Omaha Bombardment. Part IIIa: After Action Summaries
Introduction
Part III of this series analyzed the effectiveness of the pre-H-Hour bombardment at the Omaha Assault area, and generally summarized key details as they applied to the topic. Space precluded including a more complete accounting of the activities of the ships of the bombardment group. While that was necessary, it also omitted many smaller details which complete the picture of a bombardment that was indifferently prosecuted.
In the following paragraphs I have summarized the the various reports submitted by the ships of the bombardment group, highlighting the relevant portions as they pertain to the pre-H-Hour bombardment. If you have the time and interest in the bombardment, I recommend these paragraphs for your review.
As I mentioned, these paragraph, as with this entire Bombardment Series, focus only on the pre-H-Hour bombardment and it effectiveness in neutralizing the beach defenses. There is much more to the story of the ships of the bombardment group on D-Day and the following weeks. But that has been more than adequately covered by historians, whereas the initial bombardment had been virtually ignored.
Western Fire Support Group
USS Texas, BB34
USS Texas, March 1943
Sources:
- Commanding Officer, USS Texas, Action Report for Period 3-17 June, 1944, Operation Neptune, dtd 28 June 1944
- Commanding Officer, USS Texas, Chronological Narrative of Operations of U.S.S Texas for Period 3 June 1944 to 17 June 1944, inclusive, Operation Neptune, dtd 23 June 1944
- USS Texas, War Diary, June 1944
Position: Bearing about 030° from Pointe du Hoc, range about 13,000 yards.
The Texas was first tasked to neutralize the guns at Pointe du Hoc (WN75) with “up to 250 rounds” of 14-inch gunfire and ended up actually firing 255 rounds.
Unfortunately, though the Texas wasn’t aware of it, the guns had been removed, and those 255 rounds did little more than “bounce the rubble,” as Steven Zaloga so aptly phrased it in The Devils Garden. In reality, that massive shelling should also have stunned the garrison to the point the Rangers would have had an easy job. But synchronization had fallen apart. The Ranger boats were mistakenly led towards Pointe et Raz de la Percée, and by the time they had cleared up the confusion and reached their landing beach, they had lost a third of their LC(A)s and 40 minutes. Any neutralization effects were largely overcome by the time the Rangers stepped off their craft and grabbed the ropes.
Despite the desperate fight the Rangers encountered as they scaled the cliffs, Texas’ action report claimed:
“Any personnel in the area must certainly have been killed.”[1]
It was a very unfortunate comment, but a perfect example of gunners being overly impressed by the big explosions they cause. And once again we see clear evidence of a total lack of control over the bombardment force. Some of the destroyers in the area were aware of the mix-up and the delay, and helped suppress German positions as the delayed Ranger flotilla passed too close inshore as they sought Point du Hoc. Yet these were individual actions of initiative, and no one on the Texas had the situational awareness to restart neutralization fires on Pointe du Hoc itself as the Rangers belatedly approached their beach. As a result the defenders would have 45 minutes to pull themselves together before the Rangers landed.
In his after action report, Hall tried to put the best face on the episode, stating:
“It later developed that four of the guns had been moved and emplaced in a hedge lane about a mile south. This new position was bombarded and knocked out by Texas using airspot during the morning of D-Day.”[2]
Unfortunately, the only fire mission he could have been referring to (at 1033 hours) was too far south for the Pointe du Hoc’s relocated guns, but may have produced the very useful effect of silencing one of the 352d Division’s 155mm field artillery batteries (the Texas’ spotting aircraft did report it as a mobile field battery).
We’ll leave off the action at Pointe du Hoc and move to the Texas’ other missions. At H-04, the Texas was to shift fires from the Pointe and place 12 rounds of 14-inch on two adjacent targets, T88 and T89, about a kilometer west of the point. That had also been Satterlee’s target for the previous half hour, and I’ll defer further comment on that objective until I get to that ship.
Texas’ final Pre-H-Hour mission was target T72 (WN73), which it was supposed to hit with 250 rounds from its 5-inch battery, from 0550 to 0623 hours. It reported it fired for the full period, but expended only 190 rounds (91 HC and 99 Common). This began a trend in which all ships firing at this key position failed to fire the full planned bombardment. At 13,500 yards to target T72, this was at the higher end of the 5-inch gun’s range, and it’s accuracy may have been less than desired, especially firing from casemate mounts with spotting from the foretop (rather than air spot). In addition, at that range the projectiles would have lost about 60% of their velocity. The secondary battery ceased fire at the planned time (0623 hours) rather than synchronized with the leading wave, probably because at that range it was impossible to observe the position of the leading waves.
