion of responsibilities that permeated planning and execution. In a cruel twist of fate, Hall’s doubts became self-fulfilling prophesies, because he shunned his responsibilities.
But even if Hall’s assertion that the decision should be made by the man on the spot has merit, that would not justify delegating the decision as far down as eventually happened. At the British beaches, the decision was delegated only down to their equivalent of the Deputy Assault Group Commanders. Recall that Hall’s two Deputy Assault Group Commanders were naval captains (equivalent to Army colonels), both of whom would meet the DD/LCTs at Point K and escort them to the 6,000 yard line for deployment. In other words, they, too, would have been ‘on the spot’ if a decision needed to be made. That would have been the far better solution.
In addition, any validity to his rationale faded to nothing in light of two subsequent events. First was the landing at Utah Beach, where RADM Moon made the launch decision with MG Collins’ advice, and where the Deputy Assault Group commander was on the spot in the boat lanes to issue orders to adjust when the DD/LCTs arrived late. Second, the assumption that very junior officers with six weeks training on DD tanks were the best men to make the decision proved patently unwise. This was especially so, as their decision would determine the fate of a critical mass of combat power, upon which so much of the first waves’ success depended.
Hall’s judgement was seriously faulty.
But the question remains, was this truly the guidance Hall issued before the operation? It certainly was never reduced to writing in his own order, nor was it reflected in any of the Army orders. Was this merely Hall revising history to avoid accountability? MacLaughlin once again comes to our aid. His after action report stated Hall and Gerow came to an agreement that:
“ . . . the senior naval commander in each flotilla carrying DD tanks make the decision as to whether the DDs would be launched, or the LCTs beached and the tanks unloaded on the shore. The senior DD tank unit commander was to advise the flotilla commander in this matter.”[7]
While generally in line with Hall’s version, there was a significant difference. Where Hall described a joint decision, with the Army responsibility emphasized by being mentioned first, MacLaughlin’s version clearly indicated it was a Navy decision, with Army input (paralleling, in part, Bradley’s position). Thus, from this initial decision, the Navy and Army were not on the same page regarding this key responsibility. Such is usually the case when contentious matters are decided without being documented or translated into orders.
And apparently, not all the actors within the Navy were on the same page, either, and this failure was also a result of Hall’s faulty planning. Neither Hall’s original operation plan (dtd 23 May 1944) or its subsequent change (30 May 1944) mentioned such a decision would be a joint Army-Navy responsibility. His original order merely instructed two of his Assault Group commanders that the DD tanks might have to be landed, and left unstated who would decide. In the absence of guidance from above, the orders of the two assault groups were naturally disjointed. The Assault Group O-1 order did mention the decision would be a joint Navy-Army responsibility, but only mentioned it in a footnote to an annex detailing the employment of Landing Craf, Support (Small). The order for Assault Group O-2 didn’t address the topic at all. Further, by the time Hall’s order and the two assault group orders were issued, the DD/LCT teams had been broken up, with the LCTs and their embarked DD tanks already sailed for Portland, and the tankers already shipped off separately to the final marshalling areas. If either the Assault Group Commanders or their deputies had any additional role in clarifying or coordinating the matter (most critically with the sequestered tankers) it was not recorded.
The final act in this confusion occurred just a day or two prior to the initial sortie, when the tankers rejoined the LCTs in Portland Harbor. This was when Rockwell decided that instead of the decision being made separately within “each of the two LCT units carrying DD Tanks,” he would insist on one Army officer making the decision for both LCT units. Although he didn’t mention what role, if any, he would have in this proposed change, it was clear he was attempting to override both Hall’s agreement with the Gerow and the Assault Group O-1 order. Whatever Rockwell hoped to achieve, his actual result was to introduce more confusion. Barry, leading the DD/LCTs of Assault Group O-1, understood that the decision reached at that meeting placed the decision authority solely in the hand of the Army. Both his Army counterpart (CPT Thorton) and his own OiCs operated on D-Day consistent with that belief. For that matter, Rockwell’s oral history indicated he and Cpt Elder did as well.[8] All of this ran completely opposite to the version Rockwell penned after the landing.