Figure 1. Bombardment Group ship positions during the pre-H-Hour bombardment. [Yellow pins: position located by range and bearing from a specified point. Green Pins: positions generally located by range from a specified point, but no bearing. Red pins: no firm data on position.]
HMS Glasgow, C21
HMS Glasgow
Source: Commanding Officer, HMSGlasgow (C21), Operation Neptune – Chronological Narrative Report, dtd 22 June 1944.
Position: Laid own dan buoy in bombardment position: 49° 27’ 02” N, 00° 52’ 00” W.
Glasgow, along with the Arkansas, was slated to bombard the defenses of the D-3 exit. Glasgow was tasked with neutralizing targets T59 and T61, which were up on the bluffs on the east side of the draw (WN67). These defenses were generally west-facing to cover the draw, which meant Glasgow, firing from the western fire support lane, would have a good angle relative to the orientation of the key gun positions within its targets.
Unfortunately, Glasgow seems to have been infected with the same miserly attitude toward expending ammunition as had so many other ships. It was allotted 400 rounds but fired only 219. It started its bombardment at 0554 hours, but did not report when it ceased fire, so we can’t tell how well it synchronized its cease fire with the approach of the first waves. It did state that at 0630 hours, it shifted fire to a ‘strongpoint’, giving a coordinate that placed it in the center of Vierville sur Mer. That engagement was not part of the bombardment plan, but might have been as a result of something the airspot observed.
Glasgow’s report stated it opened fire on its assigned pre-H-Hour target (singular), when it was actually assigned two targets. Fortunately, its Summary of Engagements (Enclosure 2 to its report) shows it did fire at two targets during this mission, and included grids coordinates correctly which matched coordinates for both T59 and T61. So although only 55% of its planned projectiles, it seems to have hit both of its targets, though we have no indication how evenly the projectiles were distributed between the two.
USS Satterlee, DD626
Sources:
USS Satterlee, September 1943
- Commanding Officer, USS Satterlee, Report of Action, 6 June 1944, dtd 21 June 1944
- USS Satterlee, War Diary, June 1944
Position: About 3,000 yards bearing 185°T to Pointe du Hoc at a range of 3,000 yards.
Satterlee was tasked to fire 300 rounds at targets T88 and T89 (also known as WN76). In the previous post I pointed out that this was a curious target set as intelligence had only indicated there was a squad-sized element there, and it was difficult to see how it was significant enough to interfere with the landings or merit 300 rounds of scarce ammunition. In fact, the position’s main ‘weapon’ was a 150cm searchlight, which posed no threat at all for a daylight assault.[3] The position was also defended by two machine guns, but at a range of 1000 meters from Pointe du Hoc, they could not seriously interfere with the landing there. In short, there was no reason to waste the firepower of an entire destroyer on this position, and certainly not during the critical pre-H-Hour bombardment.
Nevertheless, the Satterlee faithfully fired on the position from 0548 to 0645 hours (the mission was intended to extend past H-Hour by 15 minutes). This mission was interrupted by the need to shoot a defensive counterbattery mission between 0618 and 0627 hours against light guns in the vicinity of the point. Presumably these were to the east of the Pointe as the only ‘guns’ nearby to the west were wooden dummies, mounted in a fake battery position designed to draw fire away from the position on the point.
Satterlee did not report how many of the allotted 300 rounds it expended, but as it was one of only two fire support ships to fully expend its allotted 70% of rounds on D-Day, it’s not a stretch to assume it fired all 300. One incident needs to be mentioned, although it did not take place during the pre-H-Hour bombardment. Satterlee recognized the need to suppress the Pointe du Hoc defenses as the delayed Ranger assault went in, and took the initiative to shell the area. She was prompted to this action after observing enemy troops assembling on the cliff to repel the assault—presumably the same enemy troops the Texas thought “must certainly have been killed.” Satterlee closed to within 1500 yards of the Pointe and fired with both its 5-inch guns and “heavy machine guns” (40mm and/or 20mm auto cannons?).
But this brings up another problem. Aboard Satterlee was the deputy squadron commander for Destroyer Squadron 18, and since the squadron commander had been detailed off to set up the offshore screen, his deputy was in temporary command of the destroyers. While Satterlee correctly took the initiative to shell Pointe du Hoc as the Ranger’s belatedly arrived, it took no steps to coordinate support for the Rangers with other destroyers. Most of the ships had responded to one degree or another (suppressing German positions firing on the Ranger convoy as passed too close to the shore) but it was not coordinated and there was no effort to contact Texas to see if the 14-inch guns could fire a few more salvos. At that phase of the morning (0630-0715 hours) DESRON18 was more of a collection of independently operating ships than a coordinated tactical squadron.
HMS Talybont, L18
HMS Talybont
Source: Commanding Officer, HMS Talybont, Report on Assault Bombardment, HMS Talybont, dtd 24 June 1944.
Position: Bearing 038° from Pointe du Hoc at a range of 2.7 miles.
At 0550, Talybont opened fire on targets T82 and T83, from a range of 4,000 yards. The targets covered an unnamed intermediate German position on the cliffs north of Hameau Lefevre. It was defended only by small arms and was 1 ½-2 kilometers from Pointe Du Hoc. At 0615, Talybont shifted fire to its second set of targets, T77 and T76. This covered a radar installation jointly operated by the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, and was designated WN74a (some sources refer to it as WN75). The site had been heavily bombed in the predawn hours by the RAF, and by the time the pre-landing naval bombardment commenced, the presence of the fleet had mooted the usefulness of the radars, if they survived to that point. Defended by small arms and a single mortar, it posed no immediate threat to the landings.
The 400 rounds the Talybont expended on these four targets accomplished absolutely nothing as far as the two objectives of the pre-Hour bombardment were concerned. Talybont’s first concrete contribution to the invasion came after H-Hour when it helped suppress German small arms positions on the cliffs that had engaged the Ranger craft which had come too close to shore after becoming lost.
Talybont did not record its ammunition expenditure for this phase, although I suspect it was far below the specified amount, for no other reason that the ship had to re-engage all four of its targets after H-Hour to suppress further fire.
USS Thompson, DD627
USS Thompson, May 1943
Sources: Commanding Officer, USS Thompson, Chronological Narrative of Operations, Report Of, dtd 26 June 1944.
Position: Bearing 180°T to Pointe et Raz de la Percée at a range of 2,200 yards.
From 0550 until 0715 hours, Thompson was ordered to fire 450 rounds at targets T74 and T75, which were the south and north portions of WN74 at Pointe et Raz de la Percée. The high number of rounds allotted reflected the fact that these targets were to be shelled for an hour and twenty minutes. But once again, only one of those two targets addressed a pre-H-Hour bombardment task. T74 included two 80mm field cannons (identified as 75mm in some sources) enfilading the Charlie and Dog beach sectors and did require neutralization. But T75 consisted of the site’s general defensive positions that should have been fired on at least an hour later, when the Rangers of Company C, 2nd Battalion might have been in position to assault the defenses.
At 0550 hours, Thompson elected to fire first at T74 (the gun positions) expending 107 rounds (55 common and 52 AA) and declared the position “apparently destroyed” at 0620 hours. It then shifted fire to T75, firing just 56 rounds (26 common and 30 AA) over the next 50 minutes. In total, it expended just 163 rounds (36%) of the allotted 450 against these two. By ceasing fire on the two guns 10 minutes before H-Hour, Thompson gave the crews time to recover, man their guns and open fire on the leading wave, or shortly thereafter. Thompson’s continued firing at T75 had resulted in a cloud of obscuring dust, which forced a cease fire between 0646 and 0700 hours. It isn’t known how long the two 80mm guns had been back in action (perhaps hidden by the dust from target T75) but at 0716 hours Thompson observed a field gun firing on the beachhead, and gave coordinates that matched T74—the target the ship had already declared “destroyed.” Thompson re-engaged T74, firing another 106 rounds over the next 40 minutes (60 common, 46 AA). It was a false economy to conserve the 267 rounds left unfired, just to have to fire them afterwards to silence the position that should have been neutralized before it had a chance to shell the troops ashore.
USS McCook, DD496
Sources:
USS McCook, 1943
- Commanding Officer, USS McCook, Shore Bombardment off the Coast of Normandy – Report of, dtd 13 July 1994
- USS McCook, War Diary, Month of June 1944
Position: 3200 yards off of beach at Vierville sur Mer (no bearing stated).