Rockwell also had a hand in the cascading embarkation errors. While he was not solely responsible for the disconnect between the embarkation scheme and subsequent sailing instructions in Assault Group O-1, it’s clear he conducted embarkation with inadequate information. This was compounded by failing to anticipate how the changed sailing instructions would impact the placement of Barry within the formation he commanded. This then led to the last-minute switch between the OiCs of two LCTs, which in turn led to Barry and Thornton being physically separated (during a period of radio silence), and indirectly led to the new OiC in Thornton’s craft getting lost in the boat lanes, forcing Thornton to make a decision while separated from three quarters of his command. Every error compounded the effects of the previous error and all conspired against sound decision-making in the DD/LCTs of Assault Group O-1.
Rockwell was more directly responsible for the error which saw Companies B and C of Assault Group O-2 being loaded on the wrong LCT sections. While this did not seem to affect the outcome within his own division on D-Day, it was another distraction that had to be managed as he was dealing with other problems just before the sortie.
Barry and Thornton do not escape responsibility, though it is abundantly clear their share of the blame is far, far less than Hall, Rockwell and history have heaped on them. Objectively, Thornton made the wrong decision. Were there mitigating considerations? Yes. Reports of the state of sea and wind varied widely among observers, and to make an Army officer responsible for a decision based on his judgement of sea state is simple folly. Yet he was stuck with that decision, and he made the wrong one. It appears to have been an honest mistake, but mistake it was. The bottom line, however, was that his error was just the last one of an unbroken series of errors that started with Assault Force Commander, and which could only result in disaster of one sort or another.
Barry’s responsibility is far more difficult to assess. He was largely a victim of Rockwell’s poor decisions regarding chain of command, formations and placement of Barry within that formation. As a result of Rockwell’s belated recognition of his own error, Barry set off on 5 June in an unfamiliar craft, with an unfamiliar crew, in charge of a formation three quarters of which were not from his normal flotilla, group or section. Worse, Barry’s understanding of the outcome of Rockwell’s agreement on who would make the decision to land placed him in the precise position – with no role in the decision – for which Hall would later excoriate him.
One other category of responsibility must be noted. This involves the two Deputy Assault Group Commanders (CAPT Imlay and CAPT Wright). Theirs are errors of omission, not commission. While they both noted how bad the sea conditions were, neither took the initiative to intervene. It’s hard to put all the blame on a junior officer’s decision, when older, wiser heads with more braid on their visors stood by and failed to act. The blame here is somewhat worse for CAPT Wright, who, instead of leading the DD/LCTs to the 6,000 yard line, had CAPT Sabin take that role while he went back to the Transport Area to tend to his LSTs.
Also falling into this category are various Army officers. MacLaughlin was involved from the outset in the contentious matter of who would make the decision, and while he clearly knew how important it was, he failed to monitor the developing plans and ad hoc decisions – at least there is no record of him objecting as the process continually went awry. He can be partially excused as he apparently was aboard the USS Ancon and not present when Rockwell held his pre-sortie meeting with the Army battalion commanders. Assessing the role of the two tank battalion commanders is difficult without knowing how much of the internal Navy confusion they were aware of, whether they were aware of Bradley’s position or whether they knew of Hall’s agreement with Gerow. The tank battalions’ own orders had been issued before those of the two naval Assault Groups—which, in any case these units may not have received—so could not incorporate any of the (sparse) guidance the naval orders included. Beyond that, without a reliable, independent source for what took place in Rockwell’s pre-sortie meeting, there is no way to know whether their role in that meeting was constructive or added to the confusion. The only judgement that can be rendered here is a very general observation that they did not impart a strong enough sense of caution on their company commanders. Even this limited observation really only applies to LTC Skaggs of the 741st Tanks Battalion and is tempered by the fact that Skaggs’ version of events has never been put on the record (despite his offer to provide it to Cornelius Ryan).
And of course, the Army chain of command—from the 16th Regimental Combat Team through the 1st Infantry Division to the Vth Corps—can be similarly faulted for not paying enough attention to this critical matter. As early as December 1943, Gerow voiced his doubts at a conference on Overlord:
“I don’t know whether it has been demonstrated or not: what will happen to those DD tanks with a three- or four knot current? . . . I question our capability of getting them in with that current and navigation.”[9]
Having such doubts so early in the process, one can fault Gerow (and probably others) for failing to watch more closely the evolving plans for employing the DD tanks. These were errors of omission, but did fall directly within a commander’s explicit responsibility for supervision.