This ship was allotted 300 rounds to shell target T71 from 0550 to 0625 hours. The coordinates for T71 would place the mean point of impact almost exactly on the newly built casemate that housed the 88m gun in WN72, with part of the pattern of impacts spilling over into the edges of WN73 and WN 71. McCook’s action report indicated it was assigned three targets, though none of the three orders governing the bombardment reflect this.[4] The captain decided shell the first two targets (unidentified) and reported they had been neutralized in 10 minutes, but it isn’t clear how he judged the defender’s status.
He shifted fire to his third target at 0600 hours and at this point the reports become unclear and contradictory. According to the war diary, 0603 hours the ship took two near misses from a shore battery (105mm or 155mm) followed by another one minute later. Apparently, McCook ceased fire with its 5-inch battery about this time to maneuver to avoid the shelling, though it does not mention maneuvering at this point. At 0606 hours both sources recap its ammunition expenditure to that point (220 rounds in rapid continuous fire, seemingly indicating it had ceased fire. This cease fire seems to be confirmed as neither report goes on to mention the 5-inch battery ceasing fire later. At 0615 hours McCook tried to engage an unidentified target with its automatic weapons (40mm and 20mm?) but ceased their fire one minute later due to excessive range.
Although McCook did fire 220 rounds in ‘rapid continuous fire’ as neutralization required (and as so few of the other ships managed to do) there are serious questions about its bombardment. What were the two additional targets it fired on during the pre-H-Hour bombardment and did they contribute to the beach neutralization mission? Did the rounds fired at the other two targets spare the 88mm gun’s casemate much needed pounding? And when exactly did it cease firing with its 5-inch battery? Was it at 0606 hours? Or 0616 hours? In either case it would have been premature as far as synchronization was concerned, but 0606 would have had much worse consequences.
After ceasing fire with its automatic weapons at 0616 hours (and possibly with its 5-inch battery as well?), McCook shifted fire to an unidentified target of opportunity on which it expended 100 more rounds by 0642 hours. McCook reported the first troops (as distinct from tanks) hit the beach in that sector late, at 0638 hours, meaning the defenders had 22 to 32 minutes to recover from the effects of the shelling depending on when the ship ceased fire. (However, the leading wave of tanks was landed at 0630 hours, so the breakdown in synchronization was a combination of McCook’s premature cease fire and the landing craft arriving late.)
In addition to failing to fire at least 80 of its allotted 300 rounds at T71 (that number may actually be far higher depending on where its other two ‘assigned’ targets actually were), it markedly failed to pace its final high rate of firing to the progress of the leaning landing craft.
To recap the bombardment here at the defenses of the D-1 exit, recall the Texas fired only 200 of its allotted 250 5-inch rounds, and the Thompson fired only 220. Where there should have been 550 rounds impacting, there were only 420, and that assumes all of Thompson’s extra ‘assigned targets’ were anywhere near T71. This situation would be compounded when two of the LCG(L)s slated to fire there failed to arrive, and the third fired only about half its rounds. Instead of 910 rounds, only 486 rounds were fired.
USS Carmick, DD493
USS Carmick, December 1942
Source: Commanding Officer USS Carmick, Action Report, Forwarding of, dtd 1 July 1944
Position: Bearing 19°T from Pointe et Raz de la Percée, range 3,500 yards
The Carmick was assigned three targets, T66, T67 and T68 (WN70, at Hamel-au-Pretet) and 250 rounds for the job, to be fired in the familiar 0550-0625 timeframe. All three targets lay within an area of 300 by 200 yards and could be covered with minimal shifting of aimpoints A destroyer’s standard bombardment pattern was 200 by 200 yards). Its action report stated it began firing on time at targets T67 and T68. While firing, it was fired on by a gun in that area, which Carmick, with the aid of another destroyer,[5] silenced, at least temporarily. When it was time to shift to the third target, dust was so thick it could not be seen, so it continued firing at T67 and T68 until end of ammunition and mission time.
Carmick probably made the most concrete contribution of all the fire support ships covered so far by knocking out the 80mm field gun sited in WN70. That gun was in a field emplacement (its concrete casemate was still under construction) and facing generally west along the beach to cover the D-1 exit. This was one of the few cases during the bombardment when the ship and the field gun were generally facing one another, giving the ship a favorable gun-target line, and resulted in that gun being put out of action (at least temporarily). As the gun was not in a concrete casement, this is not a perfect example of the previous discussion of needing to engaging a hardened from the correct angle, but it serves to illustrate the advantage of proper ship positioning, even against field works.
Eastern Fire Support Group
USS Arkansas, BB33
USS Arkansas, April 1944
Sources:
- Commanding Officer, USS Arkansas (BB33), Report of Operations, June 3-18 June 1944, dtd 26 June 1944.
- USS Arkansas, War Diary for June 1944, dtd 21 July 1944.
Position: About 3 miles off Port-en-Bessin, grid coordinates: 738943.
There were high hopes for the twelve big guns of the Arkansas. They would fire on targets T60, T63 and T65 with 350 rounds of 12-inch projectiles. These targets included all three resistances nests defending the D-3 exit (WN66, -67 and -68), with excellent angles against the large guns in WN68. The chances of quickly opening the exit were pinned on those big guns . . . as long as the large shells didn’t crater the roadway too badly.
Having been briefly distracted by the necessary counterbattery fire against Port-en-Bessin, Arkansas’ main battery opened fire on its assigned targets at 0552 hours. It ceased fire at 0623 hours, noting that the airspot had observed smoke and fires (but did not state that this smoke prevented firing). After 30 minutes of firing its main battery, Arkansas’ expenditure of 12-inch ammunition was just 70 rounds (56 HC and 14 AP). That was roughly only 18% of the expected support the ground troops had been counting on. It isn’t at all clear why this happened. The ship was anchored, had good firing data and was in a stable position. And there were orders from both Admiral Ramsay and Rear Admiral Bryant to keep firing using the best data on hand in case of obstructed view. Nor does it seem firing was interrupted or halted due to smoke. That would seem to point to problems with fire control or the proficiency of the gun crews, but there was no mention of problems with either of those. Regardless, 70 rounds would account for only five salvos—not counting rounds needed for ranging—which would take just five minutes of firing at a slow rate and just two-three minutes at a high rate of fire.
Something is missing here; the Arkansas seems to have been hardly used its main battery. The only explanation I can think of is the ship kept the majority of its turrets free and aimed at Port-en-Bessin just in case those batteries came back to life.
Another question is: which target the ship fired on? It was assigned three, and with two gun directors for the guns of its main battery, could theoretically have engaged two targets at a time. But its reports fail to mention which target(s) it actually engaged, merely stating it opened fire on prearranged targets. The ship fired such a small percentage of its allotted rounds that it is fair to ask, did Arkansas fire all 70 rounds at one target? Or attempt to spread the projectiles across all three targets (only about 30 projectiles per target)? Either way, it is almost certain the bombardment at the D-3 exit was ineffective.
All in all, it was a sorry showing at the D-3 draw. Not only did Arkansas fire a mere 70 rounds of 12-inch projectiles out of a planned 385, but as we saw earlier in this piece, Glasgow fired only 219 6-inch projectiles of a planned 400 at the same exit. The failure these two big ships to fire those 496 shells must sure have contributed to the defenses of the D-3 Draw being the last to fall on D-Day.
The Arkansas’ secondary (5-inch) battery was due to fire at the E-3 draw during the pre-H-Hour bombardment, but the ship instead left it engaging in counterbattery fire against Port-en-Bessin, so its 5-inch guns contributed nothing to the beach neutralization mission. The Arkansas’ contribution to the pre-H-Hour bombardment was largely wasted. Even when it engaged its tertiary battery’s 3-inch guns (which were not specifically addressed in the bombardment plan), it chose to direct them at Ste. Honorine (vicinity of WN59) instead of any of the beach defenses.
HMS Tanatside, L69
HMS Tanatside
Source: Commanding Officer, HMS Tanatside, Operation “Neptune” – Report on Bombardment – A.M. 6th June, 1944 (D_Day), dtd 26 June 1944.
Position: At 0545 Hours, bearing 355° from Port-en-Bessin, range 4.1 miles, and a range of 10,000 yards to the targets. Ship continued to close on targets until approximately 0621 hours when its range to target was 6,000 yards.