The most unconscionable part of this tragedy took place in the days, weeks and even months after 6 June, when individuals were seeking to avoid blame. Rockwell’s actions come in for the most severe criticism, if for no other reason than short-stopping the reports of the LCT OiCs. He misrepresented the comments of the OiCs to the benefit of his version of events. Worse, he wrote his own action report before he even received two of the OiC reports, one notably being Barry’s. That meant Rockwell condemned Barry without even considering his account. And the fact that Barry’s account directly contradicted Rockwell on the most vital point casts Rockwell in an even worse light, from which one might logically infer he did that intentionally to keep the potentially embarrassing facts of the matter buried.
Rockwell’s hypocrisy was further emphasized with his decades-later admission that within his own division, they had indeed launched “one or two” DD tanks that promptly sank. This revealed that Rockwell’s judgement was also so poor that he allowed launching in ‘clearly unsuitable’ weather conditions – the same sin for which he condemned his scapegoat, Barry. Again, it is another vital point he seems to have concealed when the hunt for someone to blame was under full swing.
Hall’s endorsement of Rockwell’s report (quoted in part above) was equally as self-serving, and, if not blatantly false in parts, was at the very least ill-informed. Any agreement he may have reached with the V Corps Commander had long since been rendered outdated by sloppy orders or the unsanctioned changes Rockwell instigated just before sortieing. Had Hall been kept in the dark on this? Clearly not, as Rockwell’s report plainly stated the decision had been left to the senior Army officer of each group. Which indicates Hall was trying to spin the facts.
Hall’s endorsement omitted the point that Elder had launched ‘one or two’ tanks without consulting Rockwell (as Rockwell noted in his oral history), which would have revealed that Hall’s joint decision policy had been disobeyed. This is likely because Rockwell concealed that matter from Hall (and from history for 40 years), just as he had withheld Barry’s report. But if Hall had been kept in the dark on this point, it demonstrates the fact that Hall’s inquiry into the matter had been woefully inadequate. So, was Hall uninformed of this? Or did he know and simply chose to omit it? This is crucial, as up to that point, the Rockwell/Elder team had functioned exactly as the Barry/Thornton team had, the only difference being Rockwell/Elder took action to stop the mistake before it became total. This distinction was lost on Hall, and as a result his endorsement drew a comparative picture that was false and prejudicial to Barry and Thornton.
And finally, Hall’s bland assertion that the Army and Navy leaders were supposed to consult by radio is undermined by his order that did not grant them authority to break radio silence. Rockwell’s oral history made it clear that when Elder and he broke radio silence, it was in violation of orders. Again, Hall’s endorsement painted a picture that was not an accurate reflection of the operational conditions Hall himself had set.
A close examination of Hall’s endorsement raises more red flags. It was written three and a half months after D-Day and fully two months after Leide’s endorsement to the same Rockwell report. A quick survey of 43 endorsements which Hall provided to the reports of subordinate units or ships, shows 37 had been issued by 15 August, with the vast majority signed within a month of receipt. The last endorsement signed was on 22 September, and not coincidentally that was the endorsement to the very questionable Rockwell report. Clearly, he had been sitting on that contentious matter for as long as possible (which should also have given him time for a thorough investigation into the matter – something he did not do). By that date, the 741st Tank Battalion was no longer attached to the 1st Division, having been attached to a second and then a third division, and many of the key Army figures in both battalions were killed or evacuated from theater due to wounds. Not that it mattered much, because Hall did not provide distribution of his endorsement or Rockwell’s report to the 741st Tank Battalion (busy racing through France at the time), effectively blindsiding the tankers. Of the four Army units he did include in distribution: Bradley no longer commanded the First US Army, Gerow no longer commanded V Corps, the 1st Division hadn’t seen the 741st in more than 3 months, and the 743rd Tank Battalion was also under a new commander. Further, in the distribution block to his endorsement, Hall excluded the basic letter (Rockwell’s report) from delivery to the 743rd Tank Battalion. Between this act and completely omitting distribution to the 741st Tank Battalion, Hall ensured no one on the Army side who was present at Rockwell’s pre-sortie meeting or aboard the LCTs on D-Day could read and dispute Rockwell’s questionable version of events. He was just as sneaky on the Navy side; he did not forward any of these documents to LCT Flotilla 19 – the unit Barry belonged to (though he did provide a copy to Rockwell’s and Leide’s Flotilla 12).