Tanatside was perhaps the only ship on the eastern side of Omaha that did not join the free-for-all against the Port-en-Bessin batteries before the bombardment period commenced. I suspect this was because the ship had not yet reached its intended firing position as its report shows it was more than twice as far offshore as the other destroyers when the bombardment began, and it continued closing another 4000 yards while firing.
Its orders were to fire on targets T54 and T128, which were about 100 yards apart on the west side of the E-1 exit (WN65). It was allotted 400 rounds for the mission (with 200 more allotted for a post-H-Hour shoot at Port-en-Bessin). It had a somewhat favorable angle on the WN65 positions. It opened fire at 0545 hours, and although the target was obscured at 0521 hours, it (correctly) continued blind firing until 0629 hours when it reported the DD tanks had been enveloped by the smoke. As with so many of the other fire support ships that day, it was rather parsimonious in expending rounds on its beach bombardment task, firing just 238 rounds of the 400 allotted (60%). It then fired 480 rounds at Port-en-Bessin during its post-H-Hour mission. It seems the priority placed the beach bombardment came in a poor second place to preemptive counterbattery missions.
FS Georges Leygues
FS Georges Leygues
Source: Pending.
Position: Pending.
Unfortunately, I don’t have the action report for the Leygues. According to the plan, it was to place 250 6-inch projectiles on target T53 (WN64, near the crest of the bluffs). Given the results of most of the other fire support ships, the Leygues probably shorted its firing schedule, too, but we can’t say that for certain.
It does seem safe to say, however, that the E-1 draw defenses did not receive a substantial percentage of its planned neutralizing fire.
FS Montcalm
FS Montcalm
Source: Pending.
Position: Pending.
As with Leygues, we don’t have an action report for Montcalm. It was scheduled to fire on seven targets in the vicinity of Port-en-Bessin for 70 minutes, from 0550 to 0700 hours, and had 300 rounds for the job. Given the enthusiasm the rest of the fire support ships had for counterbattery fire, I think it’s safe to say Montcalm likely expended all 300 rounds, if not more.
USS Emmons, DD457
Sources:
USS Emmons, November 1943
- Commanding Officer, USS Emmons, Report and Narrative of Operations of USS Emmons (DD457) during Operation Neptune from 5 June 1944 to 17 June 1944, dtd 22 June 1944.
- USS Emmons, War Diary, June 1944.
Position: Bearing 240° from targets (target coordinates 66808950 & 687088943) at a range of about 5,500 yards, placing ship about 2,000 yards off the nearest shore.
Emmons was one of five bombardment ships assigned to pummel the defenses of the E-3 draw.[6] Earlier we covered the disappointing actions of the secondary battery of the Arkansas, which failed to place any rounds on target T43 in WN61. After briefly joining the dogpile on Port-en-Bessin, Emmons moved west towards its fire station, experiencing some difficulty finding a spot that did not foul the guns of Arkansas, Leygues and Montcalm. If finally took position (as stated above) to shell its targets, T47 and T50, which were to receive 300 rounds. Those targets encompassed WN62. The Emmons position made it virtually impossible to engage the two west-firing casemated 75mm guns which enfiladed Easy Red. The range and bearing the Emmons’ report listed are not compatible with the 2,000 yards it claimed it was offshore, so its exact position isn’t certain. But its general location was very good to take on the 50mm cannon and 75mm PAK 40 antitank gun, both of which faced eastward and covered the anti-tank ditch that blocked the E-3 exit. The 50 mm cannon was in an open-pit emplacement, and the PAK 40 was in a log bunker, both of which should have been highly vulnerable to the Emmons 5-inch shells.
As with so many other bombardment ships, Emmons did not fire its full allotment of shells, but fell short only a modest 42 shells. It fired exactly twice as many of the less capable Common projectiles as it did AA projectiles, which may partially account for its failure to do any damage to the two vulnerable emplacements. During the last part of the bombardment, the targets were clouded with dust, and the ship tried to maintain a firing solution while trying to keep position against the current, using an SG radar fix on the Port-en-Bessin breakwater; it had not dropped a dan buoy. Despite the obscuration, the ship continued to fire blindly, ceasing fire at 0625 hours, about the time it claimed the first boat wave landed.
USS Baldwin, DD624
USS Baldwin, March 1944
Source: Commanding Officer, USS Baldwin (DD624), Action Report for June 6-8, 1944, dtd 16 June 1944.
Position: At 0556 hours, on a bearing of 227° to target T43 (coordinates 69308940), range not stated. Between 0619-0637 hours, it closed to 1,830 yards from the beach.
There is some confusion regarding the Baldwin’s location relative to the Emmons. Figure 1 shows where each ship reported its own location, but Baldwin’s report placed Emmons to the west of it. In either case, Baldwin had poor angles on most of the emplacements within its assigned targets, T43, T47 and T50. T43 was in WN61 (with the 88mm gun) while T47 and T50 were the same targets in WN62 that Emmons also targeted. As was fairly standard, it was allotted 300 rounds for the period 0550 to 0625 hours.
Baldwin initially opened fire on T43 (WN61), which the Arkansas was also supposed to hit with 250 rounds (but did not). It ceased fire after expending 56 rounds. It then shifted fire to T47 (WN62), and though the target was partially obscured, enemy guns returned fire “sporadically.” Baldwin fired just 24 rounds before it ceased fire on T47. Next in line was T50 (Also in WN62) which came in for only 16 rounds. At this point T43 became active again, and Baldwin directed 12 rounds at it, supposedly ‘silencing’ the position. From 0619 to 0638 hours, Baldwin closed the beach ahead of the boat wave, as far in as 1830 yards off the beach, firing an additional 42 rounds before breaking away.
In total, Baldwin fired only 150 of its allotted 300 rounds during the pre-H-Hour bombardment. Despite that failure, it did two things well: it closed the beach to closely support the leading boat waves, something few other destroyers did during this phase; and it synchronized its firing with the actual progress of that boat wave rather than ceasing fire according to the schedule. Still, it failed to fire fully half its prescribed ammunition.
USS Harding, DD625
USS Harding, October 1943
Sources:
- Commanding Officer, USS Harding (DD625), Action Report, USS Harding, Operation Neptune covering period from sortie from Weymouth, England 5 June to 0800 9 June (Departure this ship from bombardment area for Plymouth , England for repairs, ammunition and fuel replacement), dtd 20 June 1944.
- Commanding Officer, USS Harding, Brief Chronological Narrative Report of Operations – Operation Neptune – From time of departure for assault to and including 17 June in accordance with NCXTF 181220B of June, dtd 21 June.
Position: No bearing given, but gave a range of about 3,000 yards from target T41 (coordinates 69558930). [Harding’s report also placed Emmons west of Baldwin, reinforcing the possibility that one of them gave an incorrect position.]
Harding was tasked with a single target, T41, which was on the beach in the eastern end of WN61, and therefore could cover both the D-3 and F-1 exits. As with other ships of the eastern group, Harding took part in the response to the shelling by the enemy batteries near Port-en-Bessin, while experiencing several near misses.
Harding opened fire at 0547 hours on three pillboxes in the vicinity of T41, which it soon claimed it had destroyed. It then continued to fire on “the area around the pillboxes including the draw to Colleville.” Either Harding has mistaken the F-1 draw for the D-3 draw, or it had begun to fire 4-500 yards west of its target. At any rate, it had fired 100 rounds in 18 minutes. There is some difference between the ship’s two reports as the why it ceased fire, but it did so at about 0605 hours, either because all the positions were destroyed, or because smoke covered the area. It then shifted fire to target T33, which was Melbreak’s primary target. After 20 rounds fired in 5 minutes, Harding declared this target destroyed as well. At 0610 hours it shifted fire to a fortified house in a draw west of Port-en-Bessin, which it declared destroyed after 40 rounds and five minutes. At 0615 hours, having closed to about 1,700 yards from the beach, it shifted fire to a field gun it had spotted on the beach, and fired six salvos (24 rounds) to cover the area. Harding claimed it scattered the crew and forced the gun to withdraw, but doubted it was destroyed. Needless to say, no gun covering the beach was in a position that permitted it to withdraw.
“At about this time a series of underwater explosions occurred along the beach and somewhat to the northward of our position, extending out into the water for almost 1000 yards. This appeared to have been shore controlled mines. Several minutes later the rocket craft opened up.” That initial set of explosions were either ranging shots from the nearest LCT(R) or the German’s defensive rockets firing from near St. Laurent, as there were no command detonated sea mine fields.
Harding then shifted fire to a gun emplacement on the breakwater at Port-en-Bessin, though its two reports differ as to the time this happened (0625 vs 0652 hours). It believed it destroyed the position after firing 30 rounds. The ship ceased fire at 0656 hours, when it said the troops landed. The leading waves of the 3rd Battalion, 16th Regimental Combat Team did land about a half hour late, and far to the east, which would be consistent with Harding’s observations.