Hall’s handling the of the affair’s aftermath is perhaps the classic ‘indictment-by-endorsement’ bureaucratic maneuver, wherein a potentially embarrassing investigation is forestalled by a carefully spun story that closes out an affair by shifting the blame to someone not in a position to defend himself. Nothing else captures the essence of the DD tank saga as does this sorry concluding action.
But that isn’t the end of Hall’s role in the matter. In a further paragraph of his endorsement to Rockwell’s report he betrayed an utter lack of understanding for the ground combat side of such assaults.
“(b) That under normal circumstances, artillery, tanks and other armored vehicles, which have to be transported in large landing craft, should not be landed in an assault until the beach has been cleared of enemy resistance and the vehicles and craft carrying them will not be exposed to direct aimed artillery fire during the landing.
“(c) That if circumstances make it necessary to employ tanks, artillery or other armored vehicles in the first wave or other early waves of the assault, they have a far better chance of reaching the shore in safety if they are transported by landing craft instead of swimming in under their own power.”
“Under normal circumstances . . . “ is a bizarrely inappropriate phrase to lead a recommendation about an assault so spectacularly un-normal as Omaha Beach. If followed, Hall’s recommendation was tantamount to throwing unsupported infantry ashore reminiscent of the WWI mass attacks, and it disregarded everything learned about the essential need for combined arms operations, even at the earliest stages of an assault. In his formal report on the landings, he expanded on this point, suggesting that naval gunfire was all that the assaulting troops would need for support. Spoken like the old Battleship sailor he was. Yet this completely disregarded the massive failures of bombardment in his own landing – primarily due to communications breakdown between ships and troops ashore. And while the destroyers proved invaluable on D-Day, nevertheless there were numerous enemy guns sited in such a manner that they were impervious to naval gunfire and were only knocked out by tanks ashore. And finally, the lack of adequate bombardment ships and lack of adequate time for such a bombardment in the European Theater precluded giving this recommendation any serious consideration.
As for the second paragraph, the obvious counterpoint is that one of the two principle reasons the DD tank concept was adopted in the first place was because amphibious commanders, such as Hall, did not want to risk LCTs in the first wave. The whole fiasco could have been avoided had he simply ordered the DD tanks be landed in the first place. But he did not do that. His comments here—lightly cloaking criticism of the Army DD tank concept—are actually the observations of a man who is not self-aware enough to realize he was part of the problem that generated use of the DDs in the first place.
Other Beaches - Other Results
Utah Beach
Earlier in this installment I touched on Utah Beach. Let’s look more closely at the actions there: how did Rear Admiral Moon handle the same situation over on his beach?
Recall that Moon had no previous amphibious experience, and worse, he had much less time to organize his command and plan for the landings due to the late addition of Utah Beach. It’s no surprise that his force did not come off well in Exercise Tiger (the final Utah Beach rehearsal exercise). And yet, his handling of the DD tank matter on D-Day was far superior to the far more experienced RADM Hall.
Moon decided to keep the question of launching DD tanks in his own hands. He did not delegate it. While this may not have been the best echelon for that decision, it was at least a clear assignment of responsibility, something lacking in Hall’s command. Second, he would seek the advice of his Army counterpart, MG Lawton Collins (the VII Corps commander, riding in Moon’s command ship), ensuring unanimity of command. These two provisions alone eliminated the wide array of problems that arose in Hall’s command.
The result was a much different mentality on D-Day, with executing units knowing where to look for a firm decision. This began at the bottom, with USCG Cutter 17 flagging down the commander of CTG 125.5 (Commander E. W. Wilson) at 0309 hours to ask whether the DD tanks were to be launched or landed. Wilson then proceeded in his flagship (LCH-10) to the USS Bayfield (the Utah command ship) and put the question to Moon. Moon consulted with Collins at 0333 hours and the two decided to go ahead with the launching. It was a clear decision made in a timely fashion and quickly passed to all the necessary parties.
DD Tanks on the Beach at Utah.