In its report, Harding figured as a hard-hitting, fast- and accurate-shooting, and quick-reacting ship, rapidly laying waste to a good section of the enemy defenses. Yet the resistance encountered when the troops landed indicates the ship’s damage claims were overstated, to say the least. Harding was clearly operating in a manner inconsistent with its orders. Its mission was to drench one single target with 300 rounds to neutralize it, synchronized with the landing of the leading wave. Instead, it engaged in a series of small scale sniping escapades with doubtful effects, all but one of which had nothing to do with its objective of neutralizing beach defenses. It fired only 100 of its allotted rounds at its assigned target area and ceased fire there at least 25 minutes before H-Hour. Harding totally failed in its beach neutralization mission.
USS Doyle, DD494
USS Doyle, January 1943
Source: Commanding Officer, USS Doyle (DD494), Action Report for Period 6-8 June, 1944, Allied Invasion of the French Coast, undated.
Position: Not Stated.
As with several others, Doyle began the day by piling on the Port-en-Bessin batteries, briefly engaging one between 0545 and 0550 hours. Unlike the other ships, Doyle fired on a battery west of Port-en-Bessin. It then shifted its fire to its assigned target, T40 (WN60) at 0550 hours and ”fired intermittently with half salvos until 0625.” Its gun line was fouled twice by other destroyers and had the typical problem with dust and smoke. The Doyle’s narrative report did not specify how many rounds it fired for this mission, but it included an overlay that showed its fire missions and rounds expended for each mission. It listed 167 rounds fired for T40—out of an allotted 300 rounds—between 0550 and 0625 hours.
Obviously, a bombardment of half salvos (two rounds) fired intermittently has no resemblance to a neutralizing barrage fried rapidly and continuously, timed to coincide with the landing of the first wave.
Interestingly, Doyle fired 562 AA projectiles and only 156 Common projectiles through D+1, indicating the assumed shortage of AA projectiles my not have been a fleet-wide issue.
HMS Melbreak, L73
HMS Melbreak
Source: Commanding Officer, HMS Melbreak (L73), [No title or subject], dtd 15 June 1944.
Position: Not stated.
Unfortunately, Melbreak’s report was extremely brief and contained absolutely no details on its bombardment mission. It was scheduled to shell target T33 (WN59 near Sainte-Honorine-des-Pertes) and was allotted 300 rounds for the task. This was one of the targets that served neither the counterbattery mission nor beach neutralization mission. As with the other Hunt class escort destroyers, it did not provide a detailed report of actual expenditure of ammunition. It merely stated it left the area that evening with only 30% of its ammunition remaining. The large majority of this would have been fired at one of Melbreak’s eight post-H-Hour assigned targets in and around Port-en-Bessin, which it was to shell from H+80 to H+240.
USS Augusta, CA31
USS Augusta, August 1945
Source: USS Augusta (CL31), War Diary for the Month of June 1944, dtd 5 July 1944.
Position: Bearing 228°T to Pointe du Hoc at 8 miles range.
Although not included in any of the bombardment plans, the Augusta’s War Diary did include mention of firing one mission during the pre-H-Hour bombardment, and one more after H-Hour. The ship anchored in Fire Support Area 3 at 0617 hours and fired on an unspecified target between 0618 and 0623 hours. It expended just 21 rounds.
By 0805 hours, the ship had withdrawn and anchored in the Transport Area.
FOOTNOTES:
[1]TexasAction report, pg. 7
[2] CTF 124 AAR, pg 102.
[3] Chazette, Alain, et al, Atlantikwall, Omaha Beach, Editions Histoire et Fortifications, Vertou, Fance, 2014, pg 91.
[4] Hall’s CTF-124 order, Bryant’s CTG-124.9 order, or CAPT Sander’s COMDESRON 18 order No. 7-44.
[5]Carmick’s log stated they thought it was Thompson assisting them, but it more likely the McCook when it was firing on its target of opportunity.
[6]Arkansas, Emmons, Baldwin Harding and Doyle. Harding’s target, T41, was on the east side of WN61. Doyle’s target was WN60, and while that directly overlooked the F1 draw, its 75mm guns also dominated the D-3 exit.