Life, however, is not that simple. The DD/LCTs were not yet on hand to launch the tanks. The convoys carrying the Utah landing force encountered the same problems in crossing the English Channel as did the Omaha convoys. In this case, the DD/LCTs were running late. Fortunately, Wilson was on top of matters and anticipating problems. At 0347 hours, he queried the Bayfield, “If LCTs do not arrive for first wave, do you want to hold LCVPs?” At 0353 hours he was told, “Do not wait for LCTs with DD tanks.” He passed that word on at 0400, adding he would send the DD/LCTs when they arrived. At 0426 hours the DD/LCTs arrived and were sent in.[10] In an effort to catch up with the assault waves, the DD/LCTs passed the 6,000 yard line, closing to 3,000 yards where they launched their tanks. The DDs crawled ashore roughly 10 minutes after the first wave (i.e, 20 minutes late). [11]
The relative lack of beach defense at Utah might give the mistaken impression that all went well with the landing. It did not. But at least when it came to the DD/LCTs, the command responsibilities, planning and leadership resulted in sound execution, even in light of the late arrival of the convoy.
The Eastern Naval Task Force
The operation orders for the British and Canadian assault forces called for the DD tanks to be launched at an even greater distance—7,000 yards—with at least one order warning that in the case of enemy fire, they might have to launch beyond even that. Fortunately, most of their DD tanks were taken into the shore, and those that were launched did so at either 5,000 yards (comparable to the distance at Omaha) or at about 1,500 yards. In all cases, the decision was made by a naval officer with the rank of either captain or commander (equivalent to Army colonels or lieutenant colonels), which was a significant difference from the practice in Hall’s assault force. In almost every case, the decision was made after consulting with the Army counterpart.
The employment of DD tanks on the British and Canadian beaches was summarized by Rear Admiral Phillip Vian, the Naval Commander of the Eastern Task Force (under whom the Assault Forces S, J and G operated).
“Launching of D.D. Tanks
“27. The weather conditions were on the border line for swimming D.D. Tanks; in all the assaults the D.D. Tanks arrived late, and after the first landing craft had touched down.
“28. In SWORD Area it was decided to launch the D.D. Tanks but to bring them in to 5,000 yards before launching, in view of the weather and lack of enemy opposition. Thirty-four of the 40 tanks embarked were successfully launched and 31 reached the beach. The leading tanks touched down about 12 minutes late and after the L.C.T. (AVRE). At least one tank was run down and sunk by an L.C.T. (AVRE) and it is credible that not more were hit by these L.C.T. which had to pass through them. Twenty-three tanks in this area survived the beach battle and did good work in destroying strong points which, being sited to enfilade the beaches, presented no vulnerable aperture or embrasure to seaward.
“29. On the JUNO front it was decided not to launch the D.D. Tanks but to beach their L.C.T. with the L.C.T. (AVRE). This was successfully accomplished in Assault Group J.2, but in Assault Group J.1 the D.S.O.A.G. in charge of the L.C.T., when about 1,500 yards from the beach, decided to launch the D.D. Tanks. This resulted in some confusion in the groups following, but all L.C.T. except one launched their tanks, which arrived about 15 minutes late and 6 minutes after the assaulting infantry.
“30. In GOLD area D.D. Tanks were not launched and L.C.T. were beached just after the L.C.T. (AVRE).” [12]
Interestingly, he described the conditions as “on the borderline for launching D.D. Tanks”, which to some degree parallels the mixed observation of the conditions in the Omaha Assault Area. The far happier results of the 34 DD tanks launched at Sword Beach, which were launched at a distance nearly the same as at Omaha, indicates the sea conditions there were actually more moderate than at Omaha.
Of course, few sources agree as to the actual losses among DD tanks, and some disagree even whether units were launched or landed. For instance, at Gold Beach, where RADM Vian reported all DD tanks were landed on the beach, one source stated 32 DD tanks of the Nottinghamshire (Sherwood Rangers) Yeomanry were launched inside of 700 yards, and only 24 made it in. Similarly, yet another report stated that of the 38 DD tanks of Group J.1 that launched close inshore at Juno Beach, 19 foundered. Most of these discrepancies can be accounted for due to the fact that a substantial number of DD tanks were drowned out in the surf after touching down. In some cases, there was water inside the canvas screen that the pumps could not handle, and when the tank’s front pitched up with the gradient of the beach, the water flooded to the rear and into the engine compartment. In other cases, incoming waves broke over the back of the deflated canvas skirts and flooded the engine compartments. These cases cannot be counted among those that foundered while swimming, and regardless, in most of these cases, the crews continued to fight their disabled tanks until the tide reached inside the turrets.
A DD tank mired in soft ground at Gold Beach.
To my mind, the example of the British and Canadian beaches—as well as Utah Beach—provided the cautionary lesson that proper employment of an operationally fragile system in a questionably suitable environment requires the judgement of seasoned and mature officers of appropriate rank and of the appropriate armed service. The failure to recognize this truism was a major factor in fathering the debacle of the 741st Tank Battalion.
Parting Comments
And with that we conclude this deep—very deep—dive into the circumstances surrounding the employment of Duplex Drive tanks at Omaha Beach. The subject turned out to be vastly more complex than I anticipated, requiring no fewer than six long installments to do it justice. Even at that length, I saw fit to omit discussion on some points, such as the possible effect stronger-than-anticipated currents might have had on collapsing the screens as the swimming tanks tried to steer ‘upstream’ to counteract their drift to the east. I also omitted discussion of the actions of the surviving tanks once they made it ashore – a subject covered many times by many authors, and not within the focus of my series.
Incomplete as this series may be in those respects, I’m confident this has been the most thorough treatment of the subject, revealing several layers which have not been told elsewhere.
When I first set out to review the impact of the planning process and the orders for Omaha Beach, I intended not to make this a witch hunt or an attack on individuals. I wanted to focus on systems and processes, doctrine and planning. Unfortunately, the sheer scope of errors, bad decisions, sloppy plans and shabby cover-ups called for more sharply focused conclusions where some individuals were concerned. I regret having to do it, but not having done it.
In future posts, I will continue to explore how strategic priorities, resource constraints, command decisions and the planning system affected the conduct of operations at Omaha Beach. I hope you’ll join me.
[1] As most of the document referenced in this installment have been thoroughly discussed and cited in previous installments, I will omit duplicating them here, and will only include citations for newly introduced documents.
[2] In the original design a canvas curtain had walled off the area above the engine compartment. This was replaced by a chimney-like exhaust stack may have addressed the carbon monoxide poisoning threat, but that isn’t clear in Duncan’s report.
[3] For Juno Beach see ONEAST/J.2, Appendix C, para 2(c), pg 689; for Sword Beach, see ONEAST/S.7b para 12, pg 994; for Gold Beach, see ONEAST/G.FOUR, Part II, para 8, pg 1346; for. All three orders are contained in Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force’s complied Operation Neptune Naval Operations Orders which can be found at NARA RG 38 or online here. Page numbers cited here refer to those of the online file.
[4] At one British beach, instructions were to actually anchor during launching.
[5] Commander, 3rd Armored Group, Report After Action Against Enemy, June 1944, pp 2-3. NARA, RG 407, Box13647, Entry 427.
[6] Commander, Assault Force “O” 22 September 1944 second endorsement to Com.Grp 35, LCT (6) Flot letter of 14 July 1944. NARA, RG 38 or online here.
[7] MacLaughlin, op cit.
[8] In that oral history, the revelation that one or two tanks were launched as planned without Rockwell giving instruction – they had not yet broken radio silence – indicates he had no role in the decision-making.
[9] Balkoski, Joseph. Omaha Beach: D-Day, June 6, 1944 (p. 98). Stackpole Books. Kindle Edition.
[10] CTG 125.5 (Commander, Red Assault Group), Action Report, Operation Order N0. 3-44 of Assault Force “U”, Western Naval Task Force, Allied Naval Expeditionary Force, dtd 12 July 1944, encl 1, pg 1. NARA RG 38, or online here.
[11] CTF 122 (Commander, Western Naval Task Force), Operation Neptune – Report of Naval Commander, Western Task Force (WNTF), pg 163 (online page reference). NARA: RG 38, or online here.
See also: CTF 125 (Commander, Force “U’), Report of Operation Neptune, dtd 26 June 1944, pg 654 (as contained Report of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force on Operation Neptune, dtd 16 Oct 1944). NARA 38, or online here.
[12] Operation Neptune – Report of Naval Commander Eastern Task Force, dtd 21 August 1944. Vian’s report is in Volume II of the Report of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force on Operation Neptune, dtd 16 Oct 1944. Vian’s report begins at pg. 178. The reports of his subordinate force commanders are also contained in that same document as follows: Force S Commander, pg 241; Force G Commander, pg. 330; and Force J Commander, pg. 439. This document can be found at NARA, RG 38, or online here